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Abstract 
by Joshua Leo Sofaer 
Taking as its starting point the definition of autobiography proposed by Philippe Lejeune in 
his essay 'The Autobiographical Contract', this study uses performance-based research to 
instigate a number of theoretical propositions which aim to test the boundaries of what is 
understood as autobiography. While the area under investigation is tightly focussed on the 
margins of autobiographical practices, examples and case studies range across literature 
(including J. M. Barrie, Marcel Proust and W. G. Sebald), performance practice (including 
Marina Abramovic, Tim Etchells and Zhu Yu), popular culture (including Blind Date, 
Michael Jackson and Marilyn Monroe) and philosophy (including Giorgio Agamben, Gilles 
Deleuze and Jacques Derrida). 
The main· body of the study is divided into three chapters, each of which deals with a 
separate instance of resistance to Lejeune's definition. Chapter 1: Disinter/est: Digging 
Up Our Childhood uses an archaeological methodology to determine a model for an 
autobiography of infancy. Chapter 2: Namesake investigates how personal proper names 
signify beyond their referent. Chapter 3: The Crystal Ball explores the potential for an 
autobiography of the future. In each case the conventions of the rules outlined in 'The 
Autobiographical Contract' are challenged. 
The thesis does not aim to redefine autobiography in terms of a new (or better) set of 
rules but rather exploits the ontological slippage which is inherent in the autobiographical 
subject. Lejeune's definition is used (as he himself suggests in his essay) as a subject for 
study in itself: as a departure point. 
This thesis proposes that 'the contracf which Lejeune defines is in many instances 'the 
performance' of autobiography- the autobiographical performance- the way in which 
'self' is produced in the performance of writing a life; that autobiography is manifest 
through an enactment rather than bound by an agreement. lt is a cultural performance. 
The autobiographical performance asks us to engage, as writers and readers, as creators 
and interpreters, with the open-endedness which is at the heart of the meaning of 
performance itself: as process. 
Performance is also that which gives rise to the methodology, structure and case studies 
in the thesis. Each of the three chapters take their name and their point of inception from a 
performance project. While performance practice is not the dominant subject under 
investigation, it is, more fundamentally, the way into each of the chapters of this study. lt is 
performance which provides the framework and leads to the selected case studies. 
Performance is thus an epistemology in and of itself but also acts as the precursor to 
other kinds of knowledge. The autobiographical performance, which is the performance of 
the autobiographical act, is therefore proposed as one example of the way in which 
performance operates (not simply as cultural performance for an audience of spectators, 
but including and often more importantly, organisational performance, technological 
performance and linguistic performance). 
Writing about the autobiographical subject necessarily includes the writing self. lt is the 
investigation of my childhood, my name and my future, which leads to a wider discourse 
on the relationship of the writing self to these particular areas of research. In this way the 
writing always returns to the process of writing itself, to the writer's 'stake'. lt is these 
narratives which give rise to a multiplicity of texts, sources which range from literary 
classics to contemporary cultural phenomena. 
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_I: 
'-
AnYthing is an autobiography but this was~ conversation • 
. Gertrude Stein', Everybody's Autobiography 
lr:~troduction: The Title Explained 
Autobiography is not a guessing game. 
Philippe Lejeune 1 
... the more the genre gets written about, the less 
agreement there seems to be on what it properly includes. 
William Spengeman2 
We cannot tolerate the ambiguity of human existence, 
and we thus provide ourselves with icons of experience and reality. 
Mary Evans3 
What is the contract that has been broken? 
The contract which has, according to the title of this study, been broken, is the contract 
proposed by Philippe Lejeune in his essay 'The Autobiographical Contract', published in 
English translation in 19824• 
In this essay, which offers an ontology of autobiography, Lejeune defines the genre as 
follows: 
... a retrospective prose narrative produced by a real person concerning 
his own existence, focussing on his individual life, in particular on the 
development of his personality.5 
Lejeune goes on to break down this definition into four different conditions: 
1. Linguistic form: (a) narrative; (b) prose 
1 Philippe Lejeune 'The Autobiographical Contract' in French Literary Theory Today ed. by Tzvetan 
Todorov, trans. by R. Carter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p.202. Excerpted 
from the French original Le pacte autobiographique by Philippe Lejeune (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 
1975). 
2 William Spengeman, The Forms of Autobiography: Episodes in the History of a Literary Genre 
~London: Yale University Press, 1980) p.xi 
Mary Evans, Missing Persons: The impossibility of auto/biography (London: Routledge, 1999) 
p.143 
4 The French original, which Lejeune first had published in 1975, refers not to a contract- un 
conrat- but rather to a pact- un pacte- and is excerpted from a book of the same name: Le 
pacte autobiographique. The entire book remains unpublished in English. lt is divided into three 
sections: 1. Le pacte ('Le pacte autobiographique', which is the section translated), 2. Lecture 
(essays on Rousseau, Gide, Sartre and Leiris), and 3. Histoire ('Autobiographie et histoire 
litteraire'). While both in English and in French the contract/contrat and the pact/pacte are forms of 
agreement, the contract/contrat has the added expectation of a covenant with legal effects. In other 
words it could be argued that the force and emphasis of the English 'contract' overburdens the 
intention of the French 'pacte'. lt must be admitted then (from the start) that the title of this study is 
based on a rather infelicitous translation from French into English. But while it would be possible to 
argue that one can not break a contract that has not been signed, whether or not Lejeune invokes 
a friendly pact or a full-scale legal contract, his definition of autobiography remains consistent. lt is 
that definition which produces the resistance in this study. 
5 Lejeune p.193 
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2. Subject treated: individual life, personal history 
3. Situation of the author: author (whose name designates a real 
person) and narrator are identical. 
4. Position of the narrator: (a) narrator and protagonist are identical; 
(b) narration is retrospectively oriented.6 
According to Lejeune, two of these conditions are a matter of "all or nothing", which 
means that they must be fulfilled in order for the writing in question to be considered 
autobiography. They are conditions (3) and ( 4a), in other words that the author and the 
narrator are identical and that the narrator and the protagonist are identicaf. 
This gives rise to what Lejeune proposes as the autobiographical contract: 
The autobiographical contract is the affirmation in the text of this identity 
[of the author, narrator and prota~onist], referring in the last resort to the 
name of the author on the cover. 
Lejeune is insistent that the name on the cover of the text should also refer to the narrator 
and protagonist of the content (which, note, implies there will be a name, a cover and a 
lt is the conventions of these rules and their contractual obligation that this study wishes to 
explore, with reference to three specific areas: infancy, the personal proper name, and the 
future. 
If, as according to Lejeune's general definition, an autobiography is an account of the 
creator's "own existence", which focuses on their "individual life" and "in particular on the 
development" of their personality, what might an autobiography of early childhood be? If 
infancy precedes the establishment of the prefrontal lobe and our access to long-term 
memory, how do we account for the development of our personality at this fundamental 
6 1bid. 
7 Straight away we can identify examples to the contrary. The Autobiography of A/ice B Toklas by 
Gertrude Stein contravenes both of these conditions. 
8 Lejeune p.202 
9 For a detailed account of paratextual matters, see Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation by 
Gerard Genette, trans. by Jane E. Lewin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 ). 
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stage? Chapter 1: Disinter/est: Digging Up Our Childhood explores the possibility of an 
autobiography of infancy. 
If, as according to Lejeune's contract, the name is the crucial operator in the manufacture 
of an autobiography, the "last resort" of its ontology, what does that name contribute, how 
does it signify, and what happens if it is not present? Chapter 2: Namesake explores the 
affects of the personal proper name in relation to the writing self. 
If, as according to Lejeune's conditions, the narration of an autobiography must be 
"retrospectively oriented" then what might an autobiography of the future be? Lejeune 
does allow some flexibility in his general conditions, for genres he describes as "close to 
autobiography" (and thus implied as not, or separate from, autobiography). The 
exceptions are listed as follows, with the rule they contravene in brackets: 
... memoirs: (2); biography: (4a); first person novel: (3); autobiographical 
poem: (1b); diary: (4b); self-portrait or essay: (1a and 4b). 
So diary writing and the self-portrait or essay are given as examples of almost-but-not-
quite autobiography that contravene the 4b rule. They are forms of writing in which the 
author narrator may describe not just the past -what has happened to them - but also the 
present- what is happening to them, what they feel, what they want. Lejeune highlights 
these exceptions to the "retrospectively oriented" 4b rule because they exist as genres at 
the margins of autobiography. But even these examples, which allow for a present tense 
as well as a past tense, exclude, or at least neglect, the possibility of a future tense. 
Chapter 3: The Crystal Ball explores the potential for an autobiography of the future. 
What is autobiography? 
Of all the genres of literature, autobiography has to be the most contested. In the history 
of literary criticism it is a relatively new study and while it has been recuperated, it is rarely 
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given an elevated status in the literary hierarchy. Often it is interpreted (and created) with 
an associated discipline, lumped in with therapeutic, psychoanalytic, social 
anthropological, or historical perspectives. lt is accorded a status where its merit is· 
frequently non-artistic. 
The problem of defining autobiography remains as unsettled today as it was in the first 
critical analyses of the genre, which can be traced back to Georges Gusdorf's article 
'Conditions and Limits of Autobiography' first published in French in 195610, Ray Pascal's 
book Design and Truth in Autobiography of 1960, Philippe Lejeune's 1971 publication 
L 'autobiographie en France which was adapted to become Le pacte autobiographique 
four years later, and Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation of a Literary Genre 
by Elizabeth Bruss published in 1976. The emergence of autobiography as a topic for 
literary studies has been traced by James Olney in his edited volume of 1980 
Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical and particularly in his own essay as part of 
the volume 'Autobiography and the Cultural Moment: A Thematic, Historical, and 
Bibliographical lntroduction' 11 . As Olney demonstrates, part of the problem of establishing 
a series of rules by which we can identify the genre of autobiography, is that the writers of 
autobiographies have no rule systems in which to work: 
... there are no rules or formal requirements binding the prospective 
autobiographer - no restraints, no necessary models, no obligatory 
observances gradually shaped out of a long developing tradition and 
imposed by that tradition on the individual talent who would translate a 
life into writing.12 
This lack of rules or requirements for autobiographers has not stopped critics 
retrospectively defining the genre through rule systems. Lejeune is not the only one to do 
10 Georges Gusdorf, 'Conditions and Limits of Autobiography' trans. by James Olney in 
Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical ed. by James Olney (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980) 28-48. Originally published in French as 'Conditions et limites de 
l'autobiographie' in 1956 
11 For a very comprehensive bibliography of early critical studies of autobiography see 'The Study 
of Autobiography: A Bibliographical Essay' in Spengeman. This seventy-five page bibliography is 
not exhaustive but certainly gives all key texts associated with the genre up until the essay's 
r:ublication in 1980. 
2 James Olney, 'Autobiography and the Cultural Moment: A Thematic, Historical, and 
Bibliographical Introduction' in Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical ed. by James Olney 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) p.3 
20 
this. Though not as precise in her boundaries as Lejeune, Elizabeth Bruss sets out a 
system of three rules with various clauses and sub-clauses, which similarly to her French 
colleague, argue for the consistent identity between the author, narrator and protagonist 
("source and subject matter'') and for the "truth-value" in the text, both in terms of its 
creation by the author and its reception by the reader13. But even Bruss needs to admit 
(although she does so in parenthesis) that: 
The rules of autobiography are after all such that we can read any text 
symptomatically, and even delight in our ability to see what an author 
busily engaged in his task cannot. 14 
In other words, whether or not a writer sets out to write an autobiography, whatever it is 
that makes that writing autobiographical, it is betrayed by the relationship between the 
author and their text. 
The problem of forming a definition of autobiography is that it always seems possible to 
find exar(lples which do not correspond to the definition but that we nevertheless read as 
autobiographical, or conversely which do correspond to the larger part of the definition but 
fit more happily into another genre. On the one hand theorists claim that autobiography is 
impossible ('The search for the 'real' person is doomed to disappointment, for the two very 
good reasons that no 'real' person actually exists, and cannot be contained, let alone 
represented, in print'15) and on the other that everything is autobiography, insomuch as it 
issues from the life of its creator, not least because the writing itself creates the life16. In 
other words, as Gusdorf wrote in his seminal article, 'it is itself a meaning in the life'17• 
13 See Elizabeth W. Bruss, Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation of a Literary Genre 
London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976) pp.8, 10-11 
14 Ibid. p.20 
15 Evans p.138. As early as 1960 Ray Pascal wrote: 'I do not think one can evade the conclusion 
that the supreme task of autobiography is not fulfilled in modern autobiography.' Ray Pascal, 
Design and Truth in Autobiography (London: Grand Publishing, Inc., 1960) p.12 
16 This is not just the case for writing. As Barry Schwabsky observes: 'Whereas a Modernist like 
Barnett Newman could claim, "We are making [our work) out of ourselves," today's painters might 
with more justice say, "We make ourselves out of our work".' Barry Schwabsky, Vitamin P (London: 
Phaidon Press, 2002) p.7 
17 Gusdorf in Olney p.43 
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lt is not the purpose of this study to support or deny the relevance or accuracy of any of 
these understandings of what autobiography is, nor even to interrogate them in any detail. 
Part of the efficacy of working with the autobiographical subject is precisely the ontological 
slippage which defines it. The reductive 'fixing' of that subject is the last ambition of a 
project which hopes to explore its potential. Rather the centre is used to explore the 
boundaries and limits; Lejeune's definition is used as a point from which to shoot an arrow 
to see where it might land. 
Perhaps the most useful definition of autobiography for the purposes of this study is that 
from the root- self (autos), life (bios), writing (graphe)- although there are times when 
the other writes rather than the self, times when it is death that is the subject rather than 
life, and times when the text is an image rather than writing 18. 
This study explores (and perhaps to a degree presumes) the autobiographical 
performance rather than the autobiographical contract; that autobiography is manifest 
through an enactment rather than bound by an agreement. 
What is performance? 
As Jon McKenzie convincingly argues in his general theory of performance Perform or 
Else, performance is to contemporary society what discipline was to that of the nineteenth 
century. From the global ramifications of party and nation politics to the esoteric world of 
live art, from the tragic spectacular of international terrorism to the undergraduate drama 
student, from the stock-market to soap-opera, from high performance drugs to 
performance studies - 'performance' is the modus operandi of contemporary culture. lt 
seems now that there is only performance. 
18 The use of the word 'text' in this context is thus intended to stretch beyond the written document 
to encompass other forms of creation and include for example, film, theatre, television and the 
visual arts. See Roland Barthes, 'From Work to Text' in Image Music Text by Roland Barthes 
(London: Fontana Press, 1977). 
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McKenzie identifies three major paradigms of performance in his study19: 
Performance Management: the organisational performance of economic power evaluated 
in terms of profit and loss. 
Performance Studies: the cultural performance of tradition and transformation embodied 
in the living moment. 
Techno-Performance: the technological performance of the stuff that surrounds us from 
air fresheners to eyeliners, but with a specific focus on computer technologies. 
The autobiographical performance necessarily meets all three of these performance 
paradigms. 
Autobiography's organisational performance is marked by its commercial popularity. Sales 
of autobiography titles are at their highest recorded levels. In 2002 in the UK alone, a 
revenue of £54,134,320 was earned from sales of 5,670,959 units. Sales of autobiography 
titles represent 5% of the market sales and 3.9% of its volume, making it the fifth most 
valuable book category after fiction, children's literature, mind-body-spirit, and travel20. 
Autobiography's cultural performance lies in its recording of embodied moments of a life 
but also more specifically, as this study aims to attest, autobiography as cultural 
performance. In other words the creation and reception of autobiography as a form of 
performed cultural production. This has particular focus in this study where the impetus for 
the areas of investigation is performance practice itself. As is described below, it is 
performance research which activates the discussion of what the autobiographical 
19 He identifies others, referring in passing to, for example, linguistic and philosophical 
~erformances. He necessarily draws on these other paradigms in his general discussion. 
See Jeremy Neate and Sarah Percival eds, Book Sales Yearbook: The Year in Detail (London: 
Bookseller Publications I Nielsen BookScan, 2003) 
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performance might be. lt is thus that the cultural performance is both form and content; 
both methodology and subject. 
Autobiography's technological performance is exemplified by its many modes of 
production, including on line blogs21 , performance practices, the printed page, visual arts, 
body adornment, the domestic environment, plastic surgery, to highlight but a few. These 
are all modes of production which are reliant on effective technological performances. 
Alongside these three paradigms additional mention must be made of the linguistic 
performance, exemplified by J. L. Austin's work on the performative utterance. Here the 
written or spoken word constitutes an action - a performance - rather than simply 
describing it. In the complex relationship between lived experience and the 
autobiographical text, the word as action plays central stage in the investigations of this 
study. 
What is the function of the key terms? 
Even within the discipline of Performance Studies (let alone across the disciplines of 
Cultural Studies, Philosophy and Linguistics) there is a diversity in the semantic 
application of the key vocabulary: performance, performative and performativity. A brief 
look at the usage in three contemporaneous texts exemplifies this diversity. 
In The Radical In Performance: Between Brecht and Baudri/lard, Baz Kershaw identifies 
'performance' as something that is opposed to theatre - something that does not come 
with the teleological restrictions of that tradition - something outside the black box but that 
is nevertheless a genre of cultural production. 
21 A 'blog' is a we!;! [Qg, that is an on line diary or journal. 
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The 'performative' for Kershaw is something that is of, or pertains to, performance. lt is 
employed as an adjective to invest the noun with qualities that we would associate with 
the putting on of certain kinds of performance trope. An example: 
So modern democracies[ ... ] may be described with some accuracy as 
performative democracies in order to indicate how fully they rely upon 
various types of performance for the maintenance of their political 
processes and social structures.22 
In Performing the Body I Performing the Text however, the editors Amelia Jones and 
Andrew Stephenson, identify the 'performative' as a noun itself. lt marks a methodology 
which need not necessarily be connected with performance at all. 
The notion of the performative highlights the open-endedness of 
interpretation, which must thus be understood as a process rather than 
an act with a final goal, and acknowledges the ways in which the circuits 
of desire and pleasure are at play in the complex web of relations among 
artists, patrons, collectors, and both specialized and non-specialized 
viewers.23 
The 'performative' in this context is not then about the theatrical notion of putting 
something on -of choice- but rather a process of reading and understanding. lt is a 
gestura! and interpretive schema that takes place in language, a schema that is an 
increasingly prevalent mode of study in the humanities and issues from J. L. Austin's work 
on the performative utterance. 
The 'performance' here is still the act- the 'deeds done'24 as Peggy Phelan has said, but 
this action is not limited or restricted by the boundaries of genre or cultural production -
certainly not (necessarily) theatrical in intention, and rather very possibly simply an every 
day gesture. 
22 Baz Kershaw, The Radical in Performance: Between Brecht and Baudrillard (London: Routledge, 
1999)p.13 
23 Amelia Jones and Andrew Stephenson eds, Performing the Body: Performing the Text (London: 
Routledge, 1999) p.1 
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'After Mourning Sex: Peggy Phelan in conversation with lrit Rogoff in Henry Rogers and David 
Burrows eds, Making a Scene (Birmingham: ARTicle Press, 2001) p.133 
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In Performing the Unnameable: An Anthology of Australian Performance Texts, the editors 
James Alien and Karen Pearlman use the term 'performance' in place of what might 
otherwise be termed experimental theatre. In their forward they write: 
We decided, with some regret, not to deal with performance art, 
performance poetry or sound art. Instead the book would focus on 
performance works most often presented in theatres and of a set 
duration.25 
This understanding of performance is not consistent with the others even from a formal 
understanding of genre, where the whole point of performance is that it takes place 
outside the theatre space. 
I do not argue for a right or wrong and especially not for a singular definition; rather this 
study embraces this semantic slippage which is symptomatic of the hybridisation of what 
have been historically understood as the separate disciplines of Theatre, Visual Art and 
Writing, which now come together in Performance Studies. Everything can be a 
'performance' -so performance acts as an umbrella term for a variety of cultural practices 
and ways of thinking. 
The 'performance' of the autobiographical performance then, necessarily engages all 
these potential meanings. But while the performance in question may be a staged event in 
a black box theatre space, it is more likely that it references the 'open-endedness of 
interpretation', 'as a process, rather than an act with a final goal', to re-quote Jones and 
Stephenson. 
The autobiographical performance asks us to engage, as writers and readers, as creators 
and interpreters, with this open-endedness, an open-endedness which is at the heart of 
the meaning of performance itself. 
25 James Alien and Karen Pearl man eds, Performing the Unnameable: An Anthology of Australian 
Performance Texts (Sydney: Currency Press, 1999) p.xiv 
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The relationship between performance practice and this text should also be introduced. 
Each chapter of this study has been conceived through, with or as a result of, a 
performance work. 
What is the relationship between writing and performance? 
Over the last decade much has been made of the 'coming together' - the 
interdependency- of theory and practice, especially in the institutions which teach and 
research art, design, performance and drama. This approach, which has struggled for a 
name, seems to issue from a false premise26 . At a cultural moment when everything from 
fashion to philosophy is founded on concept and idea it is surely a misnomer to separate 
out (in order to bring together) the 'theory' and 'practice' of the creation of art which is 
increasingly based in thought and argument. There is no practice without theory; there is 
no theory without practice. The position that practice without theory is 'craft' becomes 
redundant in light of the theoretical propositions posed by contemporary design practices 
(architecture, product, graphic, fashion etc.) which are now at the forefront of critical 
thinking. Of course it is as easy to find works that are 'empty' of theoretical content, as it 
is to talk up the same works in terms of their theoretical imperative. The quality of theory is 
not the point - rather it is its potential. 
Perhaps after all this is an argument of terminology. The reactionary art college or drama 
student who proclaims that they want nothing to do with theory would no doubt never-the-
less affirm an interest in principles of form, structure and aesthetics. 
Too often the written word has been a metonym for theory, while all other languages- of 
the body, of the brush, of the camera, of the stage- have delineated practice. As one 
slice of the academy calls for the bringing together of 'theory' and 'practice', another 
highlights the impossible boundaries of fiction and the ontological instability of writing. This 
26 Some of the offerings include: 'praxis', 'studio theory', 'contextual studies', 'practice based 
research' and 'performance research'. 
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is evidenced in the pragmatics of bookshop layout, where you might have to search 
through 'philosophy', 'cultural studies', 'biography', or 'fiction' sections before you find the 
title you are looking fof7• Writing is no longer considered as the sole proprietor of 
theoretical communication (if ever it was). Writing itself is identified as an arts practice. 
There is certainly a difference between rummaging through an archive before sitting at a 
computer terminal tippy-tappying away (is this supposed to be theory?) and rummaging 
through a record collection before jumping up and down in front of a mirror in a rehearsal 
space (is this supposed to be practice?). But there is also a difference between jumping 
up and down in a rehearsal space and marking a blank canvas with your paint brush. The 
(essential) differences of outcome need not mean that the creator's intention or the 
reader's experience of the text is marked by a concomitant differential. Surely, as with 
genetic difference within and between race, there is a greater percentage of variation 
within genre than between genre. This isn't to pour the whole of cultural output into one 
huge melting pot and cry 'it's all the same stuff' but the desire to bring theory and practice 
together, as if they were separate things that needed to be grafted in some kind of cultural 
miscegenation, denies the possibility that they were always already part of the same thing. 
The academy's emphasis of bringing together 'theory' and 'practice' (which in fact acts to 
separate the two out) is less about a forward thinking pedagogy and more about 
acknowledging its own difficulty in knowing how to deal with (evaluate, assess, archive 
and laud) work which does not comply with academic convention; which is not to dispute 
the necessary difficulties of a research project which aims to use writing and performance 
together for the same goals28 . 
27 This is the problem Roland Barthes identified in relation to Georges Bataille. See Roland 
Barthes, 'From Work to Text'. 
28 Projects which are making the case for 'performance research' include PARIP (Practice as 
Research in Performance) based at Bristol University and ResCen (Centre for Research into 
Creation in the Performing Arts) based at Middlesex University. Both projects identify the need to 
clarify the academy's position in assessing practice based research, specifically within the context 
of doctoral research. 
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Each of the three chapters which form the body of this study take their name and their 
point of inception from a performance projecf9. In each case the relationship between 
performance and writing is negotiated in a slightly different way. 
Disinter/est: Digging Up Our Childhood (which forms Chapter 1) was a performance-
lecture in Cambridge University's Mill Lane Lecture Rooms as part of National Science 
week and an installation at The Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology in Cambridge, 
both in March 2001. Disinter/est: Digging Up Our Childhood used an archaeological 
model to investigate the possibility of an autobiography of infancy. The content of the 
performance and the installation led directly to a series of theoretical propositions. While 
the outcomes of the performance elements were necessarily underpinned by theoretical 
imperatives and an 'academic' research process, the writing which forms the first chapter 
of this study was entirely contingent on the product of performance. The relationship was 
directly causal. 
Namesake: The Story of a Name (which forms Chapter 2) was a live performance with 
soundscape in collaboration with the composer Jonathan Cooper presented at The Jewish 
Museum, Home and The Swiss Church, all in London in May 2004. Namesake: The 
Story of a Name addressed the power of personal proper names to affect transformation 
and took as its seed a visit to my namesake, Joshua Sofaer. The development of the 
performance and the development of the critical writing happened alongside each other. 
The research for both performance and writing came from the same archives and 
methodologies. The resulting outcomes - performance and writing - find themselves 
reliant on each other; the writing quotes the performance and the performance quotes the 
writing. The relationship was symbiotic. 
The Crystal Ball (which forms Chapter 3) was a performance at the ICA in June 2002 
produced with the support of a commission via Arts Council England. The Crystal Ball 
29 See Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. 
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was an experimental theatre piece in which members of the audience had their futures 
predicted by a panel of experts. While the performance predictions led to a series of 
written investigations, these investigations were not concerned with the subject of the 
predictions themselves. In other words the performance proposed a series of possibilities 
from which individual strands were selected. The relationship was indirectly causal. 
In all three chapters the relationship between performance and writing is purposefully 
tentative, experimental and may at times seem arbitrary. The possible routes of 
investigation were often endless. I have to acknowledge, to quote Beckett: 'There are 
many ways in which the thing I am trying in vain to say may be tried in vain to be said. '30 
Writing about autobiography I am necessarily writing my own autobiography. This is 
exemplified not only by the fact that this project has been written into my life over the 
protracted period of its development but also by the use of autobiographical case 
studies31 • lt is the investigation of my childhood, my name and my future which leads to a 
wider discourse on the relationship of the writing self to these particular areas of research. 
In this way the writing always returns to the process of writing itself, to my 'stake'. I make 
no apology for the inclusion of my own narratives. lt is these narratives which give rise to 
a multiplicity of texts, sources which range from literary classics to contemporary cultural 
phenomena. 
The move from the autobiographical to the collective- the demobiographical (to offer a 
neologism)- maintains threads from this writing subject. The focus is therefore often on 
the social performance of body types gendered as 'boy' or 'man', sexualised as 'queer', 
brought into social space as 'Jew'. 
What are the sources employed in this study? 
30 Samuel Beckett, Three Dialogues with Georges Duthuif (London: John Calder Publishers, 1999) 
~.123 
1 A development not only of the project itself but also of my style, proficiency and understanding of 
what it is that is being made in this writing. 
30 
The variety of texts which are used to interrogate the areas under discussion are not 
limited to any single archive, genre or form. What they are not, or rarely, are 'books' which 
conform to Lejeune's classic definition, found in the 'Autobiography' section of a 
bookshop. They have been selected to answer the needs of the specific proposition in 
question and therefore include approaches which range across Autobiography, 
Performance Studies, Literary Criticism, Art History, Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, Cultural 
Studies, Media Studies, Linguistics and Archaeology. 
These discourses necessarily always already interrelate. Academic departments (and the 
writings which issue from them) which 'specialise' in any of these areas, offer 
investigation, comment and analysis on the others. 
The concern that such a general and non-specific methodological approach results in thin 
analysis is answered by the need to test the scope of the conceptual premise: that of the 
autobiographical performance. 
Most of the sources are western, late Twentieth Century or early Twenty-first Century. 
One major exception to this general rule and the only text which runs through all chapters 
of the study is Marcel Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu. Proust's novel is not a 
specific focus of the thesis but rather embodies its general themes. While Proust's book is 
not an autobiography per se (a proposition which is discussed at some length on several 
occasions in the course of this study) it is the account of an autobiographer. Proust's 
narrator is writing his life. Proust's narrative follows the life of a writer coming to the 
moment of writing. This apprenticeship is configured through themes which directly 
correspond to those of concern here. Firstly, the narrator's difficulty in accessing his own 
point of origin, the life he has led before the time he can remember- his infancy- is 
configured through the extended 'digression' from his own life to that of Charles Swann. 
Swann's narrative pre-figures that of the narrator, but also introduces it, for Swann's 
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narrative is both concurrent with, and a metonym for, the narrator's own birth and early 
childhood. Secondly, A la recherche du temps perdu is preoccupied with the potential and 
affect of the proper name. This is configured not only by the teasing which takes place in 
regard to the personal proper name of the narrator, which is and is never quite 'Marcel', 
but also in the way in which names, even down to the very titles of the separate books 
which form the entire work, activate discourses on meaning, subjectivity and being. 
Thirdly, while ostensibly A la recherche du temps perdu appears to be about the past -
temps perdu - its whole orientation is towards the future. This is the narrative of someone 
who ends at the point of beginning, whose life is spent looking forward not only to the 
future moment of writing but also towards posterity and what a future beyond life can 
bring. A la recherche du temps perdu is then, a recurrent and underlying source for this 
study. 
The three chapters loosely follow the narrative of an autobiography, from birth to death, 
from infancy to the future, each section containing seven sections, like the days of a 
week32. While they can be read independentlf3, cumulatively they hope to offer a 
perspective on some of the ways in which self is enacted, specifically (though not 
exclusively) through writing practices. 
What is the imperative of the autobiographical performance? 
When Philippe Lejeune writes that '[a)utobiography is not a guessing game' he asks us to 
understand autobiography as a genre which is formed by the boundaries of his definition. 
This study argues that while autobiography is not a guessing game, it can not be confined 
to those boundaries. lt may not be a guessing game but it can often necessitate detective 
work. 
32 The number 7 has been described as God's perfect number. The Old Testament is littered with 
allusions to the holy number seven. 
33 Some portions of the text have been published independently in draft form. See Appendix 3. 
32 
When William Spengeman writes that ' ... the more the genre gets written about, the less 
agreement there seems to be on what it properly includes,' he focuses on the academy's 
disagreement over the boundaries of autobiography. This study exploits that 
disagreement, not in order to push the boundaries further (in order to include more) but 
rather to test its limits and limitations. 
When Mary Evans writes that '[w)e cannot tolerate the ambiguity of human existence, 
and we thus provide ourselves with icons of experience and reality,' she highlights the 
general desire for an autobiographical subject which the reader can identify as being a 
'true' representation of that subject, but she simultaneously argues that no such truth ever 
exists. lt is between the perception of that truth and the text which promotes it, that this 
study, and the autobiographical performance, lies. 
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Chapter 1: Disinter/est: Digging Up Our Childhood 
Fig. 1: Aerial Evidence, October 20, 1971 Cambridge 
Disinter/est: Digging Up Our Childhood: Introduction 
Those years of my earliest childhood are no longer a 
part of myself; they are external to me; I can learn 
nothing of them save - as we learn things that 
happened before we were born -from the accounts 
given me by other people. 
Marcel Prousf" 
I was born on the 1st August1972 in Mill Road Maternity Hospital in Cambridge. My elder 
sister Joanna was about to have her second birthday. By September 1973 our family had 
left for Edinburgh. 
Supported by an Eastern Arts Year of the Artist grant, my sister, archaeologist Joanna 
Sofaer Derevenski, and I, went back to Cambridge in the summer of 2000 to explore the 
city, the places of our childhood, the places we were before we can remember, and used 
the practices of archaeology to see if it was possible to understand the forgotten past. The 
research found its initial outcomes in a performance lecture in Cambridge University's Mill 
Lane Lecture Rooms as part of National Science week and an installation at The Museum 
of Archaeology and Anthropology in Cambridge. Both revolved around a series of seven 
specifically engineered 'research tools', which did not work in a material sense but rather 
activated a conceptual figure, or series of thoughts, that had arisen from various pathways 
of the research process. 
The imperatives of our research, which came together for Disinter/est, related to our own 
areas of enquiry. For Joanna, whose academic interests are in the role of children within 
the archaeological record, the project was an heuristic device, used to test not only the 
boundaries of archaeological method but also to think through the implications of a 
contemporary archaeological exploration for a prehistoric one. For myself, the stake was 
in thinking through the possibilities of a developed methodological approach - in this case 
34 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time Vols 1-6 trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 1996) Vol.3 p.5 
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archaeology- as a way of expanding the possibilities of writing and as an alternative 
method for understanding the construction and deconstruction of subjectivity. 
Infancy escapes the conventions of the autobiographic task. lt is a mysterious era that is 
both of ourselves and of other and thus lends itself to a rethinking of the relationship 
between self and autobiography. Traditionally, autobiography necessitates an experiential 
narrative, one that is predicated on introspection: the recounting of incidents, the recalling 
of memories. In tracing the 'auto' of infancy we necessarily have to negotiate an 
understanding that runs counter to this established modus operandi. Archaeology was 
pertinent for this task not only because it engaged a 'family collaboration' but because it 
deals with material remains. My hope was to use materiality, rather than the well trodden 
path of psychic drives, to think through infancy. 
In her sociological study of the genres of auto/biography, Mary Evans observes and 
laments the refusal of many auto/biographers to deal with the importance of childhood: 
... childhood is given almost no discussion and, more significantly, 
allowed no influence on adult personality or behaviour. The refusal of 
childhood (and with it, of course, the implicit refusal of the most radical 
development in understanding in the twentieth century which is 
psychoanalysis) is so striking a feature of auto/biography that it should-
but seldom does - invite comment. Indeed, comment is scarcely 
sufficient to denote the misrepresentation that this facet of conventional 
auto/biography amounts to; it might be more appropriate to suggest that 
in this general refusal lies not just a problematic literary convention but a 
dominant cultural fault.35 
Evans' observation may well be accurate, but the writers of auto/biography face a unique 
difficulty in tracking infant life: who has access to the world inhabited by the infant? All 
potential answers seem fraught with difficulty. There is a perversity in the configuration of 
the years of infancy, at once identified as (the most) crucial time of development and yet 
at the same time outside the possibility of either mature cognitive articulated experience 
on the part of the child during the time of infancy, or of adult memory in hindsight. lt simply 
35 Mary Evans, Missing Persons: The impossibility of auto/biography (London: Routledge, 1999) 
p.135 
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is not the case to say that we can access our early childhood with the same kinds of 
hindsight formulation that we would our later childhood, adolescence or young adult life. 
The left inferior prefrontal lobe that is required for long term memory is undeveloped in 
infants, under the age of three. The elaborate encoding required for classifying and 
remembering complex events cannot occur in the infant's brain. The brains of infants and 
very young children are only capable of storing some fragmented memories. This isn't to 
propose that memories of later life are 'true' or 'factual' but rather to point out the 
structural difference in the understanding of our own infancy and of our adulthood. The 
prevalence of psychoanalysis in this regard is one of necessity, not of choice. 
Psychoanalysis identifies a gap in the market. 
Evans places emphasis on the psychoanalytic possibilities of auto/biography which are 
negated by the refusal of the discussion of childhood. But psychoanalysis positions the 
adult's infant life through a certain set of standardised negotiations, often predicated on 
loss. As Adam Phillips observes: 
... the child [has become] someone for whom something essential is 
missing, or lost, or destroyed; the unified image in the mirror, the 
potential wealth and solace of the mother, the father's entitlement, the 
parent's sexual relationship. 36 
The preoccupation psychoanalysis has with loss, on behalf of the child, is perhaps its way 
of coping with the loss of infant memory. One way or another, it has resulted in a generic 
conception of the 'autobiography' of early childhood in terms of psychoanalytic tropes. The 
prevalence of psychoanalysis for the understanding of childhood closes down, rather than 
expands, potential meaning. Indeed psychoanalysis is only one way to think through 
infancy. There are many accounts, especially in life-writing, where the issue of infancy- of 
remembering or not remembering - becomes the fundamental turning point for the 
configuration and understanding of self. In their respective autobiographically based works 
Yukio Mishima, Georges Perec and Marcel Proust acknowledge the problem of not having 
36 Adam Phillips, The Beast in the Nursery (London: Faber and Faber, 1998) p.20 
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possession of the knowledge of their own infancy:l7• This not knowing highlights the 
continually deferred sense of the 'self-identity' which is their pursuit. What they do then, is 
to acknowledge that impossibility and to find literary strategies which enable them to think 
through the possibilities infancy might yield. 
In his autobiography, Confessions of a Mask written when he was only twenty-five, Yukio 
Mishima opens with an account of how he believed that he could remember the moment 
of his own birth. 
For many years I claimed that I could remember things seen at the time 
of my own birth.38 
Mishima records how his elders were bemused by this youthful assertion and decide that 
it is a prank to get them to talk about his conception. Discussing sex is the last thing the 
boy would want to do with his family; rather he genuinely believes he has a memory of the 
gleam of light on' ... the brim of the basin in which I had received my first bath'. 
Mishima himself goes on to refute the potential accuracy of such a memory, not through 
any physiological data on infant cognition, but rather through a temporal assertion: 'The 
strongest disproof of this memory was the fact that I had been born, not in the daytime, 
but at nine in the evening: There could have been no streaming sunlight.' He continues by 
allowing himself to protest that the gleam of light could have been caused by an electric 
lamp. Whether or not Mishima maintains his childhood belief that he could remember his 
own birth is never explicitly resolved (although we are encouraged to presume he would 
no longer attest to the veracity of the memory) but Mishima uses this memory of a 
memory as a way of introducing the two main themes of his work: the development of his 
sexuality and the conflation in his mind of fantasy and reality. Confessions of a Mask is a 
37 lt should be noted, especially in the case of Marcel Proust that the problem of accessing the life 
of the infant self is not necessarily an autobiographical problem but rather an argument made by 
the narrator. The relationship between Proust and his narrator is explored in further detail in 
Section 4 of this chapter, and again in Chapter 2: Namesake, Section 6: Not In My Name: Author 
38 Yukio Mishima, Confessions of a Mask trans. by Meredith Weatherby (London: Panther, 1972) 
p.7 
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rite of passage, an account of how a young man came to identify himself; how he arrived 
at the moment of writing. Mishima prefigures the core concerns of his identity through the 
account of his birth. The 'stuff of his infancy allows for a literary conceit which hints at a 
developmental signification without stating it as empirically accurate. 
In W or The Memories of Childhood Georges Perec takes it for granted that people do not 
remember the early years of their life. 
I don't know where the break is in the threads that tie me to my 
childhood. Like everyone else, or almost everyone, I had a father and a 
mother, a potty, a cot, a rattle, and, later on, a bicycle which apparently I 
never mounted without screaming with terror at the mere thought that 
someone might try to raise or even remove the two small side-wheels 
which kept me stable. Like everyone else, I have forgotten everything 
about the earliest years of my existence.39 
Perec's text, which sits uncomfortably in either the fiction or biography sections of the 
bookshop40 intersperses the biographical accounts of his life - how and why he came to 
the moment of writing -with fictionalised accounts of the terrifying island state of 'W'. For 
Perec, whose parents are dead, fiction must fill the space of the oral account offered of an 
infant life. The fiction offsets the life-narrative by showing that an invented account can do 
just as much as a remembered one in telling us how a subjectivity was formulated. Indeed 
Perec makes this explicit within the life-narrative account as well. 
My two earliest memories are not entirely implausible, even though, 
obviously, the many variations and imaginary details I have added in 
telling of them - in speech or in writing - have altered them greatly, if not 
completely distorted them.41 
Perec seems to acknowledge that what matters is not so much the facts as the falsehoods 
people believe. Similarly, this writing - Disinter/est- is not about some kind of ontological 
search to dig up the autobiography of our early childhood, or even the impossibility of it, 
but rather a methodological process of experimentation; to see what happens when 
39 George Perec, W or The Memory of Childhood trans. by David Bellos (London: The Harvill 
Press, 1996) p.12 
40 lt was, incidentally, in biography. 
41 Perec p.13 
39 
archaeology meets contemporary infancy. lt is about writing a history, not about 
unearthing it. 
As indicated by the quotation which introduces this chapter, the narrator of A la recherche 
du temps perdu remembers nothing of his early childhood, save what he is told by others. 
Access to early childhood is conflated with the time prior to birth - one learns about 
infancy 'as we learned things that happened before we were born'. For Proust's narrator, 
coming into long term memory is given the equivalence of birth itself. The impasse in 
accessing the early years results in an intriguing literary device. The first two parts of the 
giant work - 'Combray' and 'Swann in Love' - describe events before the narrator was 
born, of the life of Charles Swann. The trials of Swann not only prefigure and anticipate 
those of the narrator but they stand in for a personal account of the-self-as-infant. The 
stated aim is to give an impression as to the world in which the narrator was born. To find 
self through another . 
. . . I pass from the Swann whom I knew later and more intimately to this 
early Swann - this early Swann in whom I can distinguish the charming 
mistakes of my youth, and who in fact is less like his successor than he 
is like the other people I knew at the time, as though ones life were a 
picture gallery in which all the portraits of any one period had a marked 
family likeness, a similar tonality .... 42 
Swann is a metonym for the narrator's early childhood. He becomes it. He is the answer 
to the search for lost time. But the impossibility of the narrator (rather than Proust) ever 
'really' knowing what Swann's thoughts and feelings were is a constant reminder of the 
fictional premise of A la recherche du temps perdu. No matter how much Proust and his 
narrator Marcel may overlap and collide, the seminal introduction of Swann, forces a 
continual realisation of the fictionalisation of the narrative. 
In the published collection of articles that were written for The Observer newspaper, 
Before I say Goodbye and which trace the stages of her dying from breast cancer, email 
42 Proust Vol.1 p.21 
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accounts between Ruth Picardie and her close friends have also been included. One of 
Picardie's understandable preoccupations is that her young twins, both two years old, will 
not remember her in later life. Carrie Turk writes to her: 
... 1 have done some reflection on the issue of J[oe] & L[ola]'s memories 
of you. I am not saying this to make you feel better. But I think they will 
remember you. Firstly, I remember before I was 2 - I have memories 
that nobody would ever have bothered suggesting to me because of 
their complete banality. Jude, believe it or not, remembers having her 
nappy changed! So it is possible to have memories from early life (and 
surely, that's what hypnotherapists rely on).43 
While there is some evidence for scattered and fragmented memories from infancy, this 
quite clearly is an attempt to make a desperate friend 'feel better', despite protestations to 
the contrary. As Picardie's husband writes in an attempt to defend himself to detractors 
who question the fact that he brought his children to see the dead body of their mother ... 
. . . the truth, in any case, is that Joe and Lola are almost certainly too 
young to retain any direct memory of the room in the hospice where 
Hilary and the hospice nurses had laid Ruth out.44 
Matt Seaton's defence of a parental decision simultaneously and accidentally confirms the 
certainty which denies the children direct experiential memory of their mother- dead or 
alive. Here the problem of infant memory becomes one of a desperate need for imprinting 
the knowledge of a mother in memory, a mother who will not be present except in 
memoriam as they grow. 
The bfief outline of these examples of how infant memory configures itself through these 
texts is intended to introduce ways in which the problem of self writing self, can, or can not 
account for the years of early childhood. In all the accounts (even in the Picardie) there is 
a necessary oscillation between fact and fantasy, between knowing and not knowing, 
between biography and fiction. Disinter/est takes on board this problem with a 
43 Carrie Turk. Email to Ruth Picardie in Before I Say Goodbye by Ruth Picardie (London: Penguin, 
1998) p.52 
44 Matt Seaton 'After Words' in Picardie p.115 
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methodological approach to the past which deals specifically with times outside or beyond 
memory: archaeology. 
Within the context of the printed page, the performance and the installation, that were the 
initial outcomes of Disinter/est, become a textual, graphic and photographic arrangement. 
Here the performance script has undergone a certain amount of editing - a 
recontextualisation involving the addition and re-examination of material. Inevitably some 
of the script has been edited out, and negotiations of performance and installation lost on 
these pages, but the process of reconfiguring and rethinking a performance as printed 
matter (rather than purely the recording of an event that has been) has opened up 
avenues of thought hitherto unconsidered. 
The process of editing became the next stage of the research process. To recap: a 
working methodological hypothesis (the auto of infancy explored archaeologically) led to 
fieldwork (being in Cambridge) which gave rise to a body of data (the 'archaeological' 
research) which was subsequently interpreted by arts practice (the performance and 
installation configured around the seven 'research tools'). Editing the performance script 
becomes the next attempt to make sense of the material under discussion, exploring 
potential meanings beyond the end results of a singular research process. lt is in this 
process of editing that further research had to be made and that further layers of meaning 
have been dug out. 
This gave rise to an exponential expansion of the text. What lies ahead then, is a short 
description of each research tool, its imperative and the archaeological model which was 
its inception. (The archaeological models are italicized. They are edited extracts of Joanna 
Sofaer Derevenski's writings from the performance text.) This is then followed by a more 
extensive note - a working through beyond the boundaries initially encompassed by the 
research. lt is here, in the 'notes'. that the possibilities of text allow for a methodology that 
is unworkable in a performance or an installation. 
42 
'Note 1' considers the possibilities for a model of productive failure; a space of 
methodological collapse and disappointment that yields pragmatic and conceptual 
opportunities because, rather than despite, its failure. 'Note 2' seeks an alternative to the 
conventional understanding of 'origin' by embracing the notion of an invented or fantasy 
genealogy as pin-pointed in a spacio-graphic representation of history. 'Note 3' questions 
the power dynamic in the parent-child relationship and offers consideration on how that 
relationship might be retroactively performed and documented. 'Note 4' posits the concept 
of a 'splintered biography' as a way of considering the impossibility of any totalising 
auto/biography. 'Note 5' questions the possibility of an ontological understanding of infant 
experience as configured through sight and memory. 'Note 6' situates the canon of 
psychoanalysis against the family anecdote and performance practice in an attempt to 
acknowledge the interrelating vectors which are at stake in infant and adult play. Finally, 
'Note 7' offers an example of how everyday action and interaction follows preset 
'performance' scripts. 
As with the following two chapters, while the focus is tight in terms of the source-point (in 
this case configured by the provocation: What is an autobiography of our early 
childhood?) the examples, possibilities and propositions are eclectic and wide-ranging. 
These disparate examples converge at a point which brings together the possibilities of 
the writing self. 
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Research Tool 1: The Soft Trowel 
Fig. 2: The Soft Trowel 
The Soft Trowel -a trowel that can not do its job - is a tribute to failure. The failure of 
archaeological methodology to disinter the Cambridge years. Of course it also references 
this specific area of interest- childhood - being as it is wipe-cleanable PVC in attractive 
bright colours with no sharp edges. 
The soft trowel also acts as a metaphor for the specific spaces that had to be dug for 
Disinter/est. Whereas archaeology traditionally digs in rubbish pits (what has been 
discarded or thrown away) here it was in the toy trunk (what has been kept safe and 
preserved) that the archaeological stratigraphy and detailed statistical evaluation took 
place. Here again, however, was a search marked by failure. The laborious process of 
analysing the toy chest and the resulting data did not speak of a past childhood life, but 
rather of an adult taxonomy of items worth retaining for the future. 
Figs. 3, 4 & 5: The Toy Trunk 
Archaeological Model 1 
The discipline of archaeology is closely identified with the trowel as the instrument or tool 
that yields up the secrets of the earth. lt epitomises excavation, the activity perhaps 
associated with archaeology above all others. The Soft Trowel acts as a metaphor for 
archaeology in terms of what archaeological interpretation is. This is not to imply that 
archaeology is in any way a blunt instrument- a 'soft option' - for students who study it at 
university. Rather, in contrast to physics or chemistry, the so called 'hard' sciences, 
archaeology with its interest in human behaviour, the regular and irregular, the cross-
cultural and the culturally variable and perhaps even esoteric, is closer to the 'soft' social 
sciences. In other words, the archaeological process is one of interpretation rather than 
explanation. 
Note 1 
During the research process, Disinter/est attempted to apply an archaeological 
methodology- as far as possible -to the three year period 1971-1973 that was spent in 
Cambridge. This approach was embarked upon in the knowledge that it would most 
probably collapse. The boundaries of archaeological method were indeed challenged, or 
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at least had to confront and engage with the disciplines of social anthropology, oral history 
and psychology. There was also a necessary negotiation of the pleasures and problems 
of working with family as both eo-researcher and research subject. An archaeological 
methodology is flexible to a degree, but no matter how receptive we might be to 
disciplinary slippage, eventually there came a time when what we were doing was no 
longer archaeology {in terms of its teleological application) or rather, that archaeology no 
longer served our purpose. 
lt was in the moments where archaeology failed - at the point of collapse - that a 
productive engagement in this destabilisation allowed for an expansion of potential 
meanings for the area under study. Failure was productive. An engagement with the 
productive potential of methodological collapse. 
What does it mean to succeed in failure? Is there a model for a forced or forgone failure 
which is nevertheless a procedure of productive engagement? 
In my search for a precedent- a way of understanding what this might be- I stumbled 
{there just doesn't seem to be a more appropriate word here) upon notions of productive 
failure which surround The Great Wall of China. The Great Wall of China is a series of 
physical remains around which oscillate various different discourses and methodologies 
including history, archaeology, legend, literature and tourism. lt is a massive intercultural 
material deposit over which there is considerable contestation. 1t attracts a plethora of 
interpretive schema which it nevertheless escapes. 
The short story The Great Wall of China by Franz Kafka was never meant to be published. 
lt was the failure of his executor Max Brod to carry out the instructions of the testament 
that has resulted in its publication. This failure, Waiter Benjamin argues, was always one 
' 
that was anticipated. 'Kafka presumably had to entrust his posthumous papers to 
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someone who would not want to do his will.'45 A forgone productive failure, contributing to 
the corpus of Kafka's work. 
This 'productive failure' which is external to the diegesis, mirrors that within it. The Great 
Wall of China is a series of parables, and parables within parables which deal with the 
failure of different methodologies- of military strategy, of geography, of national 
communication - but nevertheless paradoxically produce a desired effect. 
The narrator identifies himself as a builder of the wall. His account commences with a 
description of its 'piecemeal construction', a method which went against its aim. 
After all the wall was intended, as was universally proclaimed and 
known, to be a protection against the peoples of the north. But how can 
a wall protect if it is not a continuous structure?46 
This theme of 'inexpedient methods', continues on various levels of the narrative. In the 
case of the wall construction itself, the narrator is forced to come to the "strange 
conclusion" that "the command willed something inexpedient"; which is to say that they 
embarked purposefully on a project that they knew was bound for failure; that failure was 
courted and somehow seen as productive. lt is not until the end of the story that this 
failure is understood as "one of the greatest unifying influences among our people", that 
the perpetual threat from outside, which the wall was supposed to counter but the 
piecemeal construction exacerbates, with its gaps and geographical inconsistencies, 
neutralises alterity within the community. And yet even this productive failure is 
destabilised by the parable within the parable. There is the account of the Emperor's 
death bed message that can never be delivered because the messenger will be met by an 
endless journey "through the chambers of the innermost palace; never will he get to the 
end of them" let alone the city, let alone the country. There will always be another court, 
another stair, another palace. This fable within the fable ruptures the possibility of a 
45 Waiter Ben jam in, Illuminations ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 
1999) p.137 
46 Franz Kafka, Metamorphosis and Other Stories (London: Vintage Classics, 1999) p.67 
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unified community protected by the wall, by articulating internal strife. In this way Kafka's 
metaphor for productive failure itself fails, and it is through this kind of double failure that a 
literary resolution is attained. Benjamin observes this failure as the binding thread of 
Kafka's work. 
One is tempted to say: once he was certain of eventual failure, 
everything worked out for him en route as in a dream.47 
This ultimate failure within the diegesis now refers back to an external productive failure in 
its political and social intent. As Ewa Ponowska Ziarek has written: 
This failure not only destroys the possibility of grounding the exemplary 
meaning of the text in the common ways of speaking but also exposes 
the violence inherent in that kind of grounding. Thus, for Kafka as for 
Benjamin, it is the ghostly beauty of failure that disrupts the 
aestheticization of politics and enables a turn towards the politicization of 
aesthetics.48 
Another incarnation of the beauty of failure at The Great Wall of China can be found in the 
work by artists Marina Abramovic and Ulay, who walked from either end to meet each 
other in the middle. The walk, which commenced in March 1988, had been fraught with 
problems from the moment of its conception. lt took them over eight years and a massive 
amount of bureaucratic negotiation and compromise before they could embark on the 
piece, negotiations which proliferated during the walk itself. Restricted by the Chinese 
authorities from walking through certain areas of national security and others of 
dangerous terrain, Ulay identified the practical manifestation of the walk as failing its initial 
aim: "lt had been impossible to carry out the pure concept."49 Not only was there no 
consistent wall to walk, but they had hoped to walk alone, yet they were forced to be 
accompanied; they had hoped to camp on or beside the wall, yet they were forced to use 
hotels and guesthouses. 
47 Benjamin p.143 
48 Ewa Ponowska Ziarek, The Rhetoric of Failure: Deconstruction of Skepticism, Reinvention of 
Modernism (Aibany: State University of New York Press, 1995) p.150 
49 There are many accounts of this walk. All direct quotes are from the artists and are taken as 
reporte(i by Cynthia Carr in 'A Great Wall' in On Edge: Performance at the end of the Twentieth 
Century by Cynthia Car (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1993) unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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Greater still was the failure of the relationship between the two that had given rise to the 
piece in the first place. Initially called The Lovers the piece had been conceived of as "the 
apotheosis of romantic love" with the possibility that they might even get married at the 
end of the walk. But after years of a working collaboration and love relationship Marina 
and Ulay split less that a year before the walk was due to take place. This threw the 
conceptual basis of the project into disarray; the failure of the relationship seemed to 
signal the failure of the project. 
Before [there] was this strong emotional link, so walking towards each 
other has this impact. .. almost epic story of two lovers getting together 
after suffering. Then that fact went away. I was confronted with just bare 
Wall and me. I had to rearrange my motivation. Then I always remember 
this sentence of John Cage saying, when I throw the I Ching, the 
answers I like less are the answers [from which] I learn the most. 
I am glad we didn't cancel the piece because we needed a certain form 
of ending. Really this huge distance we walk towards each other where 
actually we do not meet happily, but we will just end - it's very human in 
a way. it's more dramatic than having this romantic story of lovers. 
Because in the end you are really alone, whatever you do. 
Abramovic's retroactive reconfiguring of the conceptual foundations of the piece is a 
model of productive failure. Embarking on the walk in the knowledge that the original aim 
has collapsed both in terms of its conceptual foundation (love) and its practical 
exemplification (the walk- the wall) nevertheless produces the condition to "learn the 
most", even if her understanding of the project resolves itself (if only for that moment) in a 
nihilistic aphorism "in the end you are really alone". 
Often Abramovic and Ulay's work has been about the anticipation of collapse - of failure -
where the body is pushed to a boundary from which it can continue no further. lt is in that 
space of collapse that a productive sense of corporal engagement is established. Whether 
or not she had read Kafka's story is unclear, but at one of the most stressful moments of 
the walk, when she has run out of water and is physically exhausted, Abramovic is 
reported to have said to a visiting journalist "Kafka is good literature here". This statement 
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acknowledges the beauty of failure and how that might become a productive force. The 
collapse of methodology, the failure of intent, opens up the possibility of meaning. 
Encountering The Great Wall of China on the terms of these literary and artistic 
productions leaves open the question of the wall itself. What is The Great Wall of China? 
Despite its ubiquitous fame as a wonder of the man-made world it is difficult to find a 
sustained investigation into its make-up beyond that of the encyclopaedia insert or the 
tourism brochure. An exception is Arthur Waldron's study The Great Wall of China: From 
History to Myth. Through extensive readings of first hand sources and by accessing the 
physical remains, Waldron has come to understand the Wall in terms of what he calls 
'historical myth'. The shock about The Great Wall of China is that there is no great wall at 
all, at least not in the way that it has been conceived and promulgated by both China and 
the West, 'as having a unified history and a single purpose'. 
The Great Wall of China, it turns out, is a fascinating vision, and one not 
surprisingly deeply imbedded in learned and popular imaginations, in 
both China and the west. Yet at the root of the commonly accepted idea 
of the Wall lie some fundamental misunderstandings. The reality is quite 
different from the vision, and the whole topic is in need of 
comprehensive revision.50 
[my emphasis] 
What Waldron identifies are the ways in which legend, literature, folklore, tourism, 
oriental ism, and Chinese national identity have in effect failed the 'truth' of the wall. The 
convergence of these diverse cultural discourses have conspired to create a vision of The 
Great Wall of China for their own propagandist purposes. Rather, the Wall is a series of 
walls that were built in different geographical areas in different eras, with differing strategic 
imperatives. 
Waldron has relied predominantly on extensive written documentation for his study but he 
acknowledges that this methodological approach will also ultimately collapse. 
50 Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990) p.4 
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But the written record has definite limits, and in the Chinese case the 
kinds of cartographic and archaeological work that have made it possible 
for students of comparable topics in the west to fill in its omissions and 
resolve its inconsistencies have not yet been carried out. 51 
The methodological approaches of cartography and archaeology that could provide a 
closer understanding of the Wall have not yet been applied. So for both the wall itself, 
'useless militarily even when it was first built' which 'symbolised the failure of Ch'in rule, 
the way the emperor had fai led' and the methodology employed to understand it, failure is 
encountered time and time again52• The Great Wall of China has proliferated diverse 
significations and meanings in historiographic, and contemporary discourses. In many 
cases these seem to evince meaning through an embodiment of productive failure. 
Fig. 6: The Soft Trowel in 
The Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, Cambridge 
The Soft Trowel, a pastiche of the digging instrument so caught up with archaeology, is 
useless as an implement for scraping back the soil. Like the objects of prehistory that the 
trowel unearths and are then made sacred, so too The Soft Trowel needs to be treated 
with care, handled with gloves, displayed in the controlled conditions of a glass vitrine. 
That which was merely the tool used to disinter riches from the earth becomes itself the 
object of the gaze. So too the archaeological methodology used to disinter the Cambridge 
years becomes itself a model under study - that of productive failure. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. p.195 
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Fig. 7: Archaeologist Joanna Sofaer Derevenski 
fails to dig with the Soft Trowel 
Fig. 8: A precedent for the interest in digging. 
Beatrice Sofaer inducts her daughter Joanna into 
the use of the spade c.1972 
Joanna's staged attempts to dig with The Soft Trowel perhaps evince her skepticism at 
the working possibilities of the task set. The sandcastle she builds under supervision aged 
twenty-two months seems to strangely forecast this problem; a castle built only to collapse 
under the weight of the incoming tide. Of course success and failure are always, and only 
ever, context specific- one person's success is still another's failure53. Maybe it is the fear 
of failure which produces the impetus to embark upon a project which is bound for failure 
- a construction which makes failure success -which can not fail , because from the 
outset failure is courted: strange paradox. And perhaps that is what productive failure is: 
an exemplar of paradox. In this context The Soft Trowel is a literary device which 
highlights the productive structural impossibility of the task set. 
53 Tim Etchells (Forced Entertainment) and Matthew Goulish (Goat Island) set up the Institute of 
Failure in 2002. Existing as a website and through occasional live presentations, the Institute of 
Failure is 'situated on the ungraspable border between deadpan irony and high seriousness' to 
document, study and theorise failure as it occurs in human endeavor. Has it been successful? 
Judge for yourself at http://www.insitute-of-failure.com/ (The pleasurable paradox of an Institute of 
Failure is that it surely can not fail ; its failure is its success.) 
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Research Tool 2: Aerial Evidence 
Fig. 9: Aerial Evidence 
Aerial Evidence is an aerial photograph that was taken on 20th October 1971 at about 
mid-day. The arrow indicates the house owned by the Sofaer family on the outskirts of 
Cambridge. As the photographer pressed the cable release, Joanna Sofaer, a 14 month 
old infant, was probably playing with her toys having just watched the 11 .00 screening of 
Playschool's pets day on BBC2. Who knows what happened later that evening, but 40 
weeks on, her younger brother Joshua was born. 
Archaeological Model 2 
Aerial photography is a particularly important aspect of archaeological prospection and 
recording. In contrast to a site drawing, it is a genre in which the material world is 
recorded as an instant. More specifically, it is the idea of an encapsulated moment, not 
simply in the sense of a moment frozen in time, but a moment of interpretation - of 
realizing that there is something of value to be recorded. This is a very similar notion to 
one with which many archaeologists are familiar, that of 'interpretation at the trowel's 
edge', the constant thinking about what one is digging when one is excavatinrf'. In other 
words, the constant need to make decisions about what to uncover and to record as part 
of a process where one cannot wind the clock back. In the case of the photograph, 
however, this notion of moment becomes even more acutely rendered. 
Note 2 
This photograph acts as a quasi record of my conception, which must have taken place, 
probably in this house, within a week of this photograph being taken. This image is then, 
the first in a bio-chronology (my bio-chronology) it marks an origin (my origin). 
The Cambridge University Aerial Photography unit took a photograph in 1971 with a 
particular agenda, probably to document the continued expansion of Addenbrooks 
hospital. Looking at it today somehow the yearning to discover my roots is momentarily 
54 See I. Hodder, The Archaeological Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) 
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answered. And this is not just about attempting to uncover the moment of my conception 
(what my father called the 'ultimate narcissism'). When I showed this photograph with its 
date to a friend of mine their face lit up. "Oh!" they proclaimed "the 20th October 1971. 
That was three days after I was born." There is a general desire to fix oneself in, and to, 
the past. 
The desire to unearth one's origin in the form of tracing ancestors has become 'one of 
today's fastest growing interests', spawning numerous research services and trans-global 
internet databases55. The Western obsession with the individual, their identity and 
personal history is also evidenced by the explosion in the genres of memoir and 
biography, from David Beckham's life in pictures My World, to the glut of 'fly-on-the-wall' 
and video diary television programmes. 
The language of identity employs many indices: race, ethnicity, disability, religion, 
sexuality, class, the list goes on. One of the fundamental indices is national allegiance, in 
which the demand of nationalist identity requires that we choose an affiliation at the 
expense of others. Even the language of the liberal West which tries to smooth over 
difference through the agenda of multiculturalism, finds itself provoking a spurious search 
for an 'authentic' personal history as a backlash to setting an agenda which effaces 
difference by claiming that we are all made similar by our otherness. Indeed while 
multiculturalism insists on reducing difference to sameness, it paradoxically recognizes 
the need for positive discrimination of the under represented, which implies that difference 
does exist after all. 
lt is no surprise then, that the only two questions the host of the television game show 
Blind Date, Cilia Black, asks the contestants, are "what is your name?" and "where do you 
come from?" as if the answers to these two questions were going to prove something; that 
the complex, multifarious layers that formulate our identities and make us a potentially 
55 Windsor Ancestry Research publicity brochure. 
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better or worse date are going to be condensed into the answers. And yet it will not do to 
remain either nameless or dislocated (that is without a location)56. People want to know. 
Just as someone appears a stranger until we know their name, so too, where they are 
from seems fundamental to their identity and therefore to our ability to communicate with 
them. 
The question 'where do you come from?' presupposes, or at least demands, a single, 
unique point of origin. Not only is this impossible for many individuals57 but in Amin 
Maalouf's terms, has resulted in much violent international and sectarian hatred: 
... those who cannot accept their own diversity may be among the most 
virulent of those prepared to kill for the sake of identity, attacking those 
who embody that part of themselves which they would like to see 
forgotten. 58 
People often ask me where I am from - or even worse say "What are you because you 
look Italian or Greek or something?" And I'll say "Do you mean where was I born?"- and 
thinking they're going to hear something that will compound the mental stereotype they 
have formed of me they say "Yeah" and I'll reply "Cambridge" in my smartest 
establishment accent. And then they say "No, but originally''. 
"Well" I say, "in the Bible there is an account of how when Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon 
invaded Jerusalem in the third year of the reign of King Jehoiakim, (we're talking about 
586 BCE here) after slaughtering a massive amount of the population, he brought the 
'king and his officers', which is to say the Royal household, back to Babylon. 
Nebuchadnezzar brought back all the treasures from the temple in Jerusalem with him 
and it seems that he flirted with Judaism for a while (although he ended his life mentally 
unbalanced thinking he was a wild animal). Anyway my forefathers were part of that Royal 
household. 
56 Namelessness is explored in Chapter 2: Namesake, Section 5: Nameless: No Name. 
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'What makes me myself rather than anyone else is the fact that I am poised between two 
countries, two or three languages and several cultural traditions.' Am in Maalouf, On Identity trans. 
~ Barbara Bray (London: The Hatvill Press, 2000) p.3 
Ibid. p.31 
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So then my ancestors stayed and prospered (give or take an exodus or two) in what 
became Persia and later a part of the Turkish Empire - Baghdad- now part of Iraq (as if 
you hadn't heard!), and when my great-grandfather was 10 years old in 1877, my great-
great-grandfather left Baghdad for Rangoon, the Capital of Burma as a kind of economic 
entrepreneur. Anyway that was where my grand-father was born - as a British Citizen 
because it was part of the Empire. When his father died my grand-father, a young 
teenager, left Burma with some of his relatives for Calcutta in India, to live with other 
relatives; and incidentally that is where he met my grandmother who was also his first 
cousin once removed. Her father was in fact born in Aleppo in Syria and I'm not entirely 
sure how he ended up in India. Anyway they came to the UK in the 1930's, and my Dad 
was born in London. 
That is on my father's si~e. 
My Mother's side is a bit more complicated, I don't know as much about it, and it does 
depend on who you ask, but her family came from Eastern Europe, well probably they 
went to EasteJn Europe some time in the fifteenth or sixteenth century from Germany 
where they settled in the second half of the first millennium sometime (it's difficult to be 
exact). Anyway, her paternal grandfather was born in 1880 in Gashmanka a town 
somewhere in Russia, but moved to Dankera in the province of Kurland near Riga, in 
Latvia. He decided to emigrate to the USA for a better life, so he got on a boat to New 
York. When it docked on the Irish coast en route on the 22nd October 1904 he thought he 
was already there, so he got off. Her maternal grandfather was born in Vilkomer, now 
renamed Ukmerge, north-west of Vilnius in Lithuania. He lied about his age (we don't 
know why) and travelled to Germany (we don't know why). Somehow he ended up in 
Belfast. My mother's father was born in Dublin and her mother was born in Belfast; she 
was born in Dublin and came to England when she was 17 to train as a nurse. I was born 
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in Cambridge, but we moved to Edinburgh when I was one year old, and that was where I 
went to school." 
And when I've finished this brief introduction a common response will be, "Oh, but you 
don't have a Scottish accent". 59 
The paternal part of this 'personal history' which starts in the Biblical exodus from 
Jerusalem to Babylon under the conquering army of Nebuchdnezzar is a story of princes 
and slaves. My father's father would half jokingly, half seriously, tell us that we were 
descended from Shadrach, Meshach and Abed-nego - the rather self-righteous noblemen 
exiled from Jerusalem, who were given provinces of the Babylonian Empire to rule by 
Nebuchdnezzar in recognition of their wisdom and valour. 
My grandfather is not alone in this assertion of a royal ancestry. There is a general claim 
of Iraqi Jews that they share this direct heritage. 
The Jews of Babylonia for centuries could boast of having in their midst 
the leading family of Israel which could trace its pedigree to King David. 
These descendents of the ancient kings of Judah were known by the 
name of Rashe Galuyyoth, that is, the Heads of the Exile or Exilarchs.60 
Recent examination of the historical and archaeological records indicate, however, that 
the Jews of late Ottoman Baghdad were a conglomerate of migrants fleeing persecution in 
Persia, Kurdistan and Syria. lt is also interesting to note that the Davidic family of ancient 
59 This section of text answering the question 'Where are you from?' was used in the introduction to 
the performance 'Namesake: The Story of a Name', the performance which gave rise to the 
research outlined in Chapter 2: Namesake. See also Appendix 1. This drawn out response to the 
question 'where are you from?' has got me into trouble. I was stunned when introduced to a 
lecturer from a different university department to be asked where I was from. Rather irritated by 
what I took to be a rather ridiculous question given the circumstances I launched into the above 
monologue only to realise half way through it that actually all he wanted to know was which course 
I was working on. 
60 David Solomon Sassoon, A History of the Jews of Baghdad (Letchworth: Acuin Press, 1949) 
p.16. Also of interest in terms of trying to promulgate the idea of an Exilarch ancestry is the 
magazine of Babylonian Jewry The Scribe which is archived on line at 
http://www.dangoor.com/scribe.html 
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Judea - the Exhilarchs - who it seems did hold prerogatives and power in the first 
millennium ACE, were replaced by a social structure based on wealth in the second. 
Symbols of status dovetailed with occupations and material standing. At 
the same time we hear little of kin ties, the major element of social 
organization in premodem societies. In contrast to the numerous 
indications of class differentiation in late Ottoman Baghdad, evidence 
that kinship was potent in public life is scarce.61 
The ancestry claimed by my grandfather would seem to stumble here on two accounts: 
the multi-cultural nature of Baghdadi Jews in the nineteenth century and the shift of power 
away from heritage and genealogy, to wealth. 
Whether or not he was descended from Biblical Kings (and here it is perhaps worth noting 
that for many Babylonian Jews the 'myth' is a solid part of a historical identity formation), 
my grandfather's assertion of blue blood (which after all was perhaps merely 'play') was 
less emphatically stated than his assertion of Englishness, and his belief that he was truly 
assimilated into British life. In the unpublished memoirs of his early childhood he states, 
for instance: 
I was born in Rangoon at the time when the sun never set on the British 
Empire. Queen Victoria had died but three years earlier. Britain's 
greatness shone with brilliant splendour, and the Pax Britannica spread 
over us like a benign umbrella. lt gave us comfort and stability, and it 
fostered the conviction that God was in his heaven, and all was right in 
the world.62 
In her analysis of Jewish identity in early twentieth century Burma, Ruth Fredman Cernea, 
who draws upon these memoirs, highlights the problematic of a displaced identity for 
diasporic Jews living under British occupation. 
The families carried British passports and therefore lived as though their 
future belonged to Europe, even though their past was Middle Eastern 
and their present Asian. [ ... ] Burma was never truly [their] home; [their] 
61 Sholomo Deshen and Waiter Zenner Jews among Muslims: Communities in the Precolonial 
Middle East (London: Macmillan, 1996) p.196 
62 Ellis Sofaer, Gaya: His Childhood (London: Unpublished Memoir, 1987) p.1 
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home existed within the international community of Burma and 
specifically within an England [they] had never visited.63 
My grandfather's idealised view of the British colonialists and their culture, is not only 
evidenced time and time again in his memoirs but also in my living memory of him. 
Describing the surrounds of his childhood home, he states: 
Opposite the house was the Gymkhana Club, where the worthy 
gentlemen who carried the burden of Empire went for relaxation and 
company.64 
What are effaced from such descriptions are the clearly documented instances of 
exclusion to the Jewish Englishmen-in-exile. Jews were not allowed entry to the 
Gymkhana Club my grandfather extols, they were denied equality in education, restricted 
from high ranks in British governmental institutions and prevented from the offer of 
commission in the army. As Cernea points out, despite his outstanding record at the 
English Diocesan School, my grandfather's brother Abraham was passed over for the 
recommendation that would guarantee him a place at Oxford. One can only surmise that 
the British Colonial community in early twentieth century Burma, especially those in the 
Gymkhana Club, would have laughed in the face of my grandfather's conviction that he 
was an Englishman. 
There are many examples of an identity which is formulated on the construction of an 
assumed or invented heritage and ancestry; from Sir John Soane's rise from suburban 
builder's mate to master architect and his wholesale purchase of an aristocratic lineage 
complete with 'personalised' coat of arms, to the aunt of M. de Charlus, Mme. Villeparisis 
from A la recherche du temps perdu who has picture dealers manufacture new 
aristocratic portraits to fill up the gallery walls of her empty ancest~5 . 
63 Ruth Fredman Cernea, 'Promised Lands and Domestic Arguments: The Conditions of Jewish 
Identity in Burma' in Studies of Indian Jewish Identity ed. by Nathan Katz (New Dehli: Manohar 
Press, 1995) p.163 
64 Sofaer p.8 
65 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time Vols 1-6 trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 1996} Vol.3 p.337 
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Such fantasy inventions need not even be actively sought. They can also be a case of 
mistaken identity. If I am not in the mood to give the purposely rather facetious biblical 
response to the question "What are you because you look Italian or Greek or something?", 
I sometimes simply reply "Italian" just for ease. The questioner is entirely satisfied. They 
have possession over the truth they were seeking. This is something which Lawrence 
Mass experiences in terms of his own self-hating anti-Semitism . 
Though we were identifiably American, Andy and I relished those times 
when we thought we were passing as Italian. Andy had a widow's peak 
of black hair, which he darkened with Grecian Formula, giving him a 
swarthier mien, and I had often been told I looked Italian or 
Mediterranean. Andy was just having fun, but I took it seriously. I used to 
boast about the time, on a subsequent trip to Italy, that an Italian 
businessman on the Settebello, the luxury high-speed train that travels 
between Milan and Rome, commented on my American shoes and 
decided I was an Italian who had lived in America. Fifteen years later I 
began to notice that my pride in lookin~ Italian often involved a 
preconscious wish not to look Jewish.6 
No matter how far back you can trace your family tree, the answer to the question "where 
do you come from?" can never be answered completely, for it simply takes the gaze of 
another to radically shift any heritage you might consider to be your own, or to allow you 
to shun that you choose to reject. 
The family tree maps time spatially. The aerial photograph maps space as an instant of 
time. But the family tree also maps space- the geography of migrant journeys; Aerial 
Evidence also maps time- the time etched in the landscape. For the narrator of A la 
recherche du temps perdu, as for the archaeologist, material space has the possibility of 
revealing time . 
. . . all this made the church for me something entirely different from the 
rest of the town: an edifice occupying, so to speak, a four-dimensional 
space - the name of the fourth being Time - extending through the 
centuries its ancient nave, which bay after bay, chapel after chapel, 
seemed to stretch across and conquer not merely a few yards of soil, but 
each successive epoch from which it emerged triumphant. ... 67 
66 Lawrence D. Mass, The Jewish Wagnerite (London: Cassell, 1994) p.25 
67 Proust Vol.1 p. 70 
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Fig. 1 0: Aerial Evidence in 
The Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, Cambridge 
Aerial Evidence liberates the indeterminacy and impossibility of origin, by disrupting the 
conventional understanding of lineage as historico-biological genealogy, and rather cites it 
in a psycho-geographical imagining. 
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Research Tool 3: 
The Thing Which Makes Itself Known 
Fig. 11 : The Thing Which Makes Itself Known 
The Thing Which Makes Itself Known materializes the now invisible infant. When activated 
it emits a random series of affects which act in parallel to those of the child . lt is a small 
self-contained fortified machine bristling with disruptive forces summarised as follows: 
• The Thing Which Makes Itself Known vibrates aggressively and indiscriminately for 
periods of up to two minutes. 
• The alluring and strokable fur of its upper body dissembles the violent red underbelly 
which is covered with defensive erectile spines or studs which when projected could 
cause irritation and even minor laceration. 
• The red hide is distinctively streaked with sharp white markings to endear it to those 
with a sentimental or nostalgic inclination. 
• Protected by the bulge of the abdomen is a channel which will utter a high-pitched 
piercing cry characteristically expressing pain, alarm, fear and anger when the owner 
is least expecting it, and for no apparent or discernable reason other than that it is 
programmed to do so. 
• In its efforts to demand consideration a spherical dilation at the end of an organ at the 
top of the body emits a charge of light. 
• From the mouth opening in the head projects a hollow cylindrical flexible body, long in 
proportion to its diameter, which conveys liquid or fluid through a spitting action. This 
fluid which is spat forth will often result in a necessary changing of clothes for those in 
the immediate vicinity. 
Reminiscent of the toy which is given to a child to stimulate it, The Thing Which Makes 
Itself Known reminds the adult how a child demands to be stimulated. A suggested use for 
The Thing Which Makes Itself Known is to place it on the pillow beside you when you are 
preparing for bed. Its random activation will disturb your sleep patterns and remind you of 
the fundamental ways in which infants affect space, time and routine. 
Fig. 12 & 13: The random activation of The Thing Which Makes Itself Known disturbing sleep patterns. 
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Archaeological Model 3 
Among the potential contributions that the study of children might make to archaeology, is 
an exploration of social interaction and cultural production. The important commonalties of 
child experience, such as the acquisition of a common understanding about the physical 
nature of the world, or the learning of social norms and cultural practices, bind societies 
together. Children are social agents, both in the production of new futures and the 
reproduction of past traditions and knowledge. 
The infant is also active in controlling adult behaviour; it is vulnerable and constantly 
demands the attention of the adult in its need for food, by crying in the night or by the 
production of body fluids. The adult is thus controlled by the child and the actions 
performed by the adult are mediated through material culture, for example changing a 
nappy. Conversely, the child is controlled and regulated by the adult who can prescribe or 
proscribe forms of behaviour or set times for feeding, sleeping etc .. 
Note3 
The Thing Which Makes Itself Known is born at the intersection of an archaeological 
methodology which seeks to stake claim to the importance of childhood within the 
understanding of prehistoric societies and an arts .practice which wants to better 
understand the way in which an infant-self might actively control its environment. 
The Thing Which Makes Itself Known resembles the toy given to the child and is also a 
metaphor for that child; it configures two separate but complementary demands: 
(i) a re-evaluation of the performance of the child within the family unit, and 
(ii) a re-evaluation of the way in which performance itself operates. 
(i) The Thing Which Makes Itself Known insists that the understanding of the infant as 
a passive member of the family unit, a sponge who responds, consumes and learns, 
negates the complex ways in which power relations operate. 
Michel Foucault observes that the discourse on sexuality in the West which accompanies 
the policing of desire is understood in terms of power binaries: the state and the subject, 
the doctor and the patient, the psychiatrist and the pervert, the adult and the adolescent, 
the parent and the child. In all these instances Foucault notices an identical structure in 
the relation of power. 
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To the formal homogeneity of power in these various instances 
corresponds the general form of submission in the one who is 
constrained by it - whether the individual in question is the subject 
opposite the monarch, the citizen opposite the state, the child opposite 
the parent, or the disciple opposite the master. A legislative power on 
one side, and an obedient subject on the other.68 
This forms the basis of an argument which identifies an activator of power who demands 
their will of a recipient. In the case of the parent-child relationship, this is one of 
observation, regulation, inculcation and prescription . 
. . . the body of the child, under surveillance, surrounded in his cradle, his 
bed, or his room by an entire watch-crew of parents, nurses, servants, 
educators, and doctors, all attentive to the least manifestations of his 
sex, has constituted, particularly since the eighteenth century, another 
"local centre" of power-knowledge.69 
This argument is undoubtedly accurate but nevertheless does not account for the way in 
which the legislator is constrained and directed by the very act of legislation. They are 
made subject by the issuing of their own instruction. The exercising of the power of 
authority is necessarily subject to that authority, both in terms of the rules of engagement 
they set out and that they must react to (in other words they must respond to) those whom 
they legislate. This is not to infer that those with power use it with equanimity but rather to 
indicate that even if they are to contravene the rules they have set in place, the very act of 
contravention is one that can only take place in reaction to the rules themselves70 . 
The dynamic of power-relations is then, one of reciprocity rather than an active/passive 
binary. This is particularly marked in language and especially the language which relates 
information around identity. The essentialist identity politics of the second half of the 
twentieth century, both personal and political (the civil rights movement, women's 
68 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction trans. by Robert Hurley 
~ondon: Penguin, 1990) p.85 
Ibid. p.98 
70 In this regard in might be useful to consider more explicit legislative bodies than the family unit 
and how they are subject to their own authority. The death of Stephen Lawrence and the 
subsequent enquiry into racism in the UK Police Force revealed the appalling miscarriages of 
justice that can result from a power wielding authority which does not abide by its own rules. 
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liberation, lesbian and gay rights) has now been (at least partially) replaced by a politic 
which utilises the very language of oppression ('nigger', 'queer' etc.) as a discourse of 
empowerment. lt no longer makes sense to argue that these appellations ('nigger', 'queer' 
etc.) are simply oppressive, as their meaning and affect is entirely context specific71 • 
Foucault demonstrates such a switch of power relations - or rather a radical 
reassessment of the nature of the active/passive dynamic - in situations where the 
behaviour of the child is seen as a manifestation of adult sexuality; in other words the child 
is the evidence that is held up in the examination of the adult. 
... whereas to begin with the child's sexuality had been problematized 
within the relationship established between doctor and parents (in the 
form of advice, or recommendations to keep the child under observation, 
or warnings of future dangers), ultimately it was in the relationship of the 
psychiatrist to the child that the sexuality of adults themselves was 
called into question.72 
The child's body thus calls the adult to accounf3. The same is true for situations far more 
prosaic than those which imply sexual abuse. Psychoanalysis is one of many social 
discourses which lays the blame of psychological damage at the door of parenting. In this 
way the child (even the adult child) is held as evidence for the success or failure of 
parents. Here the wielding of the power of the family unit is put on trial. 
By rematerializing the infant-that-was, The Thing Which Makes Itself Known reminds us 
that the performance of power in the family unit is not simply a relationship between 
legislative authority and obedient subject. 
71 One might also consider the infelicitous nature of the language of sexuality itself, especially in 
sexual practices which exist outside the accepted heteronormative end point of procreation - top, 
bottom, active, passive- and the failure of this vocabulary to signify in practical terms in the field of 
play, thus spawning further definitions- passive aggressive, versatile etc.- which desperately try 
to compensate for the inability of language to cope with the subtleties and incongruities of deployed 
sexuality. See Judith Butler Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (London: Routledge, 
1997). 
72 Foucault p.99 
73 The child is also a literal manifestation of adult sexuality in that it evidences that procreation has 
taken place. Depending on the circumstances and the social infrastructure into which a child is 
born, this may evidence a healthy, social acceptability (for example, within the bounds of marriage) 
or the breaking of a criminal code (for example, rape). 
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(ii) The Thing Which Makes Itself Known reminds us of the toys given to children 
which engage them in the performance of a certain script. 
The pre-computer toys, baby-dolls which urinated and conditioned little girls with a 
maternal'instinct', the mini-DIY tools given to boys to encourage them to work just like 
Daddy, these toys which Roland Barthes describes as 'a microcosm of adult life' have 
now been replaced by computer devices which have been programmed to simulate the 
needs of animals and babies, in turn programming the child 'owner' with the button 
pressing skills to nurture them . 
. . . faced with this world of faithful and complicated objects, the child can 
only identify himself as the owner, as user, never as creator; he does not 
invent the world, he uses it: there are, prepared for him, actions without 
adventure, without wonder, without joy. He is turned into a little stay-at-
home householder who does not even have to invent the mainsprings of 
adult causality; they are supplied to him ready-made: he has only to help 
himself, he is never allowed to discover anything from start to finish?4 
In this way children are encouraged to perform to a predetermined script. Historically the 
emphasis of the script has been highly gendered (until very recently many high street 
retailers would have separate sections for boys and girls toys). The Thing Which Makes 
Itself Known is a metaphor for this 'play script'. lt is the documentation of the live act which 
it engages. lt enunciates the problem of the live act and its documentation. Through a 
metonymic gesture, it retroactively replaces the infant, allowing the now adult-of-the-
infant-that-was to recast the scene of their infancy. 
The debates in the live art sector over the last decade seem to have circulated around 
documentation and dissemination - in other words what happens when the performance 
is over. 
74 Roland Barthes, Mythologies trans. by Annette Lavers (London: Vintage, 1993) p.54 
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Peggy Phelan in her book Unmarked: The Politics of Performance makes this point 
succinctly: 
Performance's life is only in the present. Performance cannot be saved, 
recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of 
representations of representations: once it does so it becomes 
something other than performance?5 
Phelan's definition of the ontology of performance as that which 'becomes itself through 
disappearance' does not invalidate the potential of performance documentation, but rather 
positions it as something other than performance itself. This secure ontological notion has 
been contested through practices which oscillate between performance and other 
disciplines. Phelan herself cites the activities of Sophie Calle as an example of a practice 
which resists easy classification. 
Taking this a step further, such practices challenge the possibility of classifications 
themselves. When Roland Barthes designates the space of the text as one of "play" as 
opposed to the self-contained work, the notion of classification immediately becomes 
problematic: 'If the Text poses problems of classification, this is because it always 
involves a certain experience of limits'76• These limits are often treacherous in the 
context of performance practices and their documentation, where the easy conclusion is 
that the 'performance' is the live event and that anything subsequent is something 'other'. 
This stratification of genre is often based on the preconception that the performance itself 
is the original - the true. 
The understanding that witnessing live performance somehow gives us greater access to 
the 'truth' of that work is something that has been directly contested. Amelia Jones in her 
book Body Art: Performing the Subject, ponders ways in which a work is accessed. 
75 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 1993) p.146 
76 Roland Barthes, Image Music Text (London: Fontana Press, 1977) p.157 
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Having direct physical contact with an artist who pulls a scroll from her 
vaginal canal does not ensure "knowledge" of her (as an individual 
and/or artist and/or work of art) any more than does looking at a film or 
picture of this activity, or looking at a painting that was made as a result 
of such an action.77 
By affecting an equalisation of worth in different acts of witnessing, Jones liberates the 
spectator from the pressure of being there in our contemporary culture which is continually 
having to negotiate through representations. This is something that Phelan has noted as 
an unavoidable, specifically in relation to death, when considering how our understanding 
of the trauma of survivors of the holocaust is mediated through secondary sources. 
As second and third generation survivors know so well, the living 
witnesses to the theatres of death staged by the Nazis are now dying. 
The event will soon be able to be known and remembered only through 
second-order witnessing, through the agency of representations- from 
films, CD-ROMs, museums, and other public memorials. 78 
The unrepeatable performance of death can only be experienced through 
documentation79 . As our collective need to collate, record and preserve fills the archives, 
museums and libraries, the specific problems faced by practitioners of live art and 
performance to adequately and representatively document their work is thrust to the fore 
of their practice. 
Given this current obsession with documentation and the refusal of many artists who 
make live work to show performance pieces as documentation, it is not surprising that · 
practitioners who would identify themselves as 'live' or 'performance' artists are now 
making work which deals directly with documentation as performance80• 
77 Amelia Jones, Body Art: Performing the Subject (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) 
~.33 
· 
8 Peggy Phelan, 'Performance and Death: Ronald Reagan' Cultural Values Vol.3 No.1 (1998), 
100-122 (p.122) 
79 Performance and death are explored in detail in Chapter 3: The Crystal Ball, Section 5: Psychic 
Life Scientist: Ju/ia Laverne 
80 Recent works in the UK include Peter Richards's 'Performance Lucida' series where the act of 
photographing performance art 'recreations' becomes the performance itself, or Hayley Newman's 
'Connotations', a series of photographs of fictional performances. For a more sustained analysis of 
Peter Richards's 'Performance Lucida' series see: Joshua Sofaer, 'Conflict of Interest: 
Performance as a Spectator Sport' Performance Research 5.1 (2000), 120-125 
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Fig. 14: The Thing Which Makes Itself Known in 
The Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, Cambridge 
As this writing reconfigures some of the interests and ideas of a performance event that is 
now long past, so too The Thing Which Makes Itself Known negotiates this discourse by 
documenting, in absentia, and long after the event, the affective force of the infant child. 
The Thing Which Makes Itself Known is both documentation and performance, 
documentation as performance, the performance of the disruptive power of the infant. 
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Research Tool 4: Object Biography 
Fig. 15: The Object Biography 
The Object Biography attempts to track the life of the pillowcase that was laid out on the 
table with other objects, ready for the celebration and enactment of Joshua Sofaer's 
circumcision in the family home of 1972. 
Fig. 16: The table laid out with objects ready 
for the celebration and enactment of Joshua 
Sofaer's circumcision in the family home of 
1972 
Oral histories and photographic evidence suggest that the pillowcase was purchased by 
Beatrice Davis as she was then, before she got married. Working at the John Hopkins 
University Hospital in Baltimore in the USA on a placement for three months in 1966 and 
anticipating her upcoming marriage later that year, she went to The Hecht Company, a 
'general store', and purchased two matching pillowcases. They were, by all comparisons 
quite innovative in decoration for bed linen. The precise history prior to their arrival on the 
shelves of The Hecht Company can only be surmised. They were bought and brought as 
votives to a married life. A compressed survey outl ines the following gee-chronology for 
the pillowcase: 
Baltimore, USA- Edinburgh, Scotland (house #1)- Washington DC, USA- Cambridge, 
England (house #1)- Cambridge, England (house #2- circumcision)- Edinburgh, 
Scotland (house #2)- Jerusalem, Israel - Leeds, England - Lewes, England -
Cambridge, England (the Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology in Downing Street). 
Archaeological Model 4 
Objects, like people, have social lives. An object can move from one social or 
geographical context to another and, in this movement, it can acquire different and shifting 
meanings as it moves across social or geographical boundaries. In recent years, 
archaeologists have become interested in documenting these changing meanings of 
individual artifacts and have called them 'object biographies'. As with any personal 
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biography, the biographies of objects are mixtures of both deliberate change and accident; 
incidents that only make sense in hindsightB1• 
Note4 
Wedding photographs very rarely depict the wedding. They are traditionally set up (often 
taking considerably longer than the ceremony) in the gardens adjacent, or the hall next 
door. The event the photograph ostensibly purports to record, and the photograph itself, 
are separated out. The photograph of my circumcision follows this rule of ceremony; the 
act of ritual, the event itself, is never recorded. lt is hinted at, anticipated, articulated 
through conjecture but as with the problem archaeology encounters of not seeing the 
event itself and having to adumbrate it through the surrounding material evidence, here 
photography images circumstances but not the event. There are photographs of the baby, 
photographs of guests, the buffet even the artefacts needed to enact the ritual - but none 
of the ceremony itself. That the covenant of flesh was given, is evidenced through my 
living body. 
Staring into these photographs taken on my eighth day, the objects on the table prepared 
in advance from a list of instructions, like the delicacies laid out on plates for the buffet on 
the other side of the room, I am struck by things that I recognise- a dish (I remember 
growing up with the picture on it), the 'circumcision table' (later to become a work desk in 
my childhood bedroom), the cloth on the dining-table (I have it now), and the pillow case (I 
smell my parents bed, as unable to sleep I patter over to their room, aged three and four; I 
see my mother's hair spread out). 
Searching through my own 'collection' of photographs for other evidence in the life of this 
pillowcase, I come across what I have been looking for. A snap I took in Jerusalem in 
around 1981, slightly out of focus, of my mother and my younger sister in bed together, 
resting on the very same pillowcase. 52 
81 See for instance L. Peers, 'Many tender ties: the shifting contexts and meanings of the S BLACK 
bag' World Archaeology Vo1.31 No.2 (1999), 288-302 and A. Appadurai, ed., The Social Life of 
Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
82 Strange justice that the pillow case which cradled the infant and bore witness to the father's 
promise at the moment of ritual, was present at the fulfillment of that promise: 'If I forget thee, 0 
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Fig. 17: Sister and Mother in bed. 
Jerusalem c.1981 
The intractable problems the archaeologist faces when attempting to determine the 
subjectivity of prehistoric women and men and the necessary reliance on the 
interpretation of surrounding material evidence, leads to the concept of the object 
biography. In a post-Freudian society where such overwhelming emphasis is placed on 
psychic motivations and drives, despite the increasing material suffocation of capitalism, 
to rethink the materiality of the object in terms of the life it has led, is one that may lend us 
a useful model for thinking about subjectivity itself. 
The identity of the object, especially the personal object or souvenir, is usually configured 
in relation to the user or owner. As Susan Stewart observes: 
The souvenir of [this] type is intimately mapped against the life history of 
an individual; it tends to be found in connection with rites of passage 
(birth, initiation, marriage and death) as the material sign of an abstract 
referent: transformation of status. 83 
This is the case with the pillowcase which was bought to bring to a married life. The . 
connection accounts for its survival. The accepted narrative of the pillowcase follows the 
life-associations, which is to say the memories, of its primary user. Like the heirloom, 
Jerusalem, I Let my right hand forget her cunning. I Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, I 
If I remember thee not; /If I set not Jerusalem I Above my chiefest joy'. Psalm 137: 5-6, traditionally 
said by the father just before the circumcision. 
83 Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the 
Collection (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984) p.139 
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which finds its history formed by the history of its passing between owner, from generation 
to generation, the pillowcase finds its significance restricted to the heads that remember 
resting on it. 
The function of the heirloom is to weave, quite literally by means of 
narrative, a significance of blood relation at the expense of a larger view 
of history and causality.84 
Not only is the 'life' of the object effaced by that of the owner, but the object only signifies 
in terms of the memories (real or invented) of that owner. 
There is no continuous identity between these objects and their 
referents. Only the act of memory constitutes their resemblance.85 
But while the life of the object often moves alongside that of its owner, it has a separate 
narrative. Of course the basic geographical narrative of the pillowcase as outlined in the 
opening of this section does not even begin to account for the conversations that will have 
taken place resting on the pillowcase, the pillow-fights it will have taken part in, the 
amount of times it will have been washed, or the millions of bedbugs that it will have been 
host to. More importantly perhaps, being a pillowcase this particular object also captures a 
different world, the world of the unconscious, the world of the dream, worlds which can 
never be known. 
The pillowcase biography splinters the rather linear archaeological and sociological 
understanding of the object biography, which considers objects being handed down from 
person to person, and turns it into a process that has many points of contact at any given 
moment. In other words, we have one object in contact with many biographies, rather than 
an object with any singular, easily describable history. This splintering of object histories 
by seeing them as simultaneously linked to many people and many other objects has 
implications for what we mean by a notion of context and the extent to which the multiple 
84 Ibid. p.137 
85 I bid: p.145 
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meanings of objects are not just archaeologically or sociologically inaccessible, but even 
conceptually impossible, in the sense that they are constrained by our capacity for mental 
processing. One might also say something similar about personal biographies, in that the 
lives of each and every person are interwoven with the lives of others, and original 
understandings of biography in terms of what one might call a 'life-course trajectory' also 
become splintered through the situation of the individual in a web of relationships. 
Hence a notion: the splintered biography. The splintered biography acknowledges and 
expands on Mary Evans' assertion of the impossibility of auto/biography: 'The search for 
the 'real' person is doomed to disappointment, for the two very good reasons that no 'real' 
person actually exists, and cannot be contained, let alone represented, in print.'86 The 
splintered biography not only highlights the impossibility of tracing, remembering or 
accounting for the 'everything' that might formulate a subject and their life-narrative - an 
obvious point perhaps - it also highlights the infinite and circular performativity in the act 
of articulating an auto/biographic narrative, where the retelling of a life becomes part of 
that life and therefore part of the telling. Truly performative in J. L. Austin's terms, because 
the articulation becomes action; and also conceptually infinite, for as the retelling 
becomes the stuff of life-narrative, so in turn that telling is told. Writing auto/biography is 
auto/biography. 
The pillowcase biography highlights a double impossibility of auto/biography: as the site of 
the circumcision it represents the impossibility of representing the infant self which is 
outside memory; as the site of the resting head it represents the world of the unconscious 
or semiconscious into which we travel in every sleeping hour. 
lt is this semiconscious world of sleep that opens A la recherche du temps perdu and it is 
a theme that laces its way through to the end. 
86 Mary Evans, Missing Persons: The impossibility of auto/biography (London: Routledge, 1999) 
p.138 
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When a man is asleep, he has in a circle around him the chain of the 
hours, the sequence of the years, the order of the heavenly bodies. 
Instinctively he consults them when he awl'!kes, and in an instant reads 
off his own position on the earth's surface and the time that has elapsed 
during his slumbers .... 87 
In other words, the world of sleep opens up freedoms and experiences outside 
consciousness and more importantly outside time, that dissolve into redeployed time on 
waking. For Proust's protagonist, for whom memory is the very raison d'etre- and the 
man who has to imprison his beloved Albertine in or.der that she not escape his conscious 
understanding, in order that he can know, and write, h_er every movement- sleep is a 
double bind. On one hand it is what he craves desperately for nourishment and relief, and 
on the other it forces him into a hated 'not-knowing'. 
We do not include the pleasures we enjoy in sleep in the inventory of the 
pleasures we have experienced in the course of our existence. To take 
only the most grossly sensual of them all, which of us, on waking has not 
felt a certain irritation at having experienced in his sleep a pleasure 
which, if he is anxious not to tire himself, he is not, once he is awake, at 
liberty to repeat indefinitely during that day. lt seems a positive waste. 
We have had pleasure in another life which is not ours. If we enter up in 
a budget the pains and pleasures of dreams (which generally vanish 
soon enough after our waking), it is not in the current account of 
everyday life.88 
A crass example perhaps, but one nevertheless that brings home the splintering of the 
world of sleep: 'another life which is not ours'. Indeed the protagonist of A la recherche du 
temps perdu acts as a splintering mechanism for the subjectivity of its author. Literature 
(arts practice in general) allows for the possibility of inter-relating what we understand as 
fact and fiction. Marcel Proust splinters his own biography in the life of his protagonist. 
And then again; post-structuralism has revealed that as we encounter arts practice, such 
accounts are further splintered through that act of encounter.89 This model of 'reader as 
author' is pushed to a limit in Jacqueline Rose's novel Albertine. The novel retells the 
events of A la recherche du temps perdu that revolve around Albertine, from her point of 
87 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time Vols 1-6 trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 1996) Vol.1 p.3 
88 Ibid. Vol.4 p.442 
89 See for instance Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language trans. by Richard Howard (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), especially Chapter 2 'From Work to Text'. 
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view, and from those of her friend Andree Bouvet. This is not simply a fictional offshoot of 
Proust's fictionalised account of his own experiences. Rose includes 'factual' biographic 
detail of Proust's life that Proust himself does not offer in his novel, giving for instance the 
central location of the narrative as the apartment in Boulevard Malesherbes, which was 
Proust's family home. Rose takes for her narrative one splinter out of A la recherche du 
temps perdu. She proliferates her encounter with Proust by following one of its pathways. 
On the inside jacket cover we are told that the work 'stands on its own, needing no 
knowledge of the original'. Undoubtedly this marketing strategy which attempts to be all 
inclusive has some basis in the projected experience of readers - Albertine is a story 
which can be read on its own terms - but having 'knowledge of the original', without which 
Albertine would not exist, situates Rose's 'novel' as a refreshingly ontologically insecure 
interpretation and reinterpretation of the thoughts and events that pervade A la recherche 
du temps perdu. What is offered is not only a reverse positioning of selected events which 
occur in the Proust, but a psychoanalytic perspective on both the characters and their 
author. Albertine is simultaneously a novel, textual analysis, literary conceit and 
psychoanalytic case study. Part of Rose's political impetus seems to be about inverting 
the assumptions that might result from a cursory reading of Albertine's position as captive 
to the obsessions and neuroses of the protagonist of A la recherche du temps perdu. ('So 
there is a fine irony in the fact that, superficially at least, you might conclude that it is he 
who has trapped me.'90) The Albertine of Proust, who appears so much a projection of the 
protagonists world view, is given a voice of her own. 
Inside this house, I have felt safe for the first time. To begin with at least, 
when we returned to the city, it was like being on a train, destination 
chosen, ticket purchased, sitting in my seat with nothing more to decide. 
This is not one of the trains of my childhood. I am on my own. What I 
love about these journeys is being taken somewhere by someone you 
never have to see, who knows absolutely nothing about why you were 
there. And if they have no clue as to your final destination when you 
leave them, even less can they envisage- for it is of absolutely no 
interest -what might, for the duration of the journey during which you 
rely on them so totally, be going on inside your mind. A little contract to 
90 Rose, Jacqueline, Albertine (London: Chatto & Windus, 2001) p.13 
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which neither of the parties have signed. I will enclose you in this space, 
carry you in this cradle, even rock you to sleep, and then put you down 
without protest or remark, where and when you choose. And the dreams 
that you dream all the while are strictly none of my affair.91 
But of course the protagonist of A la recherche du temps perdu wishes to capture every 
gesture, every action, and were it possible, every thought and every dream of Albertine. 
He feverishly wants to be able to write the auto/biography that Mary Evans cites as 
impossible because this is the only way he can prove to himself that she does (or doesn't) 
love him. He imprisons Albertine in order that he may write her biography. By giving 
Albertine a voice and a thinking mind, Rose confounds what was always already an 
impossible desire for Proust's protagonist: the fact that he would never be able to possess 
Albertine's thoughts. ('A jealous man never sees - perhaps I should have told him - that 
his greatest rivals are not a woman's other lovers, who after all make room for him and 
who come and go as she, and they, may please, but her other companions of the night, 
who always arrive when they are least welcome and crowd every last corner of her 
mind.'92) By intervening in the narrative world of A la recherche du temps perdu while 
maintaining its narrative curve, Rose offers a model for a twice splintered subjectivity: she 
exposes (or rather creates) the thoughts of Albertine which have been inaccessible to the 
male protagonist, in the process of reworking Marcel Proust's novel A la recherche du 
temps perdu as the novel Albertine. In this sense Albertine is inter-textual and self-
reflexive, for it articulates within its pages the splintering action that it makes by its very 
existence. 
In a literary mirror to Proust's famous passage which tells how the protagonist first spies 
Albertine on the Balbec beach, Rose's Albertine articulates the same events from her 
point of view. This simple literary device -a retelling from a different perspective where 
the observer becomes the observed ('For days on end he stared'93)- highlights the 
obvious but easily forgotten, way in which 'different' life-narratives are necessarily 
interwoven, while remaining separate. This reworking also points outside itself and 
91 Ibid. p.113 
92 Ibid. p.145 
93 Ibid. p.8 
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introduces the phantasmatic realm of the author's own biography. One never escapes the 
world of the author when reading their novel. 
I thought - as you do when you read a very long book - how am I going 
to live without this? So I devised ways of not living without it.94 
Albertine is thus intimately caught up in the biography of Jacqueline Rose and Jacqueline 
Rose in A la recherche du temps perdu. 
Proust's magnum opus has inspired many artists in general terms but has also spawned 
plenty of specific artistic interpretations and re-workings in all forms of genre95. This 
intertextuality between arts practices parallels the way in which human biographies 
splinter at the point of encountering the 'other', but also exemplifies the way subjectivities 
are splintered through arts practice itself. 
My own relationship with A la recherche du temps perdu, its author Marcel Proust and the 
famous scene in which the protagonist spies Albertine on the beach at Balbec, is 
necessarily understood (as all things are) in relation to the narrative of my own life. I 
myself have travelled to Cabourg, the Normandy town on which Proust and later Rose, 
based Balbec. I have stood on the esplanade of Le Grand-Hotel (now named Promenade 
Marcel Proust) and gazed over the sand to the sea, placing Albertine on the shore of my 
mind. 
The grains of sand on Balbec beach, Marcel Proust, Jacqueline Rose, Albertine, Cabourg 
and me; we all become one splintered mass of interconnected and irreconcilable 
interrelating vectors, circulating around space, time, event and text. 
94 Jacqueline Rose quoted in Frances Williams, 'Out and Proust: Jacqueline Rose on reworking 
Albertine' Time Out24-31 October2001, p.114 
95 These include many films, most recently Time Regained by Raul Ruiz and La Captive by Chantal 
Akerman; artworks, including themed shows such as Art & Memory: Contemporary Painters in 
Search of Marce/ Proust at the Francis Kyle Gallery in London spring 2000 and the somewhat 
larger Marcel Proust: /'ecriture et les arts at the Bibliotheque Nationals in Paris at around the same 
time; a self-help book by Alain de Bolton titled How Proust Can Change Your Life; the novel/n The 
Absence of Men by Philippe Besson and of course Albertine by Jacqueline Rose; and countless 
works of non-fiction including literary essays, criticism and biography ad infinitum. 
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But that which I observe as irreconcilable (too much, too many) others have sought to 
clarify. There are models of literature which attempt to write it all: literally every action and 
every thought. Nicholson Baker's novel Room Temperature transcribes all the thoughts 
that enter the mind of the protagonist as he feeds his baby daughter her afternoon bottle. 
The stream of consciousness of Baker's protagonist separates off the outside world from 
the internal musings of his mind. This, he believes, can offer back the whole of one's life. 
I certainly believed, rocking my daughter on this Wednesday afternoon, 
that with a little concentration one's whole life could be reconstructed 
from any single twenty-minute period randomly or almost randomly 
selected; that is, that there was enough content in that single confined 
sequence of thoughts and events and the setting that gave rise to them 
to make connections that would proliferate backward until potentially 
every item of autobiographical interest - every pet theory, minor 
observation, significant moment of shame or happiness - could be at 
least glancingly covered; but you had to expect that a version of your 
past arrived at in this way would exhibit [ ... ] certain telltale differences of 
emphasis from the past you would recount if you proceeded serially, 
beginning with "I was born on January 5th, 1957," and letting each 
moment give birth naturally to the next. The particular cell you started 
from colored your entire reaction.96 
In the acknowledgement of the 'telltale differences' that would inhabit such an intention, 
the infinite possibilities of uncontainable life narratives is made clear. A biography simply 
has just too many points of reference for it to ever be written. Interestingly enough, it is 
writing itself which presents both the possibility an impossibility of Baker's project. What 
escapes his account is the moment of writing itself, as if the printed page was created by 
some kind of concomitant computer print-out automatically generated by the thoughts 
themselves. The reader is left to wonder how (on earth) Baker could remember such 
detailed actions and thoughts in order to write them down later, or, if he was writing them 
as he was experiencing them, why he does not mention the process itself7• The moment 
of writing is effaced from the task to write 'everything', leaving the writing incomplete; a 
successful literary conceit but a philosophical failure. 
96 Nicholson Baker, Room Temperature (London: Granta Books, 1984 repr. 1990) p.41 
97 The same thing proves true in Kenneth Goldsmith's Fidget which is an attempt to write down 
every moment made during thirteen hours on 16 June 1997 but fails to acknowledge how the 
record of these actions was itself manufactured. 
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Fig. 18: Two pillowcases 
The object biography of the pillowcase awaiting my circumcision highlights the way in 
which life-narratives are infinitely splintering off, branching out, possibly beyond our reach 
but certainly impossible to contain . Indeed, the object of this biography is itself subject to a 
similar instability, and impossibility, for in truth there are two such pillowcases, and there is 
no way of telling which one it was that was on the table in the photograph. So the object 
biography must conjoin the biography of two objects; two objects which have had 
separate histories which I can not separate out. Through this not-knowing, the splintered 
biography is splintered yet again. 
Fig. 19: The Object Biography in 
The Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, Cambridge 
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Research ToolS: 
Father/Baby Optical Adjusters 
Fig. 20: The Father/Baby Optical Adjusters 
The Father/Baby Optical Adjusters are an old pair of glasses belonging to Jeffrey Sofaer 
(the father) into which have been inserted lensticular lenses: bulbous, circular and highly 
charged, blurring the vision of all but the most extremely deficient eyesights. 
While physically affecting the sight of those that wear them, in reminiscence of the blurred 
immature physiology of infant vision, the Father/Baby Optical Adjusters also act as a 
symbolic referent which reinstates the hidden position of the father/photographer within 
the domestic scene of the family snapshot. 
A photograph taken in the family bathroom; mother and daughter wash the newly born 
son. Peering into this scene from the perspective of the hidden photographer twenty-eight 
and a half years after it was taken, the adult gaze effaces the childhood experience. 
Fig. 21 : The Bathroom Photograph Fig. 22: Bathroom recreation by John Swagger: 
general view 
Disinter/est commissioned archaeological illustrator John Swagger to create a virtual 
version of the bathroom scene in an attempt to experience, or re-experience, the different 
viewpoints of those people in the room at the instant the photograph was taken. The 
recreation begins by including the photographer, which, without concrete evidence, was 
presumed to be the father. Putting him back in the picture (literally) completes the 
domestic scene that is otherwise only partial. 
Archaeological Model 5 
Phenomenological approaches suggest that we can reach interpretations through bodily 
experience. In other words, that by experiencing the world through the body we gain 
insights into experience itself. lt has had a significant impact on a number of well-known 
British archaeologists in the early 1990's to present and has been particularly influential in 
80 
terms of exploring landscape and monumental architecture98• Such explorations seek to 
identify how the body encountered space in the past, although it has also been much 
critiqued within the discipline and remains controversial. 
NoteS 
In an article on the differences between film and photography, 'Photography and Fetish', 
Christian Metz says of the photographic subject: 'The person who has been 
photographed, not the total person, is dead, dead for having been seen'99• In Camera 
Lucida Barthes augments this argument when he describes the being in the photograph 
as having 'become Total Image, which is to say, Death in person'100. The body in 
photographic representation that Metz and Barthes configure as dead, is analogous to the 
archaeological body that is literally dead. Looking at photographs of our infant selves is 
like looking at a dead self and there is a strange vertiginous instability in hailing the 
subject in the domestic family snapshot as being oneself. 
This instability is particularly marked if there is an inability to attribute the time in question 
to any recollection. This is always the case with early childhood, as infancy predates 
memory 101 • Looking at self in a photograph of which you have no recollection about the 
circumstances of its creation is not restricted to early childhood and of course we have 
many experiences in life for which we have no voluntary memory - perhaps most of our 
experiences we do not remember. The indexical materia lily of the photograph promises so 
much remedy on this score, and yet it acts as proof rather than as trigger. 
The Photograph does not call up the past (nothing Proustian in a 
photograph). The effect it produces upon me is not to restore what has 
been abolished ~by time, by distance) but to attest that what I see has 
indeed existed.1 2 
The photograph highlights a point of fact. The Proustian effect, of which Barthes considers 
there to be 'nothing' in the photograph, is that of involuntary memory. Involuntary memory 
98 See B. Bender, Stonehenge: Making Space (Oxford: Berg, 1993) 
99 Christian Metz, 'Photography and Fetish' October No.34 Fall (1985), 81-90 (p.84) 
100 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida trans. by Richard Howard (London: Vintage, 1993) p.14 
101 Although as we have see in the case of Yukio Mishima, some people say that they can 
remember their own birth. 
102 Barthes p.82 
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is held in the materiality of an object (which again the photograph seems to promise)- a 
madeleine, a church bell, a cobbled street. 
The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach of 
intellect, in some material object (in the sensation which that material 
object will give us) of which we have no inkling.103 
This sentence, which precedes the famous account of the madeleine, identifies Proust's 
understanding of the power of material culture to conduct time. Unlike voluntary memory 
where the past exists within and as the present, an involuntary memory, as Deleuze 
summarises, 'appears as it could not be experienced: not in reality, but in its truth; not in 
its external and contingent relations, but in its internalized difference, in its essence'104• 
The tea soaked madeleine which Proust's protagonist brings to his lips does not recall, in 
the present, an· experience he had in Combray in the past; rather the taste of the 
madeleine is Combray, it contains it, so that the past is inseparable from the present. 
The bathroom photograph denies both voluntary and involuntary access to past 
memories. lt is outside conscious memory, it eludes it; that is for the adult-that-was-infant. 
The photograph becomes something else - a record of an event that happened - almost 
as if to someone else. Perhaps there is a clue in this 'someone else'. Instead of pursuing 
the hopeless attempt to understand the image in term of one's own past experience, 
rather see oneself through the eyes of another. To pick up again from Metz and Barthes, if 
the body in the photograph is dead, then necessarily the eyes of the living body which 
gaze into those of the image must belong to someone else105• If this 'someone else' is the 
transformed but same self then the process becomes one of self-reflection, in which 
assessments are made as to the value of the self-image in relation to self-identity. The 
'look at me then, look at me now'. 
103 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time Vols 1-6 trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 1996) Vol.1 p.51 
104 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs (London: The Athlone Press, 2000) p.61 
105 One is not dead before one is alive. 
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What does it mean to momentarily inhabit the eyes of another; to achieve self-knowledge 
through the identification with others? 
Fig. 23: Bathroom photograph 
2000 
In the first stages of love we tend to check our appearance more often than we would 
usually do. This is surely not simply a question of struggling to control our self-image but 
also an attempt to see if we can identify ourselves as we are (to be) seen through the 
beloved's eyes. 
If she had seen me, what could I have represented to her? From the 
depths of what universe did she discern me?106 
A la recherche du temps perdu is littered with such references, where Swann and here the 
narrator, detective and captor of their beloved respectively, attempt to discern how they 
are viewed by the object of their own attention. lt is a labour that does not yield fruit, not 
for Swann, the narrator, or the reader. Oddette and Albertine remain flat projections of the 
protagonist's world view and ironically it is in the search for the 'truth' of their beloved's 
feelings that both Swann and the narrator come to realise that they are not (or rather, no 
longer) in love themselves: ('To think that I've wasted years of my life, that I've longed to 
die, that I've experienced my greatest love, for a woman who didn't appeal to me, who 
106 Proust Vol.2 p.432 
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wasn't even my type!'107) . So through the attempt at configuring self through other, an 
alternative (more accurate- more truthful?) understanding of one's own desire is attained. 
The virtual recreation of the various viewpoints in the bathroom photograph extend this 
attempt to see self through the gaze of the other, by literally offering up their vision. 
Seeing through the eyes of the mother and the sister forces contemplation of the domestic 
filial and sibling relations - in this case typically gendered for 1970's Britain - bathing and 
learning how to bathe the baby. But this only goes to confirm what we already think we 
know from the photograph itself. As in Swann and the narrator's endless attempts to 
understand what their beloved think, the virtual mother/daughter recreations highlight 
spatial dynamics but not personal thought processes. 
Bathroom recreations by John Swogger 
Fig. 24: Mother view Fig. 25: Daughter view Fig. 26: Baby view Fig. 27: Father I 
photographer view 
Fig. 28: Bathroom recreation by John Swogger: 
blu"ed baby view 
So then to the self: the blurred baby perspective which highlights the non-individuated 
world-view of the neonate and the photographic documentation from which it was 
(re)created. At one specular edge we have the father's view, that is the bathroom 
107 Ibid. Vol.1 p.460 
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photograph that we can look at now, of an event we know to have taken place in that 
particular space (to the extent that we can ever know anything) and at another there is the 
recreation of what we understand as the blurred baby-view, the cognition that is not 
known, that can only be guessed at and never really be understood108. lt is perhaps in the 
space between these two frames of vision that we can settle the curiosity about the 
domestic moment encapsulated in the bathroom photograph. 
In attempting to describe her experience following the death of her father when she was 
seven years old - knowing that events took place despite the almost total gap in her 
memory - Kate Love has articulated a model for experience itself. 
.. . this gap-space (knowing and yet not knowing) which, strangely, and 
quite startlingly, I now also recognise might not be unlike a new and 
possibly more adequate interpretation of experience itself.109 
This model rejects the reading of experience as purely sensate, or on the other hand held 
entirely in language - that is understood - and places experience at the limit of 
understanding, as both 'undergoing and interpreting simultaneously'110. 
Fig. 29: Joanna Sofaer Derevenski wearing The 
Father/Baby Optical Adjusters 
Fig. 30: Joshua Sofaer wearing The Father/Baby 
Optical Adjusters 
108 See Chapter 3: The Crystal Ball, Section 1: Optometrist: Rod Dale for a further exploration of a 
blurring vision towards blindness in relation to the last writings and works of artist and filmmaker 
Derek Jarman. 
109 Kate Love, 'Experience Preferred' in Experience ed. by Kate Love (London: Loose-leaf, 2000) 
o.2 
'
10 Ibid. p.7 
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By wearing The Father/Baby Optical Adjusters -to see a blur, as the infant does- is to 
acknowledge that this blurring, this not quite in focus, is not only an appropriate model for 
the recreation of infant experience, but is also all one can hope for in the adult attempt to 
disinter the infant self. 
Configured as such, the bathroom image of the infant self is not physiognomic but rather a 
site for the contestation of personal experience. The blurred recreation of infant vision 
becomes a metaphor for the attempted reclaiming of the experience of that moment. 
Fig. 31 : The Father/Baby Optical Adjusters in 
The Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, Cambridge 
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Research Tool6: Fort/Da Mother Doll 
Fig. 32: The Fort/Da 
Mother Doll 
The Fort/Da Mother Doll is a doll modelled on the infant's mother. The doll incorporates 
locks of the mother's hair which had been growing during the years in question; the hair 
the infant child gazed at, smelt and caressed. 
The Fort/Da Mother Doll allows the-now-adult-of-the-infant-that-was to infantilise their 
mother and explicitly replay the separation trauma observed by Freud in 'Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle' discarding and reclaiming in therapeutic frenzy. 
Figs. 33 - 39: Joshua Sofaer replays the separation trauma with The Fort/Da Mother Doll 
Archaeological Model 6 
From an archaeological perspective, given the time depth and cultural variability with 
which archaeology deals, the use of psychoanalytic models for human behaviour needs to 
be treated with caution. lt seems risky, to say the least, to employ a paradigm developed 
in the very specific context of the sexually repressed atmosphere of early 20th century 
Vienna as a universal principle of human development. The acceptance of Freudian 
doctrine implies, among other things, the prioritisation of a set of very particular 
constructions of sex, gender and age that may, or may not, have been of significance to 
past people and which are themselves highly contested in contemporary society. 
Note 6 
Freud famously observes a young child (the child we know to be his grandson Ernst aged 
one and a half) throw into his curtained cot a cotton real, or spool, on a string. With the 
throwing gesture the child shouts out an "o-o-o-o" sound which Freud relates to the 
German word 'fort' meaning 'gone'. The child then pulls back the cotton real using the 
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string, grasping it with a gleeful 'a-a-a-a' which Freud relates to the German word "da" 
meaning 'here'. 
He elucidates: 
The interpretation of the game then became obvious. lt was related to 
the child's great cultural achievement - the instinctual renunciation (that 
is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in 
allowing his mother to go away without protesting. He compensated 
himself for this, as it were, by himself staging the disappearance and 
return of the objects within his reach. 111 
He later offers an alternative explanation: 
But still another interpretation may be attempted. Throwing away the 
object so that it was 'gone' might satisfy an impulse of the child's, which 
was suppressed in his actual life, to revenge himself on his mother for 
going away from him. In that case it would have a defiant meaning: 'All 
right, then, go away! I don't need you. I'm sending you away myself.'112 
As Derrida observes, it is this section of 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' that is 'the one 
often retained in the exoteric, and occasionally the esoteric, space of psychoanalysis as 
one of the most important, and even decisive, chapters of the essay'113. The pervasive 
application of this kind of psychoanalytic universal - Ernst as all children - offers the 
autobiographer a template for their childhood activity - but it is not one that could be 
easily 'proved'. The story of the spool has become internalised by psychoanalysis to such 
a degree that one imagines the observer of a given child to anticipate a fort/da; 
'discovering' the game despite a lack of evidence. And even if predetermination can be 
ruled out (but how will you see it unless you are looking for it, and if you are looking for it 
then you will know about it) then such a search would stumble on the insecurities of 
observation and memory. The question of the potential of such an autobiographic moment 
is not going to be answered by asking those who cared for us as a young child if we 
compulsively discarded and sought out our toys. 
111 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle Standard Edition Vol.18 (London: Vintage, 
2001)p.15 
112 Ibid. p.16 
113 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card trans. by Alan Bass (London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1987) p.294 
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For Disinter/est, which seeks to explore infancy autobiographically using archaeology, 
such psychoanalytic readings, while restrictive by their omnipresence (as Derrida says of 
the spool argument, 'this legend, is already too legendary, overburdened, obliterated'114) 
can be a useful way of starting to think about childhood activity within the domestic space. 
Having attempted to reject psychoanalytic models for the interpretation of childhood, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that working at such close quarters with family on family, 
inevitably the processes themselves become ones of 'working through'. The literal digging 
was perhaps not as impactual as the psychic digging. 
As part of the research process we asked each of the/our parents, who have been 
separated for many years, to complete a questionnaire. Most of the questions were 
devised in order to be able to clarify factual information about the time in question. 
Question number 28, in a section titled 'Questions relating to childhood activity' was as 
follows: 'What was a typical day for Joshua during this time?'. Here follows the/our father's 
response. 
Breastfed for several months. Some of the time playing with Joanna, 
mum and dad, or in baby bouncer (suspended beside the swing in the 
bedroom), and most of the rest lying gurgling in his cot, surrounded by 
stimulating coloured mobiles, squeezy toys and musical boxes. Also out 
for walks in push chair. Mummy used to play a game with Joshua that I 
didn't approve of, showing him some exciting object (which he 
immediately took interest in), bringing it temptingly close, and then taking 
it away, laughing, repeating this several times. 
This game the/my mother allegedly used to play with me enacts in reverse that which 
Freud identifies as being of great developmental importance in the relationship between 
mother and child. In this instance the fort/da becomes a da/fort. 
114 Ibid. p.298 
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While she maintained that she had no recollection of such a game, confronted with this 
anecdote the/my mother would not deny (indeed emphatically refused to deny) that such a 
game took place. Without specifying what she thought they were, she was however, quick 
to refute the "implications" and "insinuations" of the anecdote. So what are the implications 
and insinuations of this da/fort game? 
According to Freud the spool the child discards (o-o-o-o) only to reclaim (a-a-a-a) in 
repetitious gesture, is a symbolic representation of the mother; throwing it away and 
reclaiming it could be both a coping strategy for her departure and return and/or a 
mechanism of revenge on the same account. 
By the same logic the exciting object with which the mother tempts her son (a-a-a-a) only 
to take it away (o-o-o-o) repeating this several times, i!? a metonym for him himself; 
revealing it and removing it could be both her coping strategy in recognition of the infant's 
fragile mortality (potentially 'here' and then 'gone') and her responsibility therein and/or 
equally a mechanism of revenge for the demands that mortality and vulnerability place on 
her. Either way this marks out an arena of possible conflict for the child, where the mother 
is the person who both supplies and denies access to love/himself/exciting objects. This is 
a paradoxical pattern which is often played out in all love relationships where the person 
who has the power to alleviate hurt or unhappiness is the very person who caused it. 
Such speculative psychoanalytic interpretations of a mother's play with her son (by her 
son) seem over-speculative and not particularly useful (despite the multifarious 
applications such an interpretation might offer to an adult mother/son relationship). The 
motivation of this writing is not that of trying to unlock the hidden secrets of the drives of 
the parenUchild dyad. Rather it is in unpacking the structural inter-relation between the 
canonical text (psychoanalytic theory), the biographical account (the/my father's 
anecdote) and arts practice (the making and staging of The Fort/Da Mother Doll). 
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In 'To Speculate- On Freud', speculation is both the occasion of Derrida's reading of, and 
to note what Freud himself does in, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle'. A speculation to and 
from, forth and back, like the spool itself. Derrida reads 'Beyond ... • in terms of what he 
calls the 'auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic scene of writing'115. This neologism references 
the elaborate set of concerns that Derrida brings out of the fort/da argument, establishing 
not so much the biographical trace of its author, but the scene in which Freud writes. This 
encompasses doubt, mourning, jealousy and guilt which 'entrap speculation'. Through this 
deconstructive/constructive schema, Derrida observes the possibility for 'a new 
theoretical and practical charter for any possible autobiography.'116 This charter is founded 
in writing itself, and Derrida's stake is to discern (to name) what it is that is happening in 
Freud's repetition through writing, of the argument that he makes about the fort/da. 
Thus is confirmed the abyssal "overlapping" that I proposed above: of 
the object or the content of Beyond ... , of what Freud is supposedly 
writing, describing, analyzing, questioning, treating, etc., and, on the 
other hand, the system of his writing gestures, the scene of writing that 
he is playing or that plays itself. With him, without him, by him, or all at 
once. This is the same "complete game" of the fortlda. Freud does with 
(without) the object of his text exactly what Ernst does with (without) his 
spool.,,f 
Freud reveals himself autobiographically through his observational writing - the observer 
is always caught up with the observed . 
. . . the speculatin~ grandfather, in describing or recalling this or that, 
recalls himse/f. 11 
The creation and staging of The Fort/Da Mother Doll is also an overt repetition which 
becomes the scene for this writing. Playing with the doll repeats Ernst's gesture and 
potentially all of our own childhood gestures and inverts (and avenges?) the da/fort game 
the/my mother played with her son/me. This time-map of past action to present echoes 
Bergson's thesis in Matter and Memory- the repetition of the past in the present as being 
115 Ibid. p.336 · 
116 Ibid. p.322 
117 Ibid. p.320 
118 Ibid. p.321 
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the present- past as present. Throwing The Fort/Da Mother Doll away and getting it back, 
is an action of performance in the present which refers to the past - conjures it - repeats it 
- but nevertheless does not become it. lt is the past lived as present. Further, it is through 
an attempted re-staging of the past that one becomes present. lt is also performative in 
J . L. Austin 's sense, in that it is through language that the action takes place- for while 
the event has been staged (for the sake of the photographic demonstration) the action 
really exists in its being told . For Derrida it is also in the act of telling, in the 'scene of 
writing' that 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' becomes autobiography. 
Fig. 40: The Fort/Da Mother Doll in 
The Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, Cambridge 
Derrida's deconstruction of Freud's observational account of the fort/da also forces an 
inquiry into the relationship between the mother and father of the da/fort anecdote. The 
detached quasi-scientific manner with which the/my father recalls this incident (' .. . bringing 
it temptingly close, and then taking it away, laughing, repeating this several times') does 
not simply seem to be a gendered response to an uncomfortable memory - it also 
questions his re;:~ction at the time he refers to, betraying his stasis and paralysis to effect a 
change to a situation that he 'didn't approve of'. The accusation based in his recollection 
incriminates his own position within the domestic scene. 
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Research Tool 7: Aeroplane Spoon 
Fig. 42: The Aeroplane Spoon 
The Aeroplane Spoon is a conjunction of a childhood toy and a childhood feeding 
implement. lt is both a utilitarian and a symbolic object. Its utilitarian properties are clear; it 
feeds the young child . The Aeroplane Spoon plays the aeroplane game for reluctant 
palettes. 
Fig. 43: Joshua Sofaer being fed with 
The Aeroplane Spoon 
Symbolically it references both language and ritual. The child that is born with a silver 
spoon in their mouth is the child who is born with advantage. To be 'spoon-fed' is to 
devolve responsibility to another. 
Archaeological Model 7 
In mediating accepted norms of social life, objects simultaneously control and regulate 
behaviour. The object becomes part of a cycle of repetition and reproduction. /t becomes 
a participant in repeated actions in which the behaviour of people, through their interaction 
with the object, is disciplined and exposed. In the case of the child-adult relationship 
where the young child is dependent on the adult, this regulation is two-way. 
The need for food is a key element of the dependency I control relationship between child 
and carer, where the provision of food is enacted through ritualised eating practices in 
which both parties participate in particular roles119. Food is both a gift and a power game 
where pleasure, provision, coercion and demand are intertwined. The role of food in the 
performance of ritual is, of course, a repeated theme within the anthropological and 
archaeological literature, especially in terms of feasting, but by considering ritual as 
reiteration rather than exception, the sacred and the profane, the ordinary and the 
extraordinary are collapsed. 
11 9 See D. Lupton, Food, the Body and the Self (London: Sage, 1996) 
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Note7 
The Aeroplane Spoon is the prop in the interactive feeding performance between parent 
and child. How are these diurnal performances learnt? 
In the questionnaire that we asked our parents to complete, we requested information on 
where they sought guidance on child rearing120• Both parents clearly state that regular use 
was made of Dr. Speck's manual Baby and Child Care: "we consulted him all the time," 
our mother wrote. 
Dr. Speck was an American Paediatrician who first published his child rearing manual in 
1946, under the title The Commonsense Book of Baby and Child Care. In subsequent 
years the book sold over fifty million copies, was translated into more than thirty 
languages and to date is the best selling book in the world after the bible121 . Given that 
millions upon millions of children have been raised under the auspices of his guidance, 
the impact of Benjamin Speck on the lives and lifestyles of those born in the west in the 
second half of the twentieth century should not be underestimated. Dr. Speck's manual 
acts as a performance script for the interaction of millions of parents and children. At the 
time of his death in 1998 aged 94, Speck's influence on Western child rearing was 
recognised by President Clinton's statement, released by the White House: 
Hillary and I were deeply saddened to learn of the death of Dr. Benjamin 
Speck. For half a century, Dr. Speck guided parents across the country 
and around the world in their most important job - raising their 
children. 122 
I was keen to find out the content of this multi-million seller. Flicking through a copy of the 
book, I was struck by one of the illustrations by Dorothea Fox in the section 'The Bath' in 
the chapter 'Daily Care'. The illustration of mother bathing the baby, with the caption 'Your 
120 This questionnaire was mentioned above in relation to the Fort/Da Mother Doll and the daily 
routine of the household children. 
121 See Lynn Bloom, Doctor Spock: Biography of a Conservative Radical (New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1972) 
122 Excerpt from statement by President Clinton from While House Daily Briefing 16 March 1998. 
See Mike McCurry, 'White House Daily Briefing March 16, 1998' (1998) < http://usembassy-
australia.state.gov/hyper/WF980316/epf1 01.htm> [accessed 12 August 2001] 
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hand under his arm, your wrist supporting his head' bore a remarkable similarity to the 
photograph taken by my father of my mother washing me -the bathroom photograph of 
Research Tool 5. There was something which appeared highly staged in this repetition of 
the Fox illustration, both in terms of the action itself - the wrist supporting the head as the 
baby is bathed - and the mise-en-scene of the image -the angle of the gaze, the position 
of the key players. The bathroom photograph here becomes a performance still of the 
bathing ritual, evidence that the piece was staged according to the script, as the author 
intended. 
Fig. 43: 'Your hand under his arm, your wrist 
supporting his head' by Dorothea Fox 
Fig. 44: The Bathroom Photograph 
The everyday as performance is not something unique to the raising of children, and of 
course it would be possible to read practically all actions of daily life as interpretations of 
pre-set performance scripts. 
In his analysis of social reality, configured as a series of frames of reference, Erving 
Goffman defines the relationship between the individual and the performance of the 
everyday as the 'person-role formula': 
. .. whenever an individual participates in an episode of activity, a 
distinction will be drawn between what is called the person, individual, or 
player, namely he who participates, and the particular role, capacity, or 
function he realizes during that participation. And a connection between 
these two elements will be understood. In short, there will be a person-
role formula. The nature of a particular frame will, of course, be linked to 
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the nature of the person-role formula it sustains. One can never expect 
complete freedom between individual and role and never complete 
constraint. But no matter where on this continuum a particular formula is 
located, the formula itself will express the sense in which the framed 
activity is geared into the continuing world. 123 
In this way we are always both ourselves and the roles we play. The terms on which we 
are read by others oscillates between person and role, but often focuses on role: 
Interestingly, in everyday affairs, one is not always aware of a particular 
individual's part in life, that is, his biography, awareness often focusing 
more on the role he performs in some particular connection - political, 
domestic, or whatever. 124 
With regard to parenting it is useful to think of how the child, even the adult child, sees its 
parents precisely on these terms, which is to say as 'mother' and 'father' (with the 
concomitant expectations of their performance that such roles inevitably bring) rather than 
as 'people' in their own right. The child understands the parent in relation to themselves. 
The role of 'mother' particularly, occupies a position of performative expectation where the 
compulsory heteronormative matrix- gendered as 'mother'- is enforced. The mother's 
role has been defined (and redefined) from culture to culture and epoch to epoch; it has 
nevertheless, been defined. 
After the publication in 1990 of her seminal book critiquing compulsory heterosexuality, 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, Judith Butler spent 
considerable space in subsequent essays refuting a misreading of her argument that 
gender was somehow radical choice. The misreading of Gender Trouble stemmed from 
Butler's example of drag as a way of critiquing the 'naturalness' of gender, and 
misunderstood the performance of the gendered body as one which was optional. In an 
interview with Artforum in 1992, Butler says: 
123 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of Experience (London: 
Penguin, 1974) p.269 
124 Ibid. p.129 
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... my whole point was that the very formation of subjects, the very 
formation of persons, presupposes gender in a certain way - that gender 
is not to be chosen and that "performativity" is not radical choice and it's 
not voluntarism. [ ... ) Performativity has to do with repetition, very often 
with the repetition of oppressive and painful gender norms to force them 
to resignify. This is notfreedom .... 125 
The performance of gender, of which motherhood must surely be the ultimate 
representation, is one where women are asked to play particular roles in order to enforce 
certain 'norms'. Motherhood demands that the woman produces her child not only 
biologically but also socially126• Her performance gives rise to that of the child. 
The stage on which the performance of motherhood plays is shifting. As the artist Barbara 
Kruger comments: 
I think that the hallucination of an ideal family is becoming more and 
more difficult to perpetrate. People can no longer believe it. ... 127 
The suspension of disbelief in the family theatre no longer carries its force128• And it is in 
the family unit that Butler sees the most progressive subversion of compulsory 
heterosexuality. In discussing the documentary film Paris is Burning by Jennie 
Livingstone, a film which documents the dance form 'vogueing' in the New York 
underground drag scene, it is not so much the performance of gender which Butler finds 
subversive (which merely mimes the heteronormative model) but rather the performance 
of family: mothers and children: 
... the subversive part of what [Livingston's film] documents, for me, is in 
the "house" structure, where there are "mothers" and "children," and new 
125 Judith Butler, 'The Body You Want: Liz Kotz Interviews Judith Butler' Artforum November 1992, 
82-89 p.84 
126 For detailed arguments on the social construction of motherhood and child rearing see Donna 
Bassin and Margaret Honey and Meryle Mahrer Kaplan eds., Representations of Motherhood (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), Sharon Hays, The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood 
(London: Yale University Press, 1996) and Patrice Di Quinzio, The Impossibility of Motherhood 
\London: Routledge, 1999) 
27 Therese Lichtenstein, 'Images of the Maternal: An interview with Barbara Kruger' in Donna 
Bassin and Margaret Honey and Meryle Mahrer Kaplan eds., Representations of Motherhood (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) p.199 
126 lt is perhaps a measure of my mother's own exhaustion from this performance, that she left her 
three young children in 1983 to the care of their father. 
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kinship systems, which do mime older nuclear-family kinship 
arrangements but also displace them, and radically recontextualize them 
in a way that constitutes a rethinking of kinship, or that turns kinship into 
a notion of extended community - one whose future forms can't be fully 
predicted. What is a "house"? A "house" is the people you "walk" with. I 
love that that's a house. 129 
But in 1972 in the Sofaer family house, no such shift from the performance script was 
envisaged, and the reference manual was firmly rooted in Dr. Spock. What is so striking 
about Dr. Spock's text is the way it overtly encourages performance on the part of the 
parent. The first chapter of Baby and Child Care is titled 'The Parent's Part', as if 
parenting was literally a role or character to be studied and subsequently enacted. This 
actor/character methodology is extended even to encompass a performance of the child 
itself by the parent, as in, for instance, this account of why urging a child to eat is 
unreasonable and likely to cause problems. 
Put yourself in the child's place for a minute. To get in the mood, think 
back to the last time you weren't very hungry. Perhaps it was a muggy 
day, or you were worried, or you had a stomach upset. (The child with a 
feeding problem feels that way most of the time.) Now imagine that a 
nervous giantess is sitting beside you, watching every mouthful. You 
have eaten a little of the foods that appeal to you most and have put 
your fork down, feeling quite full. But she looks worried and says, "You 
haven't touched your turnips." You explain that you don't want any, but 
she doesn't seem to understand how you feel, acts as if you are being 
bad on purpose. When she says you can't get up from the table until 
you've cleaned your plate, you try a bit of turnip, but if makes you feel 
slightly sick. She scoops up a tablespoonful and pokes it at your mouth, 
which makes you retch. 130 
The parent is thus asked to act not only in the role of parent but also as the child they 
parent. 
The Aeroplane Spoon sits at the intersection between parent and child. lt evidences the 
parents' empathetic acting ability. lt is the prop the parent uses having inhabited the mind 
and body of their child. The Aeroplane Spoon makes eating fun, because a parent knows 
what it is like to retch. 
129 Butler p.84 
130 Benjamin McLane Spock, Baby and Child Care illust. by Dorothea Fox (London: Bodley Head, 
1969) p.449 
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lt is interesting to note the rather saccharine eulogy provided for Dr. Speck in his 
biography by Lynn Bloom. 
Often, as Dr. Speck captures the essence of intimate parent-child 
relationships, he appears to be inside the parents' mind - and the child's 
. lt I 131 
- s1mu aneous y .... 
Speck writes the script by a kind of double-act in the role of the parent and the child. 
Fig. 45: The Aeroplane Spoon 
in The Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, Cambridge 
131 Bloom p.1 6 
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Chapter 2: Namesake 
Fig. 46: Sofaer General Merchants and Commission Agents, Rangoon, Burma c.1908 
Namesake: Introduction 
' ... the proper name is only ever supposed 
to refer and not to mean.' 
Julian Wolfreys 132 
Travelling up the Finchley Road in North London, soon after I had arrived in the capital in 
the early nineties, my eye stopped on a shop front which read: Jews for Jesus. lt is 
possible that I had heard of the organisation before, but the fact that here there was a 
concrete registration of this seeming contradiction struck me. I crossed the road and 
gazed into the window. There were a few ceremonial objects used in the Jewish 
household - I seem to remember a Hanukkiah, the eight branched candelabra used 
during the festival of Hanukkah -and a Seder plate, used at the Passover meal. There 
were also a selection of books, often with a graphic incorporating both a star of David and 
a crucifix. I was a bit perplexed. I wrote down the telephone contact number clearly printed 
on the window and went on my way. 
A couple of days later I phoned up the number and asked the person at the other end, 
"what is Jews for Jesus?". After a lucid but almost blunt reply ('We are Jews who believe 
that Jesus was the Messiah,") I could practically hear the pen poised over the paper ready 
to take down my contact details in preparation for my indoctrination. When I announced 
(and spelt) my name- Joshua Sofaer- there was an awkward silence. lt was the kind of 
silence that comes when someone thinks that they misheard, or that you are taking them 
for a ride, but then realise that no, you really are telling the truth. "Oh," came the eventual 
reply, "you know there is another Joshua Sofaer in New York who is very involved with 
Jews for Jesus." 
The call finishes and I am left feeling uneasy. There is another me (at least one other). But 
not only that, he is an active member of what I take to be a weird Messianic cult. Oh dear. 
132 Julian Wolfreys, The Derrida Reader: Writing Performances (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1998) p.17 
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Fig. 47: Joshua Sofaer & Joshua Sofaer 
A la recherche du temps perdu is saturated with the importance and reverberations of 
proper names. The narrator identifies, with a shudder, the affect of the namesake: 
We are afraid of being confused with them, and forestall the mistake by 
a grimace of disgust when anyone refers to them in our hearing. When 
we read our own name, as borne by them, in the newspaper, they seem 
to have usurped it. The transgressions of other members of the social 
organism are a matter of indifference to us. We lay the burden of them 
the more heavily upon our namesakes.133 
The film-maker Alan Berliner and the comedian Dave German have both made work in 
which they have tried to contact and bring together as many other people in the world as 
they can who also share their name. In doing so they have observed the vertiginous 
warped mirror of confronting a namesake; but in both cases the end point of the project 
has been at the moment of confrontation. 
In May 2002 I went to visit Joshua Sofaer USA. the New York based evangelist in his 
early thirties, a full-time proselytizing 'Jewish believer' who preaches for the acceptance of 
Jesus, as a member of the Messianic Judeo-Christian organisation Jews for Jesus. 
133 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time Vols 1-6 trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 1996) Vol.3 p.425 
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By spending time with another Joshua Sofaer and recording our conversations, I hoped to 
better understand how names function. Observing the similarities and differences in our 
attitudes and understanding of what it meant to be in the world as 'Joshua Sofaer' - both 
exactly the same and completely different- a wider picture evolved. 
In May 2004, two years after my initial visit to Joshua Sofaer134, I presented Namesake: 
The Story of a Name, a live performance with soundscape in collaboration with the 
composer Jonathan Cooper at three venues in London. They were: The Jewish Museum 
{the London Museum of Jewish Life), Home (an art gallery and performance space based 
inside a family house in Camberwell and noted for its commitment to live art practices), 
and The Swiss Church in London {which has a growing programme of cross-cultural and 
intercultural arts activities). Each of these three venues and their audiences, the Jewish 
venue and audience, the Art venue and audience, and the Christian venue and audience, 
contributed to the resonances of the piece, the underlying message of which, was the 
need for tolerance through religious and national exchange in the current climate of tense 
·international relations. These concerns were filtered through the telling of the story of my 
meeting with my namesake, and our understanding of the meanings of our name. 
The personal proper name designates its referent. We hail another with their name and 
we respond to our own name being called. But even the fact of this trip alone, that it was 
made at all, forces the conclusion that names are not simply designators but activators 
which affect, alter, produce and even dictate life narratives. The personal proper name 
offers a proliferation of significations outside and beyond its referent. 
The problem of the name is one that has long been acknowledged. Plato's Cratylus is a 
Socratic dialogue dedicated entirely to the subject and concludes with a provocation to 
Western socio-linguistic and philosophical thought: ' ... it's one thing to be a name and 
134 I went to see him a second time and to record further interviews in January 2004. 
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another to be the thing it names.'135 As early as the Fourth Century BCE the designator 
and the referent were being separated. 
In the post-Warholian cultural climate the name has become the vessel which holds and 
enunciates what contemporary culture holds at its zenith: the celebrity. This chapter 
explores the personal proper name within the context of writing and performance, looking 
at ways in which the name is enunciated by - and itself enunciates - autobiography. 
Section 1, Naming Ceremony: In The Name Of The Father notes the potential of a name 
to span the life narrative of the named, from before birth and beyond death and explores 
the debt novelist Philip Roth pays to the name of the father. Section 2, Nametag: Meaning 
observes the ways in which personal proper names signify beyond (and before) the 
referent, with specific reference to the way in which names activate desires in Marcel 
Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu. Section 3, Name Test: Affect considers the way 
in which particular names affect life narratives, with a focus on Edward Said's struggle 
with his name, as configured in his memoir Out of Place. The central section, Section 4, 
Namesake: Identical Other considers what might be at stake in the existence of more than 
one person with the same name; particular reference is made to Edgar Allan Poe's short 
story William Wilson and the impact of mechanical reproduction on identity formulation. 
Section 5, Nameless: No Name is an extended analysis of what it might mean to be 
without a name, tracking through literary, filmic and sociological examples. In Section 6, 
Not In My Name: Author the issue of the printed author's name in the peritext of a 
published work is examined with specific reference to the author-narrator-protagonist 
relationship in Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu and is mapped against Roland 
Barthes' comments on diary and journal writing. The final section, Section 7, Ineffable 
Name: God discusses the Tetragrammaton, the most holy personal name of God and 
relates it to the figure of the first writer: the Hebrew sofaer, or scribe. 
135 Plato Cratylus trans. by C. D. C. Reeve (lndianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998) p.78 
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Each section commences with a quotation from my namesake Joshua Sofaer, a quotation 
which was recorded in interviews in New York in either May 2002 or January 2004 and 
was played back as part of the performance piece Namesake: The Story of a Name. 
Either directly or indirectly, these quotations have offered me a provocation towards the 
proposition explored in each section. 
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Do I get off on the antagonism and the rejection? On a selfish level yes, 
it's all about me and how I can be one-upping my Dad and how I can be 
one-upping the Jewish community, and oh all these Rabbis, they're not 
smart enough. But you know what? That's not how it works. 
I think probably as I was younger, one of the things that I did that wasn 1 
right, is that I used my faith to skirt some real issues of anger that I had 
with my Dad and the rest of my family and in some cases I'm working on 
it and it's going well and in some cases I've still got a way to go. 
Joshua Sofaer, New York 
1. Naming Ceremony: In The Name Of The Father 
When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer 
of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. 
And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if 
the name ceased to have meaning it would 
make no sense to say 'Mr. N. N. is dead.' 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 136 
While there are many practical affects which would prevent it (amnesias, alterations, 
violations) the personal proper name has the potential to span the length of a life. Naming 
as narrative. The UK is common with many other countries in making it a legal obligation 
to register the name of a newly born child. In England you have forty-two days from birth 
to indicate the names in which you intend to raise the child. The state has. its reasons for 
wanting to Jog births and deaths, for knowing the size and distribution of its population. 
Beyond this legal requirement, religion positions the act of naming as the covenant 
between the new born child and God. In the Jewish and Christian traditions this takes 
place in the brit milah (the circumcision) and in the baptism respectively. Even non-
believers convene secular naming ceremonies as a way of bringing their offspring into 
social space. lt would be considered a legal, religious and social travesty for a child to be 
without a name. 
In most cases, the name, or at least the family name, precedes birth. The name is 
predetermined. One carries the family name before one is born. Any subsequent birth 
136 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) §40 
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name is also 'given', it is not a matter of choice; similarly after death the name continues 
to operate outside one's own control. 
In Jewish tradition birth and death are connected through the act of naming. Naming is a 
form of memorial and bequest and it becomes crucial whether one is named after the 
living or the dead. Ashkenazim (historically Eastern European Jews) name after deceased 
relatives only; in case of divine confusion between two living destinies. Sephardim 
(historically Middle Eastern, Spanish and Arabic Jews) name after living relatives as well; 
it is considered as a form of honour. 
In biblical times however, it was unthinkable that two people (living or dead) could have 
the same name if they belonged to the same society: 
... people believed that to give the name of one living person to another 
would transfer his being, his individuality, to the other person, with the 
result that the one from whom the name is taken must cease to exist. 
And the same consideration would prevent people from naming 
after deceased relatives or ancestors. To give the child the name of a 
departed ancestor- according to the Biblical evidence - would destroy 
and obliterate the soul and the remembrance of the departed and cause 
his soul to forsake its peaceful abode in heaven. This may explain why 
names are not repeated in the Biblical period. lt was impossible for two 
persons belonging to the same family or group to have the same 
name.137 
The personal proper name as configured here is an absolute and eternal identity, 
fundamental to the course of a life narrative and beyond; not just for life, but forever. lt is 
to be preciously guarded and respected and is intrinsic not only to earthly identity but to 
the eternal soul as well. 
Naming is powerful stuff, and in an attempt to divert what was sometimes seen as the 
negative destiny encapsulated in the name, name changing was commonly employed 
(and in some circles still is) in order that a gravely ill person may avoid the Angel of Death. 
137 Benzion C. Kaganoff, A Dictionary of Jewish Names and their History (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1 978) p.97 
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Jews visualized the celestial administration as conducted in much the 
same bureaucratic fashion as a mundane government. God distributes 
His decrees among various angels and spirits for execution. The angels 
follow their orders to the letter, never deviating; they go only by names 
and addresses. And if they come to the given address and, looking there 
for a person with a certain name, do not find such a person, they report 
back that the~ could not find him. The matter is dropped and the verdict 
is destroyed. 38 
Once again, the name is a matter of life and death. Changing your name to save your life; 
identifying yourself through your name. 
As Philippe Lejeune points out, in infancy the personal proper name is also the one with 
which we first articulate ourselves: 
The individual person and his discourse are connected to each other 
through the personal name, even before they are connected by the first 
person, as is shown by the facts of language acquisition in children. The 
infant speaks of himself in the third person, using his own name, long 
before he comes to understand that he too can use the first person. 
Later, each of us will call himself 'I' in speaking; but for everyone this 'I' 
will designate a particular name, which he will always be able to utter.139 
The first point of self-identification, is through the personal proper name in the third 
person. 1t takes time to get to the moment of '1'. This infantile form of self-appellation 
prefigures a later literary trope. Ironically many autobiographical writers try to escape the 
use of 'I' by referring to themselves in the third person; this marks a return to the time of 
language acquisition 140. 
This moment of language acquisition in which the self names self, is outside memory and 
predates the establishment of the prefrontal lobe and our capacity for remembering. The 
way we acknowledge the process of ourselves as becoming through naming is most often 
through nicknames, name-calling, pet names or the taking on of another's name. 
138 Ibid. p.102 
139 Philippe Lejeune, 'The Autobiographical Contract' in French Literary Theory Today ed. by 
Tzvetan Todorov, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p.199 
140 A marked case of this would be Gertrude Stein's autobiography The Autobiography of A/ice B 
Toklas in which the 'I' is put in the voice of Alice, and Gertrude Stein is only ever referred to in the 
third person. 
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' .. .in the development of the individual, acquiring his own name is 
doubtless as important a milestone as the 'mirror stage'. This acquisition 
occurs at a moment inaccessible to memory, or to autobiography, which 
can speak only of those second and inverted baptisms which consist, for 
a child, in the accusations which freeze him in a role by means of a 
label: 'thief, for Genet, 'Yid', for Albert Cohen.'141 
We can bear witness to our becoming in these personal but non-proper names (which are 
sometimes sacred and sometimes painful) but we can not bear witness to the first time we 
are called or use our personal proper name. 
In fitting parallel, we are also not witness to the employment of our name after our death 
(this is baring the all seeing heavenly eye which many may wish to give the dead - only 
time will tell). As the Wittgenstein quotation which opens this section attests, our name 
functions semantically beyond that of our body. Julian Wolfreys corroborates this point 
when he writes: 
... the proper name operates improperly in that it can still operate in the 
subject's absence or even after the subject's death. My name, which is 
supposedly property mine can be written or uttered after my death, and 
is not dependent on my being or my presence. The proper name, then, 
performs in accordance with a semantic function which is not proper to 
it.142 . 
In this way- in a state pre-birth, in infancy, death or even simply absence- our name is 
not always ours. Autobiographic writing is, in part, about taking control of the name, 
writing to understand how one became named and often to disinherit the baggage that the 
name brings with it. 
The novelist Philip Roth has written two overtly autobiographical works: The Facts and 
Patrimony. Published just three years apart, both books resound with preoccupations 
about the author's personal proper name and death. The preface of The Facts, Roth's 
tentative and partially unwilling autobiography, commences with a childhood memory of 
141 Lejeune p.210 
142 Julian Wolfreys, The Derrida Reader: Writing Performances (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1998) p.18 
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his father's near fatal frailty after an appendix operation143. Roth's preoccupation with the 
image of a sick and emasculated father is expanded in detail in Patrimony, which follows 
the dying and eventual death of Roth's father. 
The death of the father is bound up with the legacy of the family name. Roth signs himself 
'Roth', discarding his first name, both books are dedicated to other Roths - The Facts to 
his brother, Patrimony to 'our family, the living and the dead' - and Roth makes it clear 
that he configures his identity as a writer as 'Roth': a name which he has made renowned 
through the publication of his writings. Caught up in this is a conventional filial love anxiety 
at fulfilling the father's legacy: living up to the family name. Roth's two names 'Philip' and 
'Roth' belong separately to each of his parents. 'Philip' belongs to his mother: it is the 
name of her dead father ('the unnameable animal me bearing her dead father's name'144) 
and he takes the place of his mother's father for his mother. 'Roth' however, is of the 
father, it is prima facie his first identity, 'even for the writer I would become'145. 
To be at all is to be her Philip, but in the embroilment with the buffeting 
world, my history still takes its spin from beginning as his Roth. 146 
The grammar here 'as his Roth', points both to his identity as progeny (his father's son) 
and the legacy of the name (the next Roth), a legacy which is both personal (the family) 
and public (the writer). The two are never far apart. To be his son is to write in his 
143 
'Unwilling' because he precedes and concludes the book with long apologia for his foray into 
overtly autobiographical writing. 
144 Philip Roth, The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1989) p.18 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. p.19 
147 Roth conceives the origin of the point of inscription as coming from his father. He does not deny 
a matrilineal origin ("To be at all is to be her Philip") but his professional name, his writer's name, 
comes from the father. From the start then, Roth figures writing as highly gendered. In the 
discussion that follows I run with this, though not without the knowledge that this elides the woman 
at the point of origin of inscription. As will become apparent as the discussion progresses to the 
matter of shaving - the father/son ritual - this gendered relation becomes excessive, almost to the 
point of becoming camp. There is a presumed deconstruction at work here. For an interesting 
counterpoint to Roth's point of origin see Helime Cixous and Mireille Calle-Gruber, Rootprints: 
Memory and Life Writing trans. by Eric Prenowitz (London: Routledge, 1997) p.197, where Cixous 
identifies the death of her father as the point at which she becomes him: 'I had to carry out a 
mutilating mutation of identity. As the eldest of the family, I was obliged in many circumstances to 
become my father ... .". This obligation is, however, configured as a debt to her mother, for 'the 
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The Facts commences with an open letter to Nathan Zukerman, one of Roth's fictional 
(though many suggest autobiographically based) characters, in which Roth gives his 
reasons for writing an autobiographical text. Roth writes to Zukerman about his recovery 
from a mental breakdown, a period of physical illness and about writing as a therapeutic 
process of relearning self. 
In order to recover what I had lost I had to go back to the moment of 
origin.148 
He also writes in order to make sense of his relationship with his father . 
. .. to hearten me as I come closer and closer and closer to an eighty-six-
year-old father viewing the end of life as a thing as near to his face as 
the mirror he shaves in .... 149 
The metaphor for approaching death is configured here as the shaving mirror held inches 
away from the face. The reflection peering back as a reminder of ones own mortality. This 
metaphor Roth employs, of shaving as the death of his father, prefigures (perhaps 
consciously) the far more literal association of shaving and death in Patrimony, published 
three years later. 
Patrimony traces the dying and death of his father; in it Roth recounts how he forwent his 
entitlement to his father's estate (in favour of his brother and his brother's children) and 
that the only item he wished to keep was his grandfather's shaving mug. 
The mug was pale blue porcelain; a delicate floral design enclosed a 
wide white panel at the front, and inside the panel the name "S. Roth" 
and the date "1912" were inscribed in faded gold Gothic lettering. The 
mug was our one family heirloom as far as I knew, aside from a handful 
of antique snapshots the only thing tangible that anyone cared to save 
from the immigrant years in Newark.150 
honour of my mother'. Cixous points to the absence (rather than the presence) of her father as the 
p,oint of inscription, in service to the mother. 
48 Philip Roth, The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1989) p.5 
149 Ibid. p.8 
150 Philip Roth, Patrimony: A True Story (London: Vintage, 1999) p.27 
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The mug is made precious through the fragile legible inscription of the personal proper 
name "S. Roth". This shaving mug recurs throughout Patrimony and it is as if Roth's 
preoccupation with it -with having it- as his sole inheritance, is his desire to inherit and 
take control of the family name itself. This is what the title refers to, his patrimony, literally 
what he inherits: the name and the mug. 
The shaving mug inscribed "S. Roth" had seemed to free my grandfather 
- if only momentarily, if only for those few minutes he quietly sat being 
shaved in the barber's chair late on a Friday afternoon - from the dour 
exigencies that had trapped him and that, I imagined, accounted for his 
austere, uncommunicative nature. His mug emitted the aura of an 
archaeological find, an artefact signalling an unexpected level of cultural 
refinement, an astonishing superfluity in an otherwise cramped and 
obstructed existence - in our ordinary little Newark bathroom, it had the 
impact on me of a Greek vase depicting the mythic origins of the race. 151 
By owning the origins, he owns the right to the name. This is the "moment of origin" that 
Roth seeks through the process of autobiographic writing in The Facts- his reason for 
writing at all - the shaving mug with the family name bequeathed to him in Patrimony. 
Shaving is, as Mark Simpson points out in Male Impersonators, ' ... the last non-religious 
masculine initiation ceremony in the Western world. Certainly it is the only one intimately 
involving fathers ... .'152. Simpson goes even further than this to parallel shaving with the 
act of circumcision, that is the sacrificial covenant between a father and God, a sacrifice of 
flesh: 
The very expression 'clean cut' connotes a ritual wounding such as 
circumcision (itself a symbolic castration, a sign of the Law of the 
Father). The idea of civilization is itself suggested by shaving: not just 
the initiation into manhood but also the triumph of order over chaos, 
artifice over nature. 153 
Shaving, father, death: the name. The shaving mug represents the father/son relationship 
and its embodiment in ritual and social order; it represents the death of his father and acts 
151 Ibid. p.28 
152 Mark Simpson, Male Impersonators (London: Cassell, 1994) p.110 
153 Ibid. p.111 
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as a metaphor for the fragility of life and the immanence of death; it represents legacy 
both as an heirloom and by its inscription which bares the family name. Shaving is also a 
latent metaphor for the act of writing itself; as Simpson hints, shaving - as writing - is the 
triumph of order over chaos. Roth's preoccupations: the family name and the death of his 
father, come together in the process of writing itself, a process which must necessarily 
pay a debt to the name he bares and the father who gave it. 
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I don't believe it was an accident that my name is Joshua Sofaer, that 
my name is Joshua, that it means salvation and it's a Jewish name and 
all of these things. Whether it was God or not, now I can say I really 
value that, and there is meaning that I can ascribe to those things that is 
significant. My name fits what I am doing. 
Joshua Sofaer, New York 
2. Nametag: Meaning 
... the proper name [ ... ] has other than indicative functions. 
lt is more than a gesture, a finger pointed at someone; 
it is, to a certain extent, the equivalent of a description. 
Michel Foucault154 
Start with a joke: 
Uncle George spots a nice looking gal in a bar, goes up and starts small 
talk. Seeing that she doesn't back off he asks her name. 
"Carmen," she replies. 
That's a nice name," he says, warming up the conversation, "Who 
named you, your mother?" 
"No, I named myself," she answers. 
"Oh, that's interesting. Why Carmen?" 
"Because I like cars, and I like men," she says, looking directly into his 
eyes, "What's your name?" 
"Beerfuck." 
Uncle George changes his name, on Carmen's terms, in order to give it meaning beyond 
the referent (himself). The joke operates because Uncle George takes on board Carmen's 
rule system in order to make a pass at her. 'Carmen' is both Carmen's self-designated 
name and an indication of her stated desire. 'Beerfuck' is a temporarily assumed name 
and the counter-revelation of Uncle George's desire in a linguistic mirroring. 
There is a long discourse in the philosophy of language which seeks to determine to what 
extent the meaning of most linguistic proper names are their referents155, whether or not 
154 Michel Foucault 'What Is an Author?' in Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern, A Reader 
ed. by Sean Burke (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995) p.233 
155 As propounded by John Stuart Mill. See John Stuart Mill, Collected Works: System of Logic ed. 
by J. M. Robson (London: Routledge, 1996) 
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they are descriptive 156 or if they are rigid designators 157• The imperative of such 
discussions seeks to explore the interrelations of language systems but often without 
accounting for diurnal application and usage. While it is outside the scope of this research 
to explain or explore these discourses in any serious detail, it might be useful to start by 
scrutinizing one of the classic logical arguments. 
In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke argues that names are rigid designators, in other 
words that they rigidly designate their referent in all possible worlds. The example that 
Kripke gives is that of the "heavenly body" Hesperus, which would still be Hesperus even 
if it had not been in the particular place that it was when it was first named158. He expands 
on this argument in discussion of the name 'Hitler' as follows: 
Hitler might have spent all his days in quiet in Linz. In that case we 
would not say that then this man would not have been Hitler, for we use 
the name 'Hitler' just as the name of that man, even in describing other 
possible worlds. (This is the notion which I called a rigid designator in 
the previous talk.) Suppose we do decide to pick out the reference of 
'Hitler', as the man who succeeded in having more Jews killed than 
anyone else managed to do in history. That is the way we pick out the 
reference of the name; but in another counterfactual situation where 
someone else would have gained this discredit, we wouldn't say that in 
that case thijt other man would have been Hitler. If Hitler had never 
come to power, Hitler would not have had the property which I am 
supposing we use to fix the reference of his name.159 
Kripke's argument is logical, but it is also circular (Hitler is Hitler) and while the 
philosophical application is sound, it does not account for the way in which names 
156 See for example Plato Cratylus trans. by C. D. C. Reeve (lndianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1998) 
157 See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972; repr. 2002) and Scott 
Soames, Beyond Rigidity: The unfinished semantic agenda of 'Naming and necessity' (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). Outlined in brief below. 
158 
'When the mythical agent first saw Hesperus, he may well have fixed his reference by saying, 'I 
shall use "Hesperus" as a name of the heavenly body appearing in yonder position in the sky.' He 
then fixed the reference of 'Hesperus' by its apparent celestial position. Does it follow that it is part 
of the meaning of the name that Hesperus has such and such a position at the time in question? 
Surely not: if Hesperus had been hit earlier by a comet, it might have been visible at a different 
position at that time. In such a counterfactual situation we would say that Hesperus would not have 
occupied that position, but not that Hesperus would not have been Hesperus. The reason is that 
'Hesperus' rigidly designates a certain heavenly body and 'the body in yonder position' does not-
a different body, or no body might have been in that position, but no other body might have been 
Hesperus (though another body, not Hesperus, might have been called 'Hesperus'). Indeed, as I 
have said, I will hold that names are always rigid designators.' Kripke p.57 
159 Ibid. p. 74 
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circulate in time and space. 'Hitler' is an interesting case when considering the wider 
semantic reverberations of the proper name. 
Hitler's name was 'Hitler' by chance. There is much debate as to why his father changed 
the family name from Schicklgruber (Aiois Hitler's (that is Adolph's father's) mother's 
maiden name) thirteen years before his son Adolph was born, but what it eventually 
ended up as (H-i-t-1-e-r) was a chance blunder by the notary who, when 'legitimating' 
(literally making un-illegitimate) the records of Alois' birth, recorded the spoken name 
'Hiedler' (the name of Alois Schicklgruber's foster and possibly natural father) as 'Hitler'160• 
1t would be pure speculation to suggest that had the family name remained Schicklgruber, 
Twentieth Century European history might have taken a different tack; but just as it would 
be na"ive to make such a proposition, it would be similarly na·ive to rule it out completely. If 
one accepts that naming is to some degree destiny (as proposed in the following section 
of this chapter) then the proposition begins to look less remote. As lan Kershaw points out 
in his highly detailed biography of Hitler, which opens with a protracted historical account 
of Hitler's name change: 
Adolph can be believed when he said that nothing his father had done 
pleased him so much as to drop the coarsely rustic name of 
Schicklgruber. Certainly, 'Hail Schickl~ruber' would have sounded an 
unlikely salutation to a national hero.1 1 
Unlikely enough to change history? We shall never know162• 
So while Kripke may be right that 'Hitler' could, counterfactually, rigidly designate a man 
who spent all his years quiet in Linz, it doesn't. Similarly if Hitler had not been called 
'Hitler' but some other name, like 'Schicklgruber', perhaps he would not have been the 
man who succeeded in having more Jews killed than anyone else managed to do in 
history. 'Hitler' then, does not rigidly designate Hitler in all possible worlds, because it 
160 lan Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936 Hubris (London: Penguin, 2001) p.5 
161 I bid 0 p.3 
162 The point here (made by Kershaw and implied by Hitler) is that 'Schicklgruber' is a sonic 
signifier; it sounds peculiar. 
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does not reference Hitler in the world where Hitler is called Schicklgruber; that is to say if 
the name, rather than the man, had not existed. 
'Hitler' signifies beyond the individual Hitler, in far more 'concrete' ways than this 
counterfactual historical revisionism. Despite the protestations of some linguists who 
discount the lexical meaning of proper names, even if they propose that names do have 
meaning beyond their referents ('one should not confuse the absence of lexical meaning 
in a name with total lack of meaning'163 ) 'Hitler' does have a dictionary definition. 
Hitler [Adolf Hitler (1889- 1945), leader of the Nazi Party and 
Chancellor of the German Reich. Cf. FOhrer.]1. Used attrib. and in 
possess. with ref. to Hitler's rule or personal characteristics. M20. 2. A 
tyrannical ruler or leader; a dictatorial person freq. in little Hitler). M20 
Hitler moustache/Hitler salute/Hitler Youth ... 
Hitlerian a. of, pertaining to, or characteristic of Hitler ... 164 
The dictionary offers a definition associated with the key qualities or properties of the 
individual whose name it employs (it does so for Hitler as it does for many personal proper 
names including Proust, Thatcher and recently even Delia Smith). While it is the 
properties of the person in question, rather than the person per se, that is referenced in 
this definition, the fact that a dictionary definition exists for a personal proper name 
highlights the possibilities of a personal proper name to do more than simply rigidly 
designate its referent. 
1t might be useful then to consider the personal proper name as a fluid activator in addition 
to being a rigid designator. 'Fluid activator' references the ways in which personal, social, 
historical and lexical meanings position our understanding of personal proper names for 
particular people at particular times. 
163 Stephen Wilson, The Means of Naming: A social and cultural history of personal naming in 
Western Europe (London: UCL Press, 1998) p.xi 
164 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
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In Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu the names of people and places function in 
precisely this way. Names in the novel are primarily evocative templates for the narrator 
and only secondarily rigidly designate a particular person or place. 
Both Gilles Deleuze and Michael Ragussis in their respective studies of Proust have 
described names as kinds of holding vessels. For Deleuze this vessel takes the form of a 
"half open case"165 or a "box"166, for Ragussis it is in the form of an "envelope"167• In all 
instances what is being described is the operation of the name as not simply a trigger to 
associated thoughts and feelings but rather the name as container for a series of desires. 
One of the consistent themes throughout A la recherche du temps perdu is that of 
disappointment. The disappointment of love, of self, of family, of country; the continual 
mismatch of outcome to expectation. This experience of disappointment is often 
configured around the name of a place or person. In the first instance the narrator 
configures this around place. As Ragussis points out, ' ... the child expects to see the 
pleasure of the name some day realised in the place. '166 For the narrator the key place 
names are Balbec and Venice, where the loading of expectation as contained in the name 
can never be realised in his actual experience of the town or city. (This is similar to the 
common collective experience and expectations of the cities New York and Paris; the 
former is so 'known' through repeated representation, especially in film, that the 
experience seems somehow unexceptional, and the latter carries such singular 
expectations of romantic and erotic completion which it can barely sustain.) lt is easy to 
understand the way in which place names might signify because they easily become 
tropes of their key characteristics. lt is not so clear how personal proper names would 
carry such weight. 
165 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs (London: The Athlone Press, 2000) p.117 
166 1bid. p.118 
167 Michael Ragussis, Acts of Naming: The Family Plot in Fiction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986) p.200 
166 Ibid. p.199 
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For the narrator, who, on hearing it uttered, finds the name 'Mme Guermantes' brings to 
him a wealth of expectation and desire, meeting the woman proves disjointed and 
incommensurate . 
. .. the mystery of her name, since I did not find it in her person when I 
saw her leave the house in the morning on foot, or in the afternoon in 
her carriage. 169 
This would seem to invert the logical conventions of person to name signification. We 
meet a person, we are told their name, we attach the name to the person. Here the 
person falls short of the 'meaning' of the name . 
. . . I did not succeed in integrating into the living woman the name 
Guermantes, in thinking of her as Mme de Guermantes. 170 
And it is this lack of successful integration which occupies the narrator for much of his 
search. As Deleuze points out, ' ... the narrator's activity consists in explicating, that is 
unfolding, developing a content incommensurable with the container.'171 And once this 
disappointment has been acknowledged, and the name-holder becomes known to the 
narrator, the name itself becomes unsatisfactory as a signifier . 
. . . in this single Duchesse de Guermantes, so many different women 
superimpose themselves, each one vanishing as soon as the next had 
acquired sufficient consistency. Words do not change their meanin~s as 
much in centuries as names do for us in the space of a few years. 1 2 
This pattern - the name bringing with it a meaning which can not be found in the named 
and the named becoming known only to invalidate the name - is one that is repeated for 
all three of the central female protagonists during A la recherche du temps perdu: Gilberte 
Swann, Oriane the Duchesse de Guermantes and Albertine Simonet. The conundrum of 
the name is particularly marked when there is an added erotic attachment for the narrator. 
169 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time Vols 1-6 trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 1996) Vol.3 p.24 
170 Ibid. 
171 Deleuze p.117 · 
172 Proust Vol.3 p.615 
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Indeed with Gilberte, the power of 'Gilberte Swann' is not sustainable in her presence, for 
she can not support the illusion of her name. 
Thus was wafted to my ears the name of Gilberte ....... uttered across 
the heads of the stocks and jasmines, pungent and cool as the drops 
which fell from the green watering-pipe; impregnating and irradiating the 
zone of pure air through which it had passed - and which it set apart and 
isolated with the mystery of the life of her whom its syllables designated 
to the happy beings who lived and walked and travelled in her company; 
unfolding beneath the arch of the pink hawthorn, at the height of my 
shoulder, the quintessence of their familiarity- so exquisitely painful to 
myself- with her and with the unknown world of her existence into which 
I should never penetrate.173 
With such expectations, of course when he does "penetrate" into the "world of her 
existence" he can only be disappointed; such promise is bound to fall foul. As Ragussis 
points out: ' ... the beloved object seems a belated appendage to the erotic name; the 
name precedes the person by making her possible as the beloved.'174 
In the case of Albertine, the narrator observes the inadequacy of both his own and her 
name as signifiers of the multi-faceted identities they describe. 
I ought to give a different name to each of the selves who subsequently 
thought about Albertine; I ought still more to give a different name to 
each of the Albertines who appeared before me, never the same, like 
those seas - called by me simply and for the sake of convenience "the 
sea" ... 175 
This statement presupposes a necessary descriptive quality to the personal proper name; 
that they do not simply designate the named person, but rather also describe who and 
what they are. The intensity of this description, which in the case of 'Gilberte' haunts the 
narrator, becomes torture in the case of 'Aibertine'. 
As for Albertine herself, she scarcely existed in me save under the form 
of her name, which, but for certain rare moments of respite when I 
173 Proust Vol.1 p.169 
174 Ragussis p.205 
175 Proust Vol.2 p.610 
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awoke, came and enwaved itself upon my brain and continued 
incessantly to do so.1 6 
The name of the departed lover is repeatedly inscribed on the brain in a continual gesture 
reminiscent of the torture endured by Tityus in the Odyssey, in which a vulture tears at his 
liver, which is renewed only to be torn again. 
For Proust the operation of the name is bound up with what it signifies before it 
designates. Names activate a series of connections, manifest desires, and produce 
affects which sit outside the rigid designation of the referent. Deleuze sums this up 
beautifully: 
Names themselves have a content inseparable from the qualities of their 
syllables and from the free associations in which they participate. But 
precisely because we cannot open the box without projecting this entire 
associated content upon the real person or place, conversely, obligatory 
and entirely different associations imposed by the mediocrity of the 
person or the place will distort and dissolve the first series and create, 
this time, a gap between content and container. In all aspects of this first 
figure of the Search, then, the inadequation, the incommensurability of 
the content is manifested: it is either a lost content, which we regain in 
the splendour of an essence resuscitating an earlier self, or an emptied 
content, which brings the self to its death, or a separated content, which 
casts us into an inevitable disappointment.[ ... ] Names, persons, and 
things are crammed with a content that fills them to bursting; and not 
only are we present at this "dynamiting" of the containers by the 
contents, but at the explosion of the contents themselves that, unfolded, 
explicated, do not form a unique figure, but heterogeneous, fragmented 
truths still more in conflict among themselves than in agreement.177 
The Proust examples exemplify and textualise the fluid way in which personal proper 
names activate experiences beyond the rigid designation of the named. This is not a 
second order bi-product of associated characteristics to the named, but rather first order 
meaning as contained by the name itself. 
That names mean outside and before their referent, is exemplified at its most basic in 
gender, sex and ethnic signification. When James Morris underwent his sex realignment, 
176 Ibid. Vol.5 p.492 
177 Deleuze p.122 
121 
the negotiation of his name to hers, was very much part of the rite of passage into forming 
a more satisfactory identity. 
I took a new Christian name by statutory declaration, adopting after long 
discussion and experiment the still androgynous Jan. not because I 
wished to straddle the sexes, but because I thought it would make the 
change of habit less abrupt for my relatives and friends (and perhaps I 
thought, too, at the back of my mind, that if I failed to succeed in my new 
persona I could somehow retreat into the old).178 
James becoming Jan acknowledges the cultural significations of the name in terms of 
gender and sex attribution. Jan chooses her name to somehow soften the blow of her new 
becoming, but also in recognition of a potential in the name for "retreat". The name 'Jan' 
here becomes a safe haven, a security measure -full of promise for a future identity- yet 
with a built in clause should the plan go awry. 
When Wittgenstein poses the question: 'Has the name "Moses" got a fixed and 
unequivocal use for me in all possible cases?'179 -to which the answer is clearly 'no' -he 
opens up the possibility for a complex interrelation, a fluid and active set of operations, 
manifest in the name. 11 is in recognition of this that Carmen and Uncle George are able to 
battle with each other on the field of flirtation. 
178 Jan Morris, Conundrum (London: Faber and Faber, 1974) p.114 
179 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) §79 
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I wanted the stuff that Jesus was talking about and I knew that it was 
going to be a shock. I came back to the United States and my family 
really - I realised that what I did was I crossed a line. My younger 
brothers, all of a sudden were enrolled in Jewish Day School, my Dad 
started getting quite a lot of pressure from his family. Then it really 
started to kick in: what does it mean to be a Sofaer and to believe in 
Jesus? 
3. Name Test: Affect 
Joshua Sofaer, New York 
My daddy left home when I was three 
And he didn't leave much to Ma and me 
Just this old guitar and an empty bottle of booze. 
Now, I don't blame him cause he run and hid 
But the meanest thing that he ever did 
Was before he left, he went and named me "Sue." 
Shel Silverstein 180 
One of the fundamental checks when selecting a name for a child is the school yard test. 
Is the name vulnerable to twisted nicknames or bully abuse? Even the state takes an 
active interest in the appropriate naming of children. France has a particularly restrictive 
history of what are considered suitable names. In 1972, the year that I was named, a 
three-judge court in Melun near Paris ruled that Gerard and Paulette Trognon could not 
bestow their family name (meaning 'stump' or 'butt-end') on their three-year-old adoptive 
son Philippe, remarking that it would be "un handicap"181 . Clearly for the court, the idea of 
a slightly odd name was worse for a child than possessing a name that was not the same 
as his father's. Whatever the moral or legal case (and more recently a German citizen was 
prevented by law from calling his son Osama Bin Laden) the point is clear: the names we 
have affect the way we are treated and beyond that, possibly the whole of our lives. 
In the Johnny Cash song A Boy Named Sue, lyrics by Shel Silverstein, the first verse 
describes how an absconding father names his son 'Sue' [see above]. The narrative of the 
song follows Sue, who makes it his mission to find and kill his father for giving him a name 
180 A Boy Named Sue. Johnny Cash and Shel Sliverslein. Evil Eye Music. 1969 
181 Anonymous, 'France: The Surname Game' Time Magazine 11 September 1972, 14-15 (p.15) 
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which has caused him such humiliation and trauma. When Sue meets his Dad, they have 
a bit of a brawl, and then father turns to son: 
... he said: "Son, this world is rough 
And if a man's gonna make it, he's gotta be tough 
And I knew I wouldn't be there to help ya along. 
So I give ya that name and I said goodbye 
I knew you'd have to get tough or die 
And it's the name that helped to make you strong."182 
When Sue hears this explanation he has to acknowledge that what his father says is true. 
His name has made him what he is and has given him the wherewithal to face the 
particular challenges that his life has presented. 
Naming, in J. L. Austin's terms, is an explicit performative 183 . To name a child ("I name 
you Joshua") is to perform an action through the utterance. The personal proper name is 
given in an act of performance and maintains this performative quality. In Plato's Crytulus 
Socrates makes a similar point: 
.. .if speaking or saying is a sort of action, one that is about things, isn't 
using names also a sort of action?184 
Well certainly for Althusser it was. To call out a name, or merely to use it, is to make 
someone turn around, to bring them into the social space, to hail them as a subject. 185 
Naming highlights the importance of language to society by clearly showing that the body 
outside language (that is the body which remains without reference) is excluded from the 
social space. 
Names are also actions in a far more implicit way than through the act of naming or calling 
out a name. People's names can have a crucial affect on their lives and people change 
182 A Boy Named Sue 
183 See for example J. L. Austin, How to do things with words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1962) p.32 
184 Plato Craty/us trans. by C. D. C. Reeve (lndianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998) p.8 
185 See Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: New Left Books, 
1971) 
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their name in calculation of the power of that affect. Even in ancient Greece naming was 
used in a deterministic way, to try and carve out a future life: 
... many [names] are given in the hope that they will prove appropriate, 
such as 'Eutychides' ('Son-of-good-fortune'), 'Sosias' ('Saviour'), 
Theophilus' ('God-beloved'), and many others. 186 
This is something that has continued in almost all cultures up to the present and it is 
ubiquitous to see prospective parents pouring over a naming dictionary to see the lexical 
implications of short-listed names. In the West, this contemporary caution is based in a 
religious mysticism which no longer has the grip it once held. 
A name, it was believed, not only determines a person's character, but 
also his fate. Certain names bring good fortune, others bad. 187 
Such beliefs were not only part of a folklore associated with religious culture, but part of 
the fabric of religious belief. In Judaism, in the Midrash, a hermeneutic text which acts as 
a commentary on the bible, the advice is clear: 
One should examine names carefully in order to give his son a name 
that is worthy, so that the son may become a righteous person, for 
sometimes the name is a contributing factor for good as for evil. 186 
Names then, are literally one's destiny. 
Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet are forced to carry the burden of their family names. The 
tragedy of these star-crossed lovers is configured around the impossibility of the joining of 
each of their names. Tis but thy name that is my enemy,' Juliet says to herself, 'What's in 
a name?'189. Well, all too much. lt is the conflict of their names, the chance of their names, 
which brings them to their untimely death. 11 is naming that opens their lover's discourse 
and naming which kills them. 
186 Ibid. p.25 
187 Benzion C. Kaganoff, A Dictionary of Jewish Names and their History (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978) p.111 
186 Quoted in Kaganoff p.112 
189 William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet (New York: Signet Classics, 1963) Act 11 Scene 11 
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In our lives, we live our names; our names offer us a path that would be closed to us with 
a different name. This is not about destiny. lt is not to say, by any means, that we have no 
choice over the direction our life might take, but simply that those choices are often made 
through our name. In an essay titled 'Vocation' Rowan Williams relates the story of Rabbi 
Yehuda Lowe ben Bezalel's dream. Rabbi Yehuda dreams that he has died and was 
brought before the throne of heaven. The angel tells him to wait and listen as the names 
of all those who are allowed entrance to the kingdom of heaven are read out. He listens, 
but he does not hear his name ... 
. . . and he wept bitterly and cried out against the angel. And the angel 
said, 'I have called your name.' Rabbi Yehuda said, 'I did not hear it.' 
And the angel said, 'In the book are written the names of all men and 
women who have ever lived on earth, for every soul is an inheritor of the 
kingdom. But many come here who have never heard their true name on 
the lips of man or angel. They have lived believing that they know their 
names; and do not hear their names as their own. They do not recognise 
that it is for them that the gates of the kingdom have opened. So they 
must wait here until they hear their names and know them. 190 
Rabbi Yehuda wakes up and, lying prostrate on the ground prays that he will hear his own 
true name before he dies. 
In this story is encapsulated the idea that one's 'true' name is one's vocation; that the 
name is the calling and that the life's search is to find one's name. This idea separates out 
a 'given' name and a 'true' name as part of its religious conviction but it nevertheless also 
tracks usefully into thinking about how one might find one's vocation in a secular name. 
Edward Said's memoir Out of Place is an account of how the writer's personal proper 
name 'Edward Said' gave him a particular life narrative, but it also becomes his writing: his 
reason to write. Here we see a direct correlation between the name and autobiography; 
the name literally becomes the writing of one's life. 
190 Rowan Williams, Open to Judgement: Sermons and Addresses (London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 2001) p.177 
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In this account of Said's youth, adolescence and young adult life spent in Palestine, 
Egypt, Lebanon and America, there is a repeated testimony of the personal proper name 
as the site of social, political and domestic conflict. lt is the name that opens the memoir 
and the name that reappears throughout, often in double quotation marks, as if to signal 
the appellation as belonging to someone else. 
There was always something wrong with how I was invented [ ... ) it took 
me about fifty years to become accustomed to, or, more exactly, to feel 
less uncomfortable with, "Edward," a foolishly English name yoked 
forcibly to the unmistakably Arabic name Said. True my mother told me 
that I had been named Edward after the Prince of Wales, who cut so fine 
a figure in 1935, the year of my birth, and Said was the name of various 
uncles and cousins. But the rationale of my name broke down both when 
I discovered no grandparents called Said and when I tried to connect my 
fancy English name with its Arabic partner. For years, and depending on 
the exact circumstances, I would rush past "Edward" and emphasize 
"Said"; at other times I would do the reverse, or connect these two to 
each other so quickly that neither would be clear. The one thing I could 
not tolerate, but very often would have to endure, was the disbelieving, 
and hence undermining, reaction: Edward? Said?191 
The disbelief here is crucial. As Judith Butler points out in Excitable Speech even hate 
name calling has the paradoxical virtue of haling the subject, that is, of interpellation: 
'Being called a name is also one of the conditions by which a subject is constituted in 
language'192• But if one's name is not believed the subject is not validated or interpellated. 
In other words, having a name which is subject to abuse, is perhaps better than having a 
name which does not semantically register at all. 
Said commences his account by acknowledging the way in which the domestic scene is 
constructed: 'All families invent their parents and children, give each of them a story, 
character, fate and even a language'193. And it is the parents that are responsible for his 
proper name, and consequently the dislocation of his social identity. These are indeed the 
themes of his memoir, the conflict of his name, and the conflict with his parents. More 
often than not they are the same. Indeed part of the conflict with his parents is based in 
191 Edward Said, Out of Place: A Memoir (London: Granta Books, 1999) p.3 
192 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (London: Routledge, 1997) p.2 
193 Said p.3 
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the knowledge that they have issued him with certain trials through the very act of naming 
him. As Judith Butler points out: 
One is, as it were, brought into social location and time through being 
named. And one is dependent upon another for one's name, for the 
designation that is supposed to confer singularity. 194 
The conferring of singularity which Butler highlights is the system of nomenclature which 
differentiates between 'you' and 'I', and which affords us the possibility to be hailed into 
social space. But singularity also implies unity, and it is this unity which Said feels denied. 
This impossibility of unity is not simply made evident by the lack of a singular cultural 
derivation for 'Edward' and 'Said' but the lack of any derivation at all. 
... my father was known as Wadie lbrahim. I still do not know where 
"Said" came from.195 
Said does not only see his name as incongruous and untenable but also without origin 
and paternity. This isolation of the name is matched against the names of his peers: 
I was perfectly aware of how their names were just right, and their 
clothes and accents and associations were totally different from my 
own.196 
Feelings of dislocation are exacerbated through a comparison with other names which are 
perceived as more coherent, unified and semantically viable. 
Said's self-alienation from his own name is configured around "Edward's" socially imposed 
identity, as set against his struggling self. The double inverted commas which often 
surround his name, put his name in another's voice and give that other voice responsibility 
for its usage (single inverted commas would set the name apart without putting the name 
in another's voice). lt is as if he wishes to distance himself from his own name because of 
the powerful affects it sets in motion, affects which he is desperate to escape. In an 
194 Butler p.14 
195 Said p.7 
196 Ibid. p.42 
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account of a childhood brawl Said represents the struggle with the name as a physical 
endeavour. 
I felt I had been defeated in a sense because "Edward" had given up, he 
had let go and was now dominated by someone who should have 
dominated him. Strangely, though, there was another self beginning to 
surge inside me, just as "Edward" had passed and was now a prisoner 
of Claude Braucart, so this new self came from some region inside 
myself that I knew existed but could only rarely have access to. My 
body, instead of remaining supine and abject underneath Braucart, 
began to push up against him, first disengaging arms, then pounding his 
chest and head until he was forced to defend himself, loose his grip on 
me, and finally roll over sideways as I got up and continued pummelling 
him.197 
The schoolboy fight is not just between Braucart and Said but also between "Edward" and 
Edward. 'I' must wrestle the personal proper name for emancipation. lt is as if the name 
has been standing in for the subject - a kind of social synecdoche - and only an 
incredible physical effort will uproot it. This sense of battling between the public affective 
name and the private self is the journey of the memoir. A crucial moment in this journey is 
the discovery of art and literature: 
What I wove and rewove in my mind took place between the trivial 
surface reality and a deeper level of awareness of another life of 
beautiful, interrelated parts- parts of ideas, passages of literature and 
music, history, personal memory, daily observation- nourished not by 
the "Edward" whose making my family, teachers, and mentors 
contributed to, but my inner, far less compliant and private self, who 
could read, think, and even write independent of "Edward." [ ... )lt was 
something private and apart that gave me strength when "Edward" 
seemed to be failing. 198 
Referring to his name in the third person, Said identifies both the trap of the social self as 
configured through the name, and his desire to escape it. This is not so much about an 
ontologically stable self which has been effaced or made vulnerable through a misnomer, 
but rather to acknowledge that the name carries affects which the named subject wishes 
to and can, escape. Said wishes to find a position from which he can act independently of 
his own name. 
197 Ibid. p.89 
198 Ibid. p.165 
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The text is littered with these third person references to "Edward" or "Edward Said", where 
the nomenclature is public, painful, restrictive, damaging and to be escaped. Towards the 
end of the memoir, reflecting back on the writing of the memoir itself, Said refers to the 
process of writing in relation to his cancer diagnosis and the subsequent treatment. 
As one of the main responses to my illness I found in this book a new 
kind of challenge - not just a new kind of wakefulness but a project 
about as far from my professional and political life as it was possible for 
me to go. 
The underlying motifs for me have been the emergence of a 
second self buried for a very long time beneath a surface of often 
expertly acquired and wielded social characteristics belonging to the self 
my parents tried to construct, the "Edward" I speak of intermittently, and 
how af! extraordinarily increasing number of departures have unsettled 
my life from its earliest beginnings.199 
Here the problem of the name is directly paralleled with blame directed towards the 
parents and the trauma of geographical dislocation (perhaps after all then, not so removed 
from Said's professional and political imperative as he would have us believe)200 . In 
naming the child the parents created a performance-script which he has spent the course 
of his life - and of the memoir - trying to escape. lt comes as no surprise then, that when 
Said forms his own love attachments, he configures the beloved as identifying him outside 
the confines of his name: 
She seemed to speak directly to that underground part of my identity I 
had long held for myself, not the "Ed" or "Edward" I had been assigned, 
but the other self I was always aware of but was unable easily or 
immediately to reach. 201 
Of course we all hope to be loved beyond the social, beyond the assigned, beyond that 
which is given and understood, but the fact that Said articulates his love attachment in 
199 Ibid. p.217 
200 I am aware that by focusing on Said's memoir- his life - rather than on his socio-political 
writings- his life's work- I am in danger of denying the urgency of his political imperative. The 
dichotomy embodied in his name however- Edward Said- is emblematic of his struggle to 
reconcile (Middle) East and West. 
201 Said. p.218 
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these terms highlights the extent of the negative affects he has felt result from his given 
identity. 
In the last pages of the memoir however, Said has to acknowledge that while painful, the 
set of circumstances that were set in motion by his enforced separation from his family 
and the manual of performance set in motion by his name, have ultimately made him what 
he is. 
. .. the more I think about it, the more I believe [my father] thought the 
only hope for me as a man was in fact to be cut off from my family. My 
search for freedom, for the self beneath or obscured by "Edward," could 
only have begun because of that rupture, so I have come to think of it as 
fortunate, despite the loneliness and unhappiness I experienced for so 
long.2o2 
This resolution brings Said to the point of acceptance with his name - his life - and gives 
us his writing, his memoir Out of Place. 
202 Ibid. p.294 
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The truth is that you can probably understand me far more than you 
think you can. And hopefully as you and I continue to relate to each 
other, you will. Yeah, there are different, very strongly held passionate 
views that you and I hold that don't necessarily jive with each other, but 
that's ok. From my perspective, and I would imagine you are the same, I 
don't need you to agree with me. 
Joshua Sofaer, New York 
4. Namesake: Identical Other 
One cannot help having a slightly disagreeable feeling 
when one comes across one's own name in a stranger. 
Recently I was very sharply aware of it when a Herr S. Freud 
presented himself to me in my consulting hour. 
Sigmund Freud203 
lt can be bad luck to have a namesake. lt can be a matter of life and death. For Deepak 
Pate! it was fatal. Admitted to Northwick Park Hospital in London on 24th April 2001 and 
diagnosed with meningococcal septicaemia, his life saving medicine was given to 
somebody else with the same name204. He died. 
Deepak was neglected for a namesake; he was passed over in favour of a non-identical 
identical. This is the nightmarish stuff of Kafka made real; the horror of mistaken identity; 
deselected or selected by accident. 
The fear of being falsely accused is something we all live with. One of the strongest 
arguments against the death penalty is that the wrong person might be convicted. This 
fear is not restricted to the weight of the law. As Benzion Kaganoff discovered: 
lt was a widespread folk belief among Jews during the Middle Ages that, 
confronted with two individuals of the same name, the ministering angels 
were as likely as not to choose the wrong one. Therefore, some 
maintained that several families with a common name should not reside 
in one dwelling. People went so far as to avoid entering the home of a 
203 Sigmund Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life Standard Edition Vol. 6 (London: 
Vantage, 2001) p.25 · 
204 Sharon van Guens, 'Patient died after drugs were given to namesake' The Evening Standard, 1 
November 2001, p.9 
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sick person who bore their name, lest the Angel of Death arrive during 
the visit and take the wrong soul.205 
This 'folk belief is a superstitious recontextualisation of the fear of false accusation, 
manifest in a conception of the administrative order of heaven. However far from other 
belief systems it may be, this kind of conviction identifies the threat to one's 'individuality' 
that is made by the presence of a namesake. 
What is at stake in the namesake? Edgar Allan Poe's short-story William Wilson is the tale 
of the title character's conflict with his namesake. Ostensibly William Wilson is Wilson's 
deathbed confession of his lifelong struggle against the dogged interference of his 
namesake - William Wilson - who follows him from Preparatory School to Eton to Oxford 
and beyond, mimicking him, bringing him down and exposing him. The story ends with 
Wilson's account of the 'last eventful scene of the drama' in which he finally challenges his 
namesake to a duel and murders him206• 
But right from the epigraph, Poe indicates that Wilson's namesake is allegorical. 
Underneath the title, the caption reads: 
What say of it? what say of CONSCIENCE grim, 
That spectre in my path?207 
Wilson's namesake is his own conscience, which plagues him throughout the narrative of 
the story, and throughout his life; he makes his appearances conveniently just at the 
moments when Wilson is in the process of committing a crime against his own moral 
code. The epigraph makes it clear enough that the namesake is a metaphor, but there are 
repeated clues within the text. 
205 Benzion C. Kaganoff, A Dictionary of Jewish Names and their History (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978) p.112 
206 Edgar Allan Poe, Visions of Poe ed. by Simon Marsden (Exeter: Webb & Bower) p.34 
207 Attributed to Chamberlain's Pharronida. [This is disputed. See Daniel Hoffman, Poe Poe Poe 
Poe Poe Poe Poe (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1998) p. 212]. Poe. p.24 
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... 1 might, to-day, have been a better, and thus a happier man, had I less 
frequently rejected the counsels embodied in those meaning whispers 
which I then but too cordially hated and too bitterly despised.208 
Willlam Wilson's namesake is his better self, his conscience, which doggedly follows him 
around, checking and commenting on his actions: a conscience which he finally destroys. 
In Wi/liam Wilson, Poe employs the use of a literary namesake. lt would be easy then, to 
understand William Wilson as simply a parable: the namesake as a literary conceit. Even 
within the narrative world of the story however, both name and namesake are presented 
as an invention, as being self-willed. 
Let me call myself, for the present, William Wilson. The fair page now 
lying before me need not be sullied with my real appellation.209 
and again later: 
In this narrative I have therefore designated mrelf as William Wilson, -
a fictitious title not very dissimilar to the real. 21 
As Daniel Hoffman points out: 
The chosen disguise reveals that its bearer is, in his own view, self-
begotten: he is William Wilson, William son of his own Will. He has, that 
is, willed himself into being -willed the self we meet, the one that 
survives its murder of its double.211 
The name is, in and of itself, a namesake, doubled and then quadrupled. William Wilson 
and his namesake William Wi/son -the four wills, the force of will. The namesake is 
acknowledged as a fake, as the creator of its own fiction. This fabrication forces the 
question of the identity of William Wilson. Who, in fact, is he? 
208 Ibid. p.28 
209 Ibid. p.24 
210 Ibid. p.25 
211 Hoffman p.209 
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Poe tempts us to a conclusion with the inclusion of several 'obvious' autobiographical 
references. For a start, Wilson shares a birthdate not only with his namesake, but also 
with his author. Poe was born on 19th January 1813, so was Wilson212. Poe went to 
Preparatory School at Dr Bransby's, so did Wilson. Poe had to leave the University of 
West Virginia because of misadventures in gambling; Wilson must leave Oxford for the 
same reason213. 
William Wilson thus becomes a literary namesake for his author Edgar Allan Poe. A 
namesake in all but name. That 'William Wilson' is not the 'real' name of the character, 
even within the narrative, is made possible by the text itself and allows for our indulgence 
that William Wilson is an autobiography of its author - or at least an autobiography of the 
author's struggle with his conscience. 
In this context William Wilson is less a literary conceit than the struggle to represent self in 
writing; an acknowledgement of the self that is other - existing solely as a namesake - in 
the published name of the author. Barges acknowledges the fictive autobiographical 
doppelganger of the writer in 'Barges and 1'. 
The other one, the one called Barges, is the one things happen to. I walk 
through the streets of Buenos Aires and stop for a moment, perhaps 
mechanically now, to look at the arch of an entrance hall and the 
grillwork on the gate; I know of Barges from the mail and see his name 
on a list of professors or in a biographical dictionary. I like hourglasses, 
maps, eighteenth-century typography, the taste of coffee and the prose 
of Stevenson; he shares these preferences, but in a vain way that turns 
them into the attributes of an actor. lt would be an exaggeration to say 
that ours is a hostile relationship; I live, let myself go on living, so that 
Barges may contrive his literature, and this literature justifies me.214 
212 Or in its first printing 1811. 'Poe kept moving his birthdate forward, in successive magazine 
biographies, in order to seem younger than he was. So, it appears did William Wilson.' Hoffman 
p.210. The fact that Poe went to the trouble of altering his character's birthdate alongside his own 
stresses the importance of the autobiographic reference. 
213 Even the briefest biography of Poe will give these details. See for instance Hoffman p. 210. 
214 Jorge Luis Barges, 'Barges and I' in Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern, A Reader ed. by 
SeAn Burke (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995) p.339 
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In this context, Poe's story of a namesake (one which is eerily contemporary in its 
formulation and the complexity with which it approaches the relationship of an author's life 
to that of his fiction) usefully articulates the struggle of self-judgement. 
Poe's short-story William Wilson is his progeny, verified by the published attribution 'by 
Edgar Allan Poe'. This mechanical reproduction of his name- his printed namesake-
articulates his life (his life's work. his work as his life). 
To read about oneself, to write about oneself, to see one's name printed and reprinted, to 
hear one's name in conversation, is often to read or write or hear as if it was the name of 
another. In this context- the context post industrial revolution -our personal proper name 
becomes our namesake in written and spoken language. Mechanical reproduction -
printing, photography, film -offers us the same kind of estrangement that we feel when 
we look in a mirror: it is both us and not us. 
The mechanical reproduction of our name (a kind of printed namesake) validates us as 
subjects. Just as the verbal appellation hails us into the social space, even if (as Judith 
Butler has observed215) that appellation is based in hate speech, so too seeing ones name 
in print, be it praise or slander, accords us the status of social subject. For the narrator of 
A la recherche du temps perdu the publication of his article in Le Figaro newspaper allows 
him to read himself within a social context wider than his immediate self or surroundings. 
This evaluation rotates specifically around the reproduction of his name in print. 
I saw at the same hour my thought - or at least, failing my thought for 
those who were incapable of understanding it, the repetition of my name 
and as it were an embellished evocation of my person - shine on 
countless people, colour their own thoughts in an auroral light which 
filled me with more strength and triumphant joy than the multiple dawn 
which at that moment was blushing at every window.216 
215 See Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (London: Routledge, 1997) 
216 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time Vols 1-6 trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 1996) Vol.5 p.652 
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The narrator is caught up not with the success (or more pertinently for this particular 
narrator, the failure) of his writing, but rather the literal fact of its multiplication. 
I made up my mind to send Franc;:oise out to buy more copies - in order 
to give them to my friends, I would tell her, but in reality to feel at first 
hand the miracle of the multiplication of my thought and to read, as 
though I were another person who had just opened the Figaro, the same 
sentences in another copy.217 
The narrator's desire to read "as though I were another person" his own article- his own 
name - is his desire to witness first hand his existence in social space. Again the analogy 
of the mirror is useful: we look in the mirror to check that we look OK, but also to check 
that we still exist. 
The narrator of A la recherche du temps perdu separates himself from his printed 
namesake, a namesake whose printed presence then validates his own existence. But 
while there are two namesakes in this model - the name of the narrator and the printed 
name - there is only one corporeal body. The self-validation offered by the name in print 
is problematised as soon as the uniqueness of the name is lost. The acknowledgement of 
a namesake - a corporeal other with identical nomenclature - invalidates, or at least 
destabilises, the referential function of the personal proper name through the multiplication 
of the referent. Put simply: it is no longer necessarily clear to whom the name refers. 
This is something that the comedian Dave Gorrnan the and filmmaker Alan Berliner have 
both played within their respective works about their namesakes: Are You Dave Gorman? 
and The Sweetest Sound. Both Gorman and Berliner go about collecting as many 
namesakes as they possibly can, using all the contemporary technical search resources 
open to them (the internet, email, postal directories etc.). 
For Gorrnan, the task of collecting Dave Gorrnans originates in a bet with his friend and 
eventual collaborator Danny Wallace. Danny drunkenly bets his mate that he will never 
217 Ibid. p.653 
137 
meet another Dave Gorman and that there probably aren't many more in the world 
anyway. Dave sets about proving him wrong. What starts at first as a laddish jaunt turns 
into an obsession, becomes a television series on BBC2 and eventually a book218 • Fifty-
four Dave Gormans later, Wallace agrees that his mate has won the bet. 
The script of the television series and the book are littered with references to the 
accumulative nature of the project. Gorman is only interested in racking up the Dave 
Gormans to prove a point. The imperative rotates around a notion of 'pride'. 
How was Dave treating it now? Self-discovery? A search for identity? To 
feel he wasn't alone in the world? That there were others out there with 
something fundamental in common with him? 
Bollocks. 
He was doing it to prove me wrong.219 [Danny Wallace] 
There is a wilful rejection of any attempt to understand what might be at stake in the 
project beyond the bet. 
Although they offered us exceptional hospitality, we were men on a 
mission, and we couldn't stop for long. We had more Dave Gormans to 
find today, and a very tight schedule to keep.220 [Danny Wallace] 
But what starts as a project pursued for its absurdly obsessive comic value ends up 
problematising the easy correspondence between a signifier and its identity that Gorman 
had once felt: 
Before all this started I was Dave Gorman. Now, I was only a Dave 
Gorman. Those two words that had once defined me now merely 
defined a subset to which I belonged. I was one of many. [ ... ) What did 
Dave Gorman do? Anything. Who was Dave Gorman? Anyone. Where 
did Dave Gorman live? Anywhere. My name meant everything and 
nothing.221 
218 All quotations are taken from the book rather than the television series, which to a large extent 
repeats the television script. 
21 Are You Dave Gorman? is eo-written by Dave Gorman and his friend and collaborator Danny 
Wallace. This quote is from Danny Wallace. Dave Gorman and Danny Wallace, Are you Dave 
Gorman? (London: Ebury Press, 2001) p.126 
220 Danny Wallace. Gorman p.222 
221 Dave Gorman. Gorman p.304 
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The journey which German undertakes to assert his will and power- that he was right -
ends up (albeit within the comic narrative) by robbing him of his self assurance. 
Berliner starts at the conceptual point that German concludes. His imperative is one of 
existential questioning: 'What can they be doing with my name? Are they better Alan 
Berliners than I am?', will 'the other Alan Berliners look more like Alan Berliner than I do?', 
'Who knows if my life would have been different if I'd had another name'222• 
Berliner's film is autobiography, psycho-philosophy and social history. He matches his 
personal story with a questioning of the ontology of personal proper names (though in a 
peripheral way) and an investigation into the form and context of names within North 
American culture. The film revolves around a dinner party he holds for the twelve other 
Alan Berliners that he has contacted (or Allan, Allan, Alien or Alain Berliners). He asks 
them questions about their likes and dislikes, habits and activities in a comedic, pseudo-
scientific, perhaps disingenuous attempt to find commonalities relating to 'Aian Berliner'. 
But whereas German starts with a banality- a bet- and ends up questioning the currency 
of his personal nomenclature, Berliner, having started with such questions, concludes with 
the disappointment of the banal. 
So if you're feeling a little let down because you expected some big 
revelation from my dinner party, imagine how I feel. All that preparation 
and anticipation ... and for what? I still have to share my name with them. 
I'm probably still going to be mistaken for them. And it seems I'm 
destined to be the real Alan Berliner in my mind only. But please, don't 
think of my experiment as a total failure. 
Berliner hopes for an epiphanic understanding of the condition of the namesake but the 
actuality falls short of his expectations. 
222 All quotes transcribed from the film The Sweetest Sound Dir. Alan Berliner. Cine-Matrix. 2001 
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Although he never overtly states his imperative in such terms, Berliner hints at the initial 
source of his enquiry being rooted in a direct confusion between himself and one 
particular of his namesakes; what he describes as the "ultimate embarrassmenr: the 
confusion between himself and another Alan Berliner, another filmmaker. 
A few years ago someone with my name made a film called Ma Vie en 
Rose. The critics loved it. I loved it too. That's when everyone hailed my 
debut as a feature film director. No one ever did bother to ask why I 
would suddenly start making films in French. There might even be a few 
people watching right now who think this is one of his films, or that I'm 
him or that he's me. 
Later on in the film alluding through the voiceover with some irony, to that particular Alan 
Berliner in shot: 
That's the other filmmaker, the one in black. He even looks more like a 
filmmaker than I do. 
Perhaps the search and research for all the other Alan Berliners in the world ("I can't stop 
thinking of them as the competition") is less about trying to establish his own identity as 
the 'genuine' Alan Berliner, and more about trying to dilute the cultural power and 
recognition of his most famous namesake: the other filmmaker, the Alan Berliner who has 
been critically acclaimed for his larger scale, bigger budget feature223 . 
For Gorman and Berliner, both of who are making their respective works at the fin de 
siecle - a time of massive public interest in personal history and family heritage - the 
acknowledgement of the multiple existence of their name problematises what is for all of 
us, the contested and fractured space of identity recognition. The familiar becomes 
unfamiliar; the unfamiliar becomes familiar. As Hillel Schwartz comments in his extended 
study of 'copies', The Culture of the Copy. 
223 Perhaps after all, just as the name speaks more of the namer than the named, I betray more 
about myself than Alan Berliner by this comment. 
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Powerful stuff, these namesakes, despite our insistence that individuals 
make their own waves in the world. Given a culture that reveres originals 
yet trusts that copies will more than do them justice, the blessing of a 
name is inadequate to its burden.224 
The multiplication of the personal proper name forces us to question those attributes 
contemporary western society holds close: individuality, self-determinism and difference. 
In his much quoted 1936 essay 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', 
Waiter Benjamin argues that the form of production of the artwork radically affects its 
aura225. Benjamin defines aura as the "historical testimony", the "authority", something tied 
to "presence" and yet also with a 'unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may 
be.' For Benjamin, mechanical reproduction marks the destruction of the aura of an 
artwork but he also sees this destruction as 'a symptomatic process whose significance 
points beyond the realm of art'. Aura, as Benjamin sees it, cannot be reproduced. Andy 
Warhol might ultimately agree with Benjamin that aura is present in the historical 
testimony of the object but for Warhol, mechanical reproduction is crucial to the cultural 
comprehension of aura, insomuch as it is mechanical reproduction (print, photography, 
television, film) which goes to hype the 'authentic original'. This is true not only for 
artworks but for people as well. 
Some company recently was interested in buying my "aura.'' 
They didn't want my product. They kept saying, "We want your aura." I 
never figured out what they wanted. But they were willing to pay a lot for 
it. So then I thought that if somebody was willing to pay that much for it, I 
should try to figure out what it is. 
I think "aura" is something that only somebody else can see, and 
they only see as much of it as they want to. it's all in the other person's 
eyes. You can only see an aura on people you don't know very well or 
don't know at all. I was having dinner the other night with everybody 
from my office. The kids at the office treat me like dirt, because they 
know me and they see me every day. But then there was this nice friend 
that somebody had brought along who had never met me, and this kid 
could hardly believe that he was having dinner with me! Everybody else 
was seeing me, but he was seeing my "aura".226 
224 Hillel Schwartz, The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles (New 
York: Zone Books, 1996) p.338 
225 Waiter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' in Illuminations by 
Waiter Benjamin, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999), 211-244 
226 Andy Warhol, The Philosophy of Andy Warhol (Florida: Harvest, 1975) p. 77 
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Warhol separates seeing and knowing and temporality as the key factors that affect aura. 
To know someone (well) is to negate the possibility of seeing their aura. Aura for Warhol 
is eradicated through familiarit/27• What goes to create aura however is not so much the 
not seeing, as the seeing but not knowing. And this kind of seeing without knowing is what 
mechanical reproduction through mass media offers. This is, after all, how celebrity is 
created. 
What happens to aura and the authentication of the original when there is a namesake; 
not a reproduced copy, but another authentic original? Benjamin says that there is no 
point in asking for the authentication of the original of an artwork that is designed for 
reproduction: 
From a photographic negative, for example, one can make any number 
of prints; to ask for the 'authentic' print makes no sense. But the instant 
the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, 
the total function of art is reversed. Instead of bein:!i based on ritual, it 
begins to be based on another practice - politics. 2 
Following this argument through, it makes no sense to ask who is the authentic Dave 
Gorman, Alan Berliner or Joshua Sofaer. All subjects with the same name have equal 
authority to authentication and it is perhaps this that is the most destabilising aspect of the 
namesake in a culture which places such importance on 'individuality'. 
And yet there are desperate attempts within the artworld to authenticate particular 
photographic prints, often for reasons of commerce. Through limited editions, the inclusion 
of the artist's signature, the quality of the paper, there is a hierarchy which is often 
couched in terms of the original and its copy. 
Sherrie Levine's photographic practice of directly appropriating existing images- literally 
photographing a photograph without any transformations or additions - not only goes to 
227 Familiarity is not the same as exposure. Familiarity depreciates aura but exposure through 
reproduction is the food of celebrity. Familiarity enables a knowledge not acquired through 
exposure. 
228 Benjamin p.218 
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question who the creator of the image is, but also further complicates Benjamin's 
statement that there is no authentic prinf29• 
So while the philosophical basis of Benjamin's argument follows through for both 
photography and the personal proper name, the lived experience is one which is 
contested in both instances. 
Celebrity culture might tell us something about the way in which the contemporary west 
views the interchange of naming and mechanical reproduction. This takes us to 
Benjamin's second statement in the above quotation: that when authenticity ceases to be 
applicable, the function of art is reversed from ritual to politics. lt is the de-politicisation of 
mass media and what Jacqueline Rose calls the "murderous"230 culture of celebrity that 
has re-reversed the equation and brought ritual into the culture of reproduction. Fans who 
chant "there's only one David Beckham" to Jose Fernandez Diaz's Guantanamera are not 
trying to claim that there is only one person in the world who has, or has the right to that 
personal proper name, but rather they are making a desperate attempt to authenticate the 
particular David Beckham that they revere. lt is almost as if the phrase "there is only one 
David Beckham" tries to negate the very possibility that there might in fact be many 
people with that name. Ironically it is the reproductive industry- mass media -that gives 
Beckham his status as authentic original. As Ellis Cashmere points out: 
... the national media ensured that the name "Beckham" made its 
impress on the public consciousness. Widespread interest in, and 
consumption of what many took to be, a "wonder goal" guaranteed 
Beckham an audience.231 
The link here between mass media- the reproductive machinery- and the aura of the 
authentic original David Beckham is one of cause and effect. No media, no aura. Indeed 
229 For a discussion of Sherrie Levine's practice see Douglas Crimp, On the Museum's Ruins 
~Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993), especially 126-148 'Appropriating Appropriation'. 
30 Jacqueline Rose in conversation with Marina Warner, South Bank Talks, The Purcell Room, 28-
01-03. Rose described the culture of celebrity as "murderous" because it sets up celebrities only in 
order that they should later be shot-down. 
231 Ellis Cashmere, Beckham (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002) p.20 
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Cash more takes this one step further by asking us to consider that the forms of 
reproduction are in fact the only David Beckham that there is: 
.. .is there actually anything apart from the Beckham served up on our tv 
screens and in printf32 
The religious attention of the 'fans' who devote themselves to the Beckham cult, worship 
the aura which emanates from the icon. lt is no surprise that this is the word we use to 
describe those players who have reached the zenith of celebrity- icon - a word that is 
both authentic embodiment (the one and only David Beckham) and reproduction (the 
printed and televised image) simultaneously. 
Celebrity is a useful tool for gauging what is at stake in the namesake because of its 
preoccupation with singularity and uniqueness. The ultimate in celebrity recognition is that 
of single name signifier. 
Single name fame is probably the zenith of global celebrity. Elvis, 
Marilyn, Pele, Jesus: they exist at a level somewhere above the usual 
layer of celebs where the mention of one word provokes instant 
recognition.233 
Single name fame is the zenith of global celebrity- the thing contemporary western 
society rates so highly - because it is a sign of recognition and success. Part of the 
cachet of the single name fame is the risk it takes in reproduction. There are many fewer 
Marilyn Monroes than there are Marilyns. By existing as a single name celebrity you raise 
the stakes by asking people to identify the signifier 'Marilyn' with the particular Marilyn: a 
film actress Marilyn Monroe whose major output was in Hollywood comedy in the 1950's. 
If the single name celebrity can survive the namesake test then they are perceived as 
having 'made it'. 
232 lbid p.44 
233 lbid p.43 
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Having a namesake then, is a threat, because it forces the questions 'do we know who 
you are referring to?' and 'am I known as an individual?'. 
Perhaps the metaphorical model that Poe articulates in William Wilson is actually the most 
adequate to describe the literal namesake too. The namesake becomes our social 
conscience, always there to remind us that our 'individuality' is a fragile construct ready to 
shatter at the calling of another who shares our name. 
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I don't think homosexuality is right in God's eyes. Because there are 
passages in the bible that clearly identify homosexuality with sin and 
abomination and idolatry and all that kind of stuff. I also don't think it is 
on a different level in God's eyes than a lot of other things that people do 
that are wrong. And as much as I don't like the 'inside outside' 
discussion, do you understand what I mean when I say that? ... that 
there's an 'us and a them', an 'inside and an outside', the 'saved and the 
damned: I don't like that, but you know, there is a part of it that's also 
just there. 
Joshua Sofaer, New York 
5. Nameless: No Name 
... physical presence does not suffice to 
characterize the utterer; there is not full 
presence without naming. 
Philippe Lejeune234 
Naming is power. The withholding of a name or the theft of a name is to wield power. The 
absence of a name is to be subject to power. 
On the UK television game show 'Blind Date' hostess Cilia Black asks two questions of 
every 'anonymous' contestant, in the form: "Tell us your name and where you come 
from?". 235 Given the complex, multifarious layers which formulate our identities and make 
us a potentially better or worse date, these two, rather dull questions seem inadequate. 
And yet, it will not do to remain nameless. 
Cruising for action in a nightclub the simple attainment of a name is seen in itself as a 
success. lt is a certain kind of intimacy, of knowledge. Indeed conversing with a stranger, 
the moment where you come to a formal introduction ("I am X by the way") is a 
conversational landmark that goes well beyond the information that is actually being 
shared. 
234 Philippe Lejeune, 'The Autobiographical Contract' in French Literary Theory Today ed. by 
Tzvetan Todorov, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p.199 
235 Also mentioned in Chapter 1: Disinterest: Digging Up Our Childhood, Research Tool 2: Aerial 
Evidence in relation to points of origin. 
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Names are our indices, our entrance into the world. As Wittgenstein remarks about the 
most basic systems of signification, ' ... naming something is like attaching a label to a 
thing,' and without that label we cease to be236• 
What are the repercussions of namelessness? The first chapter of Maxi ne Hong 
Kingston's memoir The Woman Waffior is titled 'No Name Woman'. The no name woman 
is an unnamed aunt who refuses to reveal the name of her lover (or rapist- we are never 
quite sure) and who commits infanticide and then suicide, rather than succumb to a life-
sentence as a social outcast. 
She kept the man's name to herself throughout her labour and dying; 
she did not accuse him that he be punished with her. To save her 
inseminator's name she gave a silent birth.237 
lt is unclear whether it is love or pride that prevents no name woman from naming the 
father of her child - but the repercussions are clear- her fertility is her death warrant; his 
anonymity saves him. The social order of the name (upholding the family name, living up 
to one's name, preserving one's good name) is contravened through the act of 
procreation. No name woman holds silent. She will not name names and as a 
consequence is robbed of her own. 
Don't tell anyone you had an aunt. Your father does not want to hear her 
name. She has never been born. 238 
The withholding of the name of an aunt by the family (a name Hong Kingston has never 
known) is an attempt to eradicate her body (even her dead body), to deny her existence, 
to revise history, to make it as if 'she has never been born'. The internal family conflict 
presents itself through the struggle over naming. 
236 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) §15 
237 Maxine Hong Kingston, The Woman Warrior: Memoirs of a Girlhood among Ghosts (London: 
Picador, 1981) p.18 
236 Ibid. p.21 
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Despite the power of not naming (withholding the name of her inseminator) that no name 
woman wields, she is still subject to a social order which robs her of her name. This is 
sexual oppression in the name of the name. She is cast out and robbed of her name 
because she fell pregnant before her name was given away in the act of marriage, the act 
where she would assume a different name. 
The sexual politic of the name is a very real contemporary issue for many women. 
Marriage, divorce, parenthood are all areas of contest, where the withholding, giving or 
assumption of a name has wide reverberations. Advice is plentiful. An online resource, 
www.hitched.co.uk, offers no less than nine methodologies for the naming of a newly 
married couple, from the wife hyphenating her birth name with her husband's name, to 
both parties selecting a shared new name. The norm however, is still for the wife to lose 
her name and take that of her husband. 
This is pretty much the tradition, everyone's used to it. Some people see 
it as a sexist tradition smacking of patriarchal property. Some see this as 
the easiest way to go. Some people really like the symbolism of the 
whole family having the same name. Some women don't like the idea of 
losing their own identity.239 
lt is however only relatively recently that a woman's choice has been of any relevance at 
all. The axiomatic sacrifice of the family name to the married daughter's husband (Mrs 
Michael Brown, in her husband's name, Mrs Jane Brown being, traditionally at least, the 
divorced or widowed wife of Mr Michael Brown) was not so much the issue to the father, 
as was the daughter-wife who perpetuates the race only by risking the name. As Derrida 
offers (in parenthesis) in a discussion of 'Freud's Legacy', the daughter child is caught up 
in a conundrum between a childless stability of the name, or a married motherhood 
without it (this was nineteenth century Vienna after all): 
... I leave it to you to follow this factor up to and including all of those 
women about whom it is difficult to know whether they have maintained 
239 Anonymous, 'Name changing options' Wedding Planning Advice 
<http://www.hitched.co.uk!plan/advice/namechange.asp> [accessed 3 January 2002] 
148 
the movement without the name or lost the movement in order to 
maintain, in that they have maintained, the name .... 240 
Daughter children, childless children, the name is lost. Or so it was. But the social order 
which positions the woman's body as patriarchal property works in many ways and the 
withholding of a name, that for no name woman was a way of wiping out all traces of her 
body, can conversely go to force our attention onto the body in gynaecological detail. 
The character Marilyn Monroe plays in The Seven Year Itch is not given a name. 
Throughout the film she is referred to as "girl" or as "she". Monroe then, fromthe outset is 
identified by her sex. This is in direct contrast to the male protagonist played by Tom Ewell 
who is always referred to as "Mr Sherman" or "Richard". 
The withholding of a name for the female protagonist in The Seven Year Itch undeniably 
encourages the (male) spectator to fixate on her as 'pure body', as a fantasy body (as 
opposed to a character or individual with drives and desires). But this lack of name also 
allows for a major element in the fantasy enabled by the film: that the "girl" is Marilyn 
Monroe. By not naming the character, the audience can more readily identify her with the 
actress who plays her. lt is not just any blonde who moves into the Kaufmann's apartment 
- it is the authentic platinum - Marilyn241 . 
After inviting her down for a drink, Sherman muses: "Lovely girl too, probably a model or 
an actress or something". This scene, which follows that of the departure of Sherman's 
wife for the summer, is the first of many in which the spectator is encouraged to implicitly 
understand the female protagonist as Marilyn Monroe. 
The film is laced with intertextualities which are constant reminders to the audience that 
they are looking at Marilyn Monroe - Marilyn Monroe's body - and the fantasy of Marilyn 
240 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card trans. by Alan Bass (London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1987) p.302 
241 Of course Marilyn Monroe is always already 'Marilyn' which is why people go to the movie in the 
first place. This proved problematic for the actress Ms Monroe, who was never given the credibility 
to play anyone but herself. 
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Monroe renting the upstairs apartment for the summer. Indeed the "girl" comes to New 
York for the summer in order to appear on television, in direct parallel to Monroe coming 
to New York for the summer to shoot the film. The "girl" appears on television to promote 
Dazzledent toothpaste, just as Monroe appeared in many television and print advertising 
promotions in the 1950's, from shampoo to shoes; a contemporary audience will have 
been well aware of this242. 
There are also continual references in the film to an "artistic picture" that "girl" has posed 
for in U.S. Camera. This refers to the nude photograph Monroe posed for in the Golden 
Dreams calendar. Although the Golden Dreams calendar was published in 1949 (six years 
before the film was released) it was reprinted in 1952, and again and again after Monroe's 
fame was established. Monroe survived the scandal this nude pin-up might have caused 
by openly admitting to it; by stating that there was "nothing wrong" with appearing naked. 
This faux-naive tone, ignorant of the possible social ramifications, is the one taken by "girl" 
in The Seven Year Itch about the photograph in U.S. Camera, which she openly displays 
to Richard Sherman. In an interview about the Golden Dreams photograph, Monroe said: 
"My hair was long then"243 and this is exactly what "girl" says in The Seven Year Itch: "My 
hair was a little bit longer then". The spectator is allowed to strip "girl" naked because slhe 
has already seen Monroe nude in Golden Dreams. 
These intertextualities culminate at the end of the film when one of the subordinate 
characters, Tom MacKenzie, comes to the Sherman apartment: 
RICHARD: I can explain everything, the stairs, the cinnamon toast, the 
blonde in the kitchen. 
TOM: Now wait a minute Dickie boy, lets just take it easy; what blonde in 
the kitchen? 
RICHARD: Wouldn't you like to know. Maybe it's Marilyn Monroe. 
242 For a full list of the items Monroe advertised see The Unabridged Marilyn by Neal Hitchens and 
Randall Riese {London: Corgi Books, 1988) p.6. 
243 As quoted in an interview with Ms M os by, 13 March 1952. See Hitchens and Riese p. 71. 
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The joke works because the spectator knows (even if the characters don't) that it is 
Marilyn Monroe, and they have been encouraged to see her as herself throughout the 
film. 
The withholding of the name of the central female protagonist in The Seven Year Itch has 
a double purpose. lt shifts the attention of the spectator on to the sexuality, and thus 
sexual promise, of the character. The character is depersonalised in order that the body 
becomes sexualised. Stripped of a name, stripped of her clothes. lt also allows that body 
to be infiltrated by the actress that plays her. Monroe as the 'girl'; "girl" as Marilyn. 
Monroe is here presented as 'pure body', and as if to echo and complement this, another 
'character' with no name is given a brief celluloid moment in The Seven Year Itch. "Girl" 
and Sherman leave the cinema after their first quasi-date which leads up to the sexual 
climax of the film: the famous skirt scene. As they do so the camera pans up to show the 
film hoarding of the feature that they have just seen. lt is The Creature from the Black 
Lagoon. The creature can be seen rising, gigantic, black, covered in an armour of scales, 
clutching a blonde woman in a white bathing suit. Discussing the film with Sherman, "girl" 
describes "creature" as "not all bad" and rather someone who just needs to be "loved and 
needed and wanted". Through this dialogue "girl" replaces the white bathing suit clad body 
in the hoarding with her own (she too only ever wears white in the film244). The creature-
pure animal- stands in for the male sex drive, as an object of identification for the (male) 
spectator, reinforcing the accessible possibility of "girl's" body. The withholding of the 
name (or in this case simply its non-existence) allows for this identification to be made. 
The (male) spectator inserts their own name into the nameless space of the creature. 
Girl with no name, Girl Power, Girl and Louise. In Deborah Levy's novel Billy and Girl, a 
contemporary fairytale on the pavements of London in which two kids are searching for 
their mother, the central female protagonist both has and has not a proper name. 
244 The only exception being when she appears as a figment of Sherman's imagination. 
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I don't know why my mother called me Girl. 
Sometimes I think she was just too lazy or too depressed to bother 
calling me by my proper name, Louise. So there are two of me: one is 
named, the other unnamed. Louise is a secret. No one knows about the 
Louise part of me. Girl stuck and that's how it's always been. Louise is 
England's invisible citizen and when I read statistics about how many 
people live in this country, I always add one more: Louise.245 
Levy's 'Girl' has a split personality and the oscillation between being named and not being 
named hints not only at a latent schizophrenia but also to the victimisation by a mother. 
The oscillation between namelessness and being named which Giri/Louise inhabits, 
marks an oscillation between danger and safety, between the wild excesses of an enfant 
terrible and socialisation. For Girl, her namelessness articulates her social exclusion, 
deprivation and abandonment. For these three women - no name woman, the "girl", and 
Girl - it is not that they have not been named or that they do not have a name but rather 
that their name is hidden, disregarded or abandoned. The resulting state of namelessness 
in which they are positioned makes them subject to a patriarchal power in which they find 
their bodies - that is their physical bodies - disenfranchised and out of their own control. 
Nameless to subjugation; or, like no name woman's inseminator, nameless for salvation. 
W. G. Sebald's novel Austerlitz is the search of the title character for his name. 'Austerlitz' 
reverberates throughout the novel as the name of the central character - that is his birth 
name- the name of his unmarried mother (as we later discover), as the name of the 
station in Paris which adjoins the new Bibliotheque de France which was built on the site 
of the collected plundered property of Jews during Nazi occupation, as the name of the 
Morovian village which was the site of a Napoleonic battle to which the central character 
assumes some affiliation, as the name Fred Astaire was born with, as the name of the 
man Kafka mentions in his diary that was called in to perform the circumcision of his 
nephew, as the name of a woman - Laura Austerlitz - who testifies in 1966 about crimes 
committed in a rice mill in Trieste, and, of course, as the name of the novel written by 
W. G. Sebald. 
245 Deborah Levy, Billy and Girl (London: Bloomsbury, 1997) p.12 . 
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Throughout the novel the narrator of Austerlitz refers to the central character by name with 
uncommon frequency: 'said Austerlitz', 'continued Austerlitz' etc .. This literary trope - the 
repetition of the name - further loads 'Austerlitz' and it's potential reverberations which 
haunt the novel and haunt the central character's journey of discovery. 
Austerlitz grows up as Dafydd Elias, fostered (as we discover) by a Welsh farmer and his 
wife in the period of Nazi occupation in Europe. The revelation to Austerlitz of his 'real' 
name - Austerlitz - has a cataclysmic effect on his life in which the realisation of his prior 
namelessness forces him to appropriate feelings of dislocation and mis-identity. Austerlitz 
makes it clear that, as far as he is concerned, he was left without a name before his true 
birth name is revealed to him. 
I have never known who I really was. From where I stand now, of 
course, I can see that my name alone, and the fact that it was kept from 
me until my fifteenth year, ought to have put me on the track of my 
origins, but it has also become clear to me of late why an agency greater 
than or superior to my own capacity for thought, which circumspectly 
directs operations somewhere in my brain, has always preserved me 
from my own secret, systematically preventing me from drawing the 
obvious conclusions and embarking on the inquiries they would have 
suggested to me.246 
In response to his headmaster's explanation that he must write his 'real' name- Jacques 
Austerlitz - on the forthcoming examination papers, the fifteen year old boy replies 
politely: "Excuse me, sir, but what does it mean?"247 What is the etymological derivation of 
Austerlitz? is the question the child is ostensibly asking, but it is the more profound 
existential question of identity, the reason, what does it mean to learn my name for the 
first time at the age of fifteen? that pervades the novel. The child represses the 
implications and demands of his new found name until adulthood. Seeing a young boy of 
about the age he was when he was fostered, Austerlitz is hit by a rush of suicidal anxiety: 
246 W. G. Sebald, Austerlitz trans. by Anthea Bell (London: Penguin Books, 2002) p.60 
247 Ibid. p.96 
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... a terrible weariness overcame me at the idea that I had never really 
been alive, or was only now being born, almost on the eve of my 
death.248 
Living without his name is, for Austerlitz, as if he had never been born. This recalls the 
state of the unnamed child who has, as yet, not been brought into the social space of 
naming. In Jewish tradition the brit milah (covenant of circumcision) marks the boy child's 
entrance into the social space and he remains nameless until that ceremony has been 
performed. 
Here, the carrier of the covenanted status (the father) is instructed to 
pass on the covenanted condition to his male heir. Until that time, the 
boy does not even have a name, which he receives only upon 
successful conclusion of the covenantal operation. Sociologically 
speaking, as a Jew, the boy is not even present until the moment of the 
brit milah. 249 
Naming marks the entrance into social order. lt is accorded the highest possible status; 
given at the moment of the sacrificial bond with God. To be deprived of a name is to be 
deprived sociality but also to be deprived of God. Taking on board his name, Austerlitz 
must take on board its implications, of the fact that it was discarded, of its heritage. He 
must all of a sudden understand himself as a victim. (As Lawrence Mass comments in his 
memoir Confessions of a Jewish Wagnerite, a memoir which acknowledges and expiates 
the author's struggle with his own self-anti-Semitism: 'it's anti-Semitism, not Israel or any 
institutional orthodoxy, that defines being Jewish for most of the world'250. lt is his implicit 
acknowledgement of this that forces Austerlitz to consider his origins, his fate, and that of 
his birth parents in occupied Czechoslovakia.) This realisation brings him close to death; a 
death that he was saved from as a child. Giving him back his name is almost to give him 
back his former fate. 
The identity of the European Jew in the first half of the twentieth century is one that is 
fraught with a struggle over naming (hiding one's name, disguising one's name, changing 
248 1bid. p.194 
249 Lawrence A. Hoffman, Beyond the Text: A Holistic Approach to Liturgy (lndianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1998} p.82 
250 Lawrence D. Mass, The Jewish Wagnerite (London: Cassell, 1994) p.247 
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one's name, being betrayed by one's name, a number instead of a name). In W or The 
Memory of Childhood Georges Perec describes the long journey of how his family 
surname, the Hebrew 'Peretz' was de-Jawed, in what he identifies as ' ... the concealment 
of my Jewish background through my patronym .. .'251 • In the Third Reich the 'Jewish 
name' was a matter of life and death, and as if to emphasise this the punctilious Aryan 
authorities gave all Jewish males the middle name 'lsrael'252• 
Being nameless can save your life. "My name is Nobody" Odysseus tells the human-
eating Cyclops, Polyphemus in The Odyssel53 . Tricked and blinded, the giant calls upon 
his neighbours to take revenge on his aggressor. 
"What on earth is wrong with you, Polyphemus? Why must you disturb 
the peaceful night and spoil our sleep with all this shouting? Is a robber 
driving off your sheep, or is somebody trying by treachery or violence to 
kill you?" 
Out of the cave came Polyphemus' great voice in reply: "0 my 
friends, it's Nobody's treachery, no[body's] violence, that is doing me to 
death." 
'Well then," they answered, in a way that settled the matter, "if 
nobody is assaulting you in your solitude, you must be sick. "254 
Odysseus escapes the island of the Cyclops unharmed, with the larger proportion of his 
company intact, by assuming a state of namelessness. Sailing away, he shouts back to 
the shore to Polyphemus: " ... your eye was put out by Odysseus, Sacker of Cities, son of 
Laertes, who lives in lthaca. "255 At a safe distance, the proper personal proper name is 
given with full force in order to compound the victory. 
For Austerlitz the shift between namelessness and name is not so felicitous. He searches 
for his lost name in the Karmelitska - the Prague state archives - a name he does not 
remember but rather has subsequently learnt. His discoveries take him eventually to 
Theresiendstadt, the forced and policed ghetto for Eastern European Jews during the first 
251 George Perec, W or The Memory of Childhood trans. by David Belles (London: The Harvill 
Press, 1996) p.36 
252 Philip Roth, Patrimony: A True Story (London: Vintage, 1999) p.213 
253 Homer The Odyssey trans. by E.V. Rieu (London: Penguin, 1946) p.149 
254 Ibid. p.150 
255 Ibid. p.153 
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half of the 1940's in which Austerlitz understands his mother to have been sent. Through 
the voice of Austerlitz, Sebald forms a single sentence which lasts over eleven pages and 
describes the appalling conditions of the place . 
. . . carrying in their luggage all manner of personal items and 
mementoes which could be of no conceivable use in the life that awaited 
them in the ghetto, often arriving already ravaged in body and spirit, no 
longer In their ~~ht minds, delirious, frequently unable to remember their 
own names .... 
There is horror at the thought of forgetting one's own name, which seems abject, in its 
distance from our cognisant standpoint, in anything but the infant or senile. To forget one's 
name is to lose one's identity. Nameless through trauma, nameless through forgetting, 
nameless through repression. 
Freud might have had much to say about the forgetting of one's own name through the 
horror of trauma had he lived to make sense of the travesties of the Third Reich. As it is, 
the forgetting of proper names - a temporary namelessness as constituted by another -
forms a major part of his thesis in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Of course, most 
of us are nameless to most people most of the time. Contemporary celebrity marks a 
journey out of the usual state of namelessness (getting one's name known). But within the 
circle of names that we do know - celebrity or otherwise - Freud highlights our tendency 
to let them go. 
and 
The process that should lead to the reproduction of the missing name 
has been so to speak displaced and has therefore led to an incorrect 
substitute. My hypothesis is that this displacement is not left to the 
arbitrary psychical choice but follows paths which can be predicted and 
which conform to laws. In other words, I suspect that the name or names 
which are substituted are connected in a discoverable way with the 
missing name: and I hope, if I am successful in demonstrating this 
connection, to proceed to throw light on the circumstances in which 
names are forgotten.257 
256 Sebald p.335 
257 Sigmund Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life Standard Edition Vol. 6 (London: 
Vantage, 2001) p.2 
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We shall, I think, have stated the facts with sufficient caution if we affirm: 
By the side of simple cases where proper names are forgotten there is a 
type of forgetting which is motivated by repression. 258 
In many ways Freud's hypothesis about the forgetting of proper names being motivated by 
repression seems axiomatic to us. The common usage phrase 'how Freudian' is applied 
especially to the paramnesia (false recollect(on) in relation to the proper name, and attests 
to our acceptance of the principle it describes. 
We can extrapolate from this that proper names are fundamental in psychic make-up, but 
also more crucially that they are a border between the conscious social world and the 
unconscious. Similar to the process of dreaming, though often much more publicly, the 
forgetting or paramnesia of proper names betrays unconscious thought. 
Just as analysis can examine dream-content to determine the unconscious and repressed 
dream-thoughts, so too it can examine the forgetting or paramnesia of proper names in a 
similar way. The motivation towards the repression might be multifarious. Freud lists many 
examples, concluding that' ... personal, family and professional complexes .. .' are the most 
The forgetting of the names of others - constituting their temporary namelessness -
betrays our own insecurities, anxieties, jealousies, likes and dislikes. Here the name not 
only positions itself at the forefront of identity, a bridge between the individual and the 
social, but also between the conscious and the unconscious. Betrayed into namelessness. 
But to be in the temporary state of namelessness might also constitute a state of 
aggrandisement. Literary anonymity, as Genette points out can be a sly device of celebrity 
spin. 
258 Ibid. p. 7 
259 Ibid. p.40 
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[Waiter] Scott, great literary strategist that he was, had discovered that 
his incognito, by arousing curiosity, was contributing to the success of 
his books. In the incognito, he would say after the fact, he also found 
deeper satisfaction, thinking himself (like some Italian actor) a better 
writer when disguised ... and believing that a true novelistic vocation is 
inseparable from a certain groclivity for suddenly disappearing, that is, in 
short, for clandestineness. 60 
To choose to withhold the name today (to remain nameless) is perhaps the most 
provocative of all states of namelessness in a culture of testimony, surveillance and 
undercover journalism. When 'privacy' is contested in courts of law and issues of 'public 
interest' are promulgated at the sacrifice of individual choice, to remain nameless is a 
state few can achieve. 
260 Gerard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation trans. by Jane E. Lewin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) p.43 
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My name is Joshua Sofaer and I am thirty-four years old. I live in New 
York City with my wife Annette and two children Eleana (who is five) and 
Talia (who is three). I work here with Jews for Jesus as a missionary. I 
direct our Youth and Children's work for the New York area and the 
North East part of the United States and ... I don~ know what else you 
want me to say. 
Joshua Sofaer, New York 
6. Not In My Name: Author 
The deep subject of autobiography 
is the proper name. 
Philippe Lejeune261 
The narrator of A la recherche du temps perdu spends the duration of the multi-volume 
novel approaching the moment of writing itself. lt is really only in the last pages of the 
writing that he begins to write. Coming to writing is a kind of epiphany for the narrator: 
How much more worth living did it appear to me now, now that I seemed 
to see that this life that we live in half-darkness can be illumined, this life 
that at every moment we distort can be restored to its true pristine 
shape, that a life, in short, can be realised within the confines of a 
book!262 
The book offers some sort of 'true' version of events which otherwise people and memory 
'distort'. Much has been made of Proust's own dedication to the process of writing (as 
opposed to that of his narrator). The image, and it appears much of the reality, is of a man 
shut up in his cork lined bedroom asleep during the day and madly scribbling away during 
the night for years on end263• Proust's life was his book and his book is his life264• 
261 Philippe Lejeune 'The Autobiographical Contract' in French Literary Theory Today ed. by 
Tzvetan Todorov, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p.209 
262 Marcel Proust. In Search of Lost Time Vols 1-6 trans. by C. K. ScoH Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 1996) Vol.6 p.431 
263 See for example George D. Painter, Marcel Proust: A Biography (London: Pimlico Press, 1996) 
and Jean-Yves Tadie, Marcel Proust: A Life trans. by Euan Cameron (London: Viking, 2000) 
264 This line of thought is expanded in Chapter 3 The Crystal Ball, Section 6: Career Psychologist: 
Ju/ie Unite. 
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There is a large body of interpretive analysis which seeks to make sense of the 
relationship between the author (Marcel Proust), the narrator (the writing voice of A la 
recherche du temps perdu) and the protagonist (the man whose life experiences are 
recounted, and who very occasionally is referred to as 'Marcel'). Part of the reason for the 
wealth of discussion of this particular aspect of A la recherche du temps perdu is the 
ontological instability of these three voices. In his essay 'The Autobiographical 
Contract'265, Philippe Lejeune articulates the problem thus: 
... on the one hand, there is no clear indication of the fictional contract at 
the beginning of the book, and in fact numerous readers have 
mistakenly identified the author Proust with the narrator; furthermore, it 
is true that the narrator-protagonist has no name - except on just one 
occasion, where, in a single utterance, the possibility is offered of giving 
the narrator the same first name as the author (we can attribute this 
utterance only to the author, for how can a fictitious narrator know the 
name of his author?), and in this manner we are informed that the author 
is not the narrator. This strange intrusion of the author functions 
simultaneously as a fictional contract and as an autobiographical clue, 
and situates the text in some ambiguous intermediate region. 266 
The 'one occasion' which Lejeune refers to (in a footnote) is the following: 
Then she would find her tongue and say: "My-" or "My darling -" 
followed by my Christian name, which, if we give the narrator the same 
name as the author of this book, would be "My Marcel," or "My darling 
Marcel."267 
Certainly the 'if' here is crucial and Lejeune is right to note that this 'if' produces a fictional 
contract which simultaneously hints at an autobiographical clue. But Lejeune is in fact 
wrong to say that Proust refers to his narrator-protagonist only once by name. At a 
moment of extreme emotional anxiety about his lover's potential infidelities the narrator-
protagonist receives the following letter from her: 
265 The essay separates out the 'autobiographical contract' (the affirmation in the text between the 
identity of the author and the protagonist) the 'fictional contract' (the "overt practice of non-identity" 
or the "attestation of fictivity") and tlie 'referential contract' (texts which convey information about a 
'reality' which is subject to verification). 
266 Lejeune p.205 
267 Proust Vol.5 p. 76 
160 
"My darling dear Marcel, I return less quickly than this cyclist, whose 
bike I should like to borrow in order to be with you sooner. How could 
you imagine that I might be angry or that I could enjoy anything better 
than to be with you? lt will be nice to go out, just the two of us together; it 
would be nicer still if we never went out except together. The ideas you 
get into your head I What a Marcel! What a Marcel! Always and ever your 
Albertine. "268 
This tantalising, potentially autobiographical leakage again pressures the question: what is 
the operation of the personal proper name of the author-narrator-protagonist in A la 
recherche du temps perdu? What is Marcel? What is Marcel? In this instance however, 
there is no deconstruction as in Lejeune's example. 1t is straightforward. The protagonist 
is Marcel. 
Over six hundred pages earlier than the above leak, Proust plays with the triadic author-
narrator-protagonist relationship by a momentary enunciation in the voice of a potential 
reader. The context is one where (typically, over the course of several pages) the 
narrator-protagonist attempts to recall the name of a woman whom he knows reasonably 
well. 
"All this," the reader will remark, "tells us nothing as to the lady's failure 
to oblige; but since you have made so long a digression, allow me, dear 
author, to waste another moment of your time by telling you that it is a 
pity that, young as you were (or as your hero was, if he isn't you), you 
had already so feeble a memory that you could not remember the name 
of a lady whom you knew quite well." 11 is indeed a pity, dear reader. [ ... ] 
An unfailing memory is not a very powerful incentive to the study of the 
phenomena of memory.269 
The 'reader's' parenthesis "or as your hero was, if he isn't you" again purposefully plays 
with the slippage between self and other, fact and fiction; but here the emphasis is the 
reverse of that in Lejeune's example. At first it is an autobiographical contract ("you" as 
directed to both the author and narrator-protagonist) and only secondarily a fictional 
contract ("or as your hero was, if he isn't you"). More importantly however, it declares 
absurd the desire to know to what extent the narrator is the author at all. Put, by Proust in 
268 1bid. Vol.5 p.172 
269 Ibid. Vol.4 p.59 
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parentheses, this slippage is tantalising but nevertheless also purposefully throwaway. lt 
is particularly piquant that this unsettling of the name of the author-narrator-protagonist 
should be at a point in the narrative that centres around a discourse on the forgetting of 
personal proper names. lt is the operation of the personal proper name, in language, in 
writing, in memory, that concerns Proust, as well as the specific contents, meanings and 
affects of particular names; but it is nevertheless unimportant what a particular name 
might be, except perhaps in the terms of a literary conceit: the similarities and differences 
between the names of the author-narrator-protagonist. The function of the text is not to 
reveal the author, but rather the reader, and this is something that the narrator (as an 
author - rather than Proust, the author of A la recherche du temps perdu) articulates in 
the last pages of the book. 
I thought of those who would read it as "my" readers. For it seemed to 
me that they would not be "my'' readers but the readers of their own 
selves, my book being merely a sort of magnifying glass like those which 
the optician at Combray used to offer his customers - it would be my 
book, but with its help I would furnish them with the means of reading 
what lay inside themselves.270 
This understanding - which predates post-structuralist theory by half a century- positions 
the reader as author, a circumstance in which the autobiographical elements belong to 
those reading. 
There is however a single instance during A la recherche du temps perdu in which Proust 
steps outside the world of the narrative to absolutely attest to the importance of a 
particular personal proper name: 
In this book in which there is not a single incident which is not fictitious, 
not a single character who is a real person in disguise, in which 
everything has been invented by me in accordance with the 
requirements of my theme, I owe it to the credit of my country to say that 
only the millionaire cousins of Frant;:oise who came out of retirement to 
help their niece when she was left without support, only they are real 
people who exist. And persuaded as I am that I shall not offend their 
modesty, for the reason that they will never read this book, it is both with 
270 Ibid. Vol.6 p.432 
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childish pleasure and with a profound emotion that, being unable to 
record the names of so many others who undoubtedly acted in the same 
way, to all of whom France owes her survival, I transcribe here the real 
name of this family: they are called - and what name could be more 
French? - Lariviere?71 
Here not only does Proust attest to the fictitious nature of his work (paradoxically by the 
use of a factual element) but he articulates the one reason for using a 'real' name: 
acknowledgement to posterity. The Lariviere family make it into A la recherche du temps 
perdu undisguised because their generosity has earned their name a place in posterity. 
So what then is the status of the narrator-protagonist with no name, or a name which is 
only alluded to on two separate occasions in this vast work, one of which is openly 
contested and thrown into doubt? Michael Ragussis considers the names of the other 
characters as synecdoche for the name of the narrator-protagonist: 
The narrator who remains nameless through so much of the Recherche 
takes his name, so to speak, from the names of others. lt is in this sense 
that the narrative of one's life is inscribed through the names of others, 
through the qualification and partial eclipse of "I" .... 272 
This is a very productive way of thinking about how personal proper names function. We 
incorporate the names of others as our own identity. (This is literally manifest in a prosaic 
way by the assumption of the name of a spouse at marriage.) In this view, the 
conglomeration of the personal proper names throughout A la recherche du temps perdu 
become the name of the narrator. 
Gilles Oeleuze extends this incorporation beyond the proper name. In his book on Proust, 
Proust and Signs he ends with a brilliant description of the narrator as a body without 
organs, spider like, who weaves the search as a web, creating and incorporating his 
characters for himself. 
271 Ibid. Vol.6 p.191 
272 Michael Ragussis, Acts of Naming: The Family Plot in Fiction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986) p.206 
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Strange plasticity of the narrator: it is this spider-body of the narrator, the 
spy, the policeman, the jealous lover, the interpreter- the madman -the 
universal schizophrenic who will send out toward Charlus the paranoiac, 
another thread toward Albertine the erotomaniac, in order to make them 
so many marionettes of his own delirium, so many intensive powers of 
his organ less body, so many profiles of his own madness. 273 
For Deleuze it makes no sense to ask who the narrator is or what relation he has to the 
author. There is "less of a narrator than a machine of the Search"274 for Deleuze. This 
machine incorporates all its characters as substance for the narrator's identity. 
But while Ragussis and Deleuze offer conceptual-literary solutions to the problem of the 
narrator-protagonist, the issue of Marcel Proust's relationship to his narrator-protagonist, 
spider or otherwise, is left hanging. Perhaps this is inevitable. All writing written under a 
personal proper name (and perhaps even writing which masquerades under an author's 
name) is subsumed as autobiographical. Which is to say, even the most overt fiction is of 
the 'self that wrote it, no matter what distance the author might seek from the articulated 
fact or sentiment. 
In his analysis of the paratextual elements of the authored text, Gerard Genette coins the 
term 'onymity' to describe the giving of one's own name, the attribution of one's legal 
name, at the front of the peritext. 
[I shall] coin the term onymity. As always, the most ordinary state is the 
one that, from habit, has never received a name, and the need to give it 
one responds to the describer's wish to rescue it from this deceptive 
ordinariness. After all, to sign a work with one's real name is a choice 
like any other, and nothing authorizes us to regard this choice as 
insignificant. 
Onymity is sometimes motivated by something stronger or less 
neutral than, say, the absence of a desire to give oneself a pseudonym, 
as is evident when someone who is already famous produces a book 
that will perhaps be successful precisely because of his previously 
established fame. The name then is no longer a straightforward 
statement of identity ("The author's name is So-and-So"); it is, instead, 
the way to put an identity, or rather a "personality," as the media call it, 
at the service of the book .... 275 
273 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs {London: The Athlone Press, 2000) p.182 
274 Ibid. p.181 
275 Gerard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation trans. by Jane E. Lewin {Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) p.40 
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Beyond the utilisation of a known name for commercial gain, the use of one's own name 
(as opposed to a pseudonym or false attribution) is about acknowledging the thing in the 
world as one's own: laking ownership and responsibility. In this sense, the putting of one's 
name to a text is to position it in the world as part of oneself. This is not about the 
adequacy of the representation of self in a particular cultural product. Even the most self-
referential and potentially revealing of writing - the journal or diary - is not necessarily an 
'adequate' representation of that self. Reflecting on his diary entries in an essay tilled 
'Deliberation', Roland Barthes recognises the ease with which the diary writes itself: that 
there is no need to worry about what to write because it necessarily must issue from 
immediate experience. He notes however, with some discomfort, what follows: 
Then comes the second phase, very soon after the first (for instance, if I 
reread today what I wrote yesterday), and it makes a bad impression: 
the text doesn't hold up, like some sort of delicate foodstuff which 
"turns," spoils, becomes unappetizing from one day to the next; I note 
with discouragement the artifice of "sincerity," the artistic mediocrity of 
the "spontaneous", worse still: I am disgusted and irritated to find a 
"pose" I certainly hadn't intended: in a journal situation, and precisely 
because it doesn't "work" - doesn't get transformed by the action of work 
- I is a poseur. a matter of effect, not of intention, the whole difficulty of 
literature is here.276 
Barthes rejects the possibility of overtly self-referential diary writing because, ironically, it 
does not adequately represent himself. 11 is not the writing itself which is inadequate, but 
it's relation to the author. But what Barthes can not escape is the escape itself. The writing 
in 'Deliberation' is in itself a form of autobiography. As Linda Anderson points out: 
'Autobiography survives its reconfiguring by poststructuralism, by absorbing and 
acknowledging self-critique"277. 11 is Barthes' self-critique which ultimately becomes his 
writing, becomes himself as attested by the attribution of his personal proper name in the 
peritext. 
276 Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language trans. by Richard Howard (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1989) p.359 
277 Linda Anderson, Autobiography (London: Routledge, 2001) p.74 
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What these examples seek to prove, is that no matter how accurate, factual or otherwise 
writing may or may not be, the printing of the author's name on the title page 
acknowledges the work as part of their life. While neither Proust's magnum opus nor 
Barthes' short deliberation are strictly speaking autobiographical in terms of their position 
on the bookshop shelf, they necessarily become them (as they begot them) through the 
personal proper name278: autobiography; self writing self. 
278 
lt is perhaps fear of this commitment, above all else, that has resulted in so many different 
authors selecting a pseudonym as the public expression of the author's name. 
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In the New Testament when Jesus was, you know, going toe to toe with 
the Rabbis, he would go toe to toe with the Rabbis, but he would also go 
toe to toe with the scribes and the priests. And if I am around a 
Christian, especially if I'm with a pastor, he'll say, 'What's your name?' 
and I'll say 'Sofaer, 'and he'll say, 'Is it French?' and I'll say, 'No, it's 
Hebrew, ' and I'll say, 'lt means scribe. The scribes and the priests in the 
Bible, those are distant relatives'. Those were the ones that Jesus was, 
in a sense, speaking against. 
Joshua Sofaer, New York 
7. Ineffable Name: God 
'God' - does it describe God as the unique 
divine being or is it a name of God? 
Saul Kripke279 
There are many gods with many names. The monotheistic Judeo-Christian-lslamic God, 
the God of Abraham, lsaac and Jacob also has many names. In Islam, 'Allah' (which 
simply means 'God' in Arabic) has at least ninety-nine names. In Christianity, Jesus is 
God named on Earth. In Judaism, God is credited with the mystical number of seventy 
names; the most holy of these is the Tetragrammaton represented by the Hebrew letters 
Yod- Heh- Vav- Heh (illil1) and transliterated in the four letters YHVH (or sometimes 
JHVH). This is the name that God reveals to Moses at Horeb in the burning bush episode: 
Then Moses said to God, 'If I go to the Israelites and tell them that the 
God of their forefathers has sent me to them, and they ask me his name, 
what shall I say?' God answered, 'I AM; that is who I am. Tell them that I 
AM has sent you to them.' And God said further, 'You must tell the 
Israelites this, that it is JEHOVAH the God of their forefathers, the God 
of Abraham, the God of lsaac, the God of Jacob, who has sent you to 
them. This is my name for ever; this is my title in every generation.280 
Moses asks God his name, and as if to counter this impertinence God replies 'I am; that is 
who I am', which has also been translated as 'I will be what I will be'. God then follows this 
by giving Moses his proper name, which has been translated here as Jehovah. 'Jehovah' 
279 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972; repr. 2002) p.26 
280 Exodus Chapter 3, Verses 13-16 
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is the widely accepted mis-translation (widely used and widely thought incorrect) from the 
Hebrew letters Yod - Heh - Vav- Heh. The Hebrew Scriptures- the Tenach- were 
written without vowels, but the ancient Hebrews would have been aware what these 
letters signified and how they should be pronounced. While theologians and historians 
agree that the name would have been widely heard and used in ancient times, 
subsequent prohibitions against the misuse of the proper name of God (illi1 1 I Yod -
Heh - Vav- Hey I YHVH) through Rabbinical teachings, meant the name stopped being 
uttered, and the title Adonai (1ll1N) meaning Lord, was said in its place. Later Christians, 
who refused the prohibitions of usage, inserted the vowels from Adonai into the 
consonants of the Tetragrammaton YHVH and ended up with Jehovah. There is no 
reason at all to presume that those vowels used in Adonai, should be the ones that were 
used in the original pronunciation of the most holy name of God, and while there is little 
general agreement on how the name should be pronounced (or should not be 
pronounced, as misuse is forbidden) a compromise consensus has arrived at Yahweh in 
the Roman Alphabet as the personal proper name of God, and many English bibles give 
this in place of Jehovah. 
The most holy name of God, sometimes known as the Tetragrammaton, sometimes 
known as the unutterable name, sometimes known as the ineffable name, is then, doubly 
ineffable. lt is ineffable (too great to be expressed in words, unutterable, indefinable, 
indescribable) firstly through ignorance- we do not know exactly what it is- and 
secondarily through prohibition -we are forbidden from using it. This leads to the illogical 
condition in which it is forbidden to utter (or write) the unknowable. 
There are two prohibitions with regard to mentioning the Divine Name. 
One is in· utterance, the other is in writing, and in both the Din281 appears 
to be perfectly clear. In so far as the prohibition of the utterance of the 
Divine Name is concerned, it is limited in the Talmud282 solely to the 
Tetragrammaton, the Ineffable Name, which was uttered only once a 
year by the High Priest in the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement.283 
281 Jewish law 
282 The main collection of Jewish oral tradition which interprets the Torah. 
283 Louis Rabinowitz, 'On the Names of God' Jewish Chronicle 10 April 1970, p. 7 
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There is nothing in the Torah284 itself which prohibits the utterance of the name of God. lt 
occurs in these writings many times and it is likely that the name was pronounced as part 
of daily services in the ancient temple in Jerusalem. The Mishna285 confirms that there 
was no prohibition against pronouncing the Tetragrammaton but by the time of the Talmud 
some rabbis asserted that anyone who pronounced the most holy name of God should be 
put to death, and would have no place in the World to Come, and that a substitute, Adonai 
(1Jl1N) or simply Ha-Shem (D\!Jil) -literally 'the name'- should be used instead. 
lt is this prohibition that has lead to ignorance of the 'correct' pronunciation of the 
Tetragrammaton and to the absurdist situation where God-fearing Jews do not pronounce 
a word they do not know how to pronounce. Consequently purposeful mispronunciations 
include wildly different linguistic formulations as a form of protection against accidental 
use of the forbidden utterance. Such 'caution' against verbal misuse does not arise from 
'God-given law' but rather later rabbinical interpretation. The prohibition against writing the 
name of God arises however, directly from Deuteronomy. As God is giving the Israelites 
instructions for the establishment of the promised land, the command is given to "blot out" 
the name of the gods of idolatrous religions and in contrast to do the opposite for God's 
name. 
There are statutes and laws that you shall be careful to observe in the 
land which the Lord the God of your fathers is giving you to occupy as 
long as you live on earth. You shall demolish all the sanctuaries where 
the nations whose place you are taking worship their gods, on mountain-
tops and hills and under every spreading tree. You shall put down their 
altars and break their sacred pillars, burn their sacred poles and hack 
down the idols of their gods and thus blot out the name of them from that 
place. 
You shall not follow such practices in the worship of the Lord your 
God, but you shall resort to the place which the Lord your God will 
choose out of all your tribes to receive his Name that it may dwell 
there. 286 
284 The first five books of the Bible: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy, 
sometimes called the Pentateuch. 
285 An early collection of Jewish oral tradition on which the Talmud was based. 
286 Deuteronomy Chapter 12, Verses 1-5 
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In each case here "the Lord your God" is an English transfiguration of the Hebrew 
Tetragrammaton. From this rabbis have inferred that Jews are commanded not to destroy, 
erase or deface the holy name of God; many take it as a cue that any name of God should 
not be destroyed. Talmudic discussions endlessly negotiate the boundaries of this law. 
Both Shakh, Yoreh De'ah 179:11, and R[abbi] Akiva Eger, Yoreh De'ah 
276:9, state definitively that the name of God occurring in languages 
other than Hebrew is regarded as a cognomen and hence the prohibition 
with reference to erasure does not apply.287 
But some interpretations of this law prohibiting the destruction of the name of God are 
taken to such an extreme, that even the most everyday of greetings become incorporated 
in its terms. 
R[abbi] Yonatan Eibeschutz, Urim ve-Tumim 27:2, and R[abbi] Ya'akov 
of Lissa, Netivot ha-Mishpat 27:2, maintain that reverence must also be 
accorded to written occurrences of the Divine Name, whether in Hebrew 
or in the vernacular. Both scholars decried even the use of the French 
adieu (the root meaning of which is "with God") in written 
communications because of the dishonour of the Divine Name resulting 
from careless disposal of such correspondence.288 
A common way to avoid such careless disposal is to always write any name of God with 
an ellipsis - God becomes G-d. As Rabbi Louis Rabinowitz noted in an article in the 
London Jewish Chronicle in 1970 · .. .in recent years there has developed a veritable 
explosive fertility in extending the prohibitions'289 to include even vernacular words which 
contain the letters of names of God: 
A combination of all these stringencies suggests giddy possibilities. If, 
despite the emphatic decision of Shabbetai Cohen, the rule is to be 
applied to the Divine Name in the vernacular; if to it one adds the latest 
development regarding every combination which accidentally occurs in a 
word as equally proscribed; if we take into consideration the refinement 
with regard to shalom290, we shall be constrained to express ourselves in 
English as follows: 
287 J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems (New York: KTVA Publishing Inc. Yeshiva 
University Press, 1977) p.204 
288 Ibid. p.205 
289 Rabinowitz p.7 
290 The word 'shalom' means 'peace' in Hebrew, and is one of the names of God; it is used in 
modern Hebrew as an equivalent greeting to 'hello' and 'goodbye' in English. If the prohibition were 
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"In my garden in G-dalming, 
I have some lovely g-detia growing. 
I often go down there when 
I want some peac-."291 
By many peoples standards, including Rabbi Rabinowitz, this is a reductio ad absurdam of 
a single prohibition against the destruction of the most holy name of God. But whatever 
level of stringency an individual chooses to accept, the general rule remains in place, 
especially around the Tetragrammaton: the name of God must not be used lightly, if used 
at all. 
lt is not the intention to enter here into a theological debate, or even to offer a quasi-
psychological generalisation of why certain people have chosen to interpret the writings of 
the Torah in this way. As Griselda Pollock has written in a discussion on the literary use of 
biblical names: 
We are not here arguing theology. Rather, taking a cue from both 
psychoanalysis and deconstruction, we are reading in the founding texts 
of western culture the legends and mythologies by which subjectivity is 
symbolically represented and in turn in relation to which it is 
constituted. 292 
The concern here is not so much to interpret the interpretations but rather to follow 
through and to see how the prohibition against mentioning the Divine Name might impact 
on a process of living and writing. A first order 'impact' would be this writing itself. The 
refusal of the prohibition within this text acknowledges the writer's ambivalence of such 
strictures (though the writing itself respects them through an acknowledgement)293. 
to extend to the word 'shalom' it would become blasphemous, in practical terms, to say 'hello' and 
'aoodbye'! 
21l1 Rabinowitz p. 7 
292 Griselda Pollock, 'Gleaning in history of coming after/behind the reapers: the feminine, the 
stranger and the matrix in the work and theory of Brach Lichtenberg Ettinger' in Generations and 
Geographies in the Visual Arts ed. by Griselda Pollock (London: Routledge, 1996) p.267 
293 But what actually does this text refuse when there is no intention that it should be destroyed? 1t 
is the erasure of the name, not its writing, which is forbidden. lt would be possible to keep all drafts 
and copies carefully, though not without some effort. Here the issue of the responsibility of a writer 
for their work becomes strangely critical. No longer is it possible, within the strictures of Talmudic 
law that is, to 'publish and be done', as each copy has the potential for a fateful disrespect of God 
with dire consequences. 
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The breaking of the prohibition within this text has a peculiar personal resonance, 
because the connection between the most holy name of God, the autobiography of man, 
and writing itself, is to be found in the vocation of the sofaef94. The sofaer (1!:110), is the 
scribe: the one who has the duty to write the Torah and thus the most holy name of God. 
The sofaer plays a central role in Jewish society and culture. lt is only the sofaer who can 
write or restore the safer tora/195, tefillin296 , and mezuzalf97• lt is the reading of this writing 
that is central to Jewish religious practice. 
The life of the sofaer (now as always) rotates around the repeated writing of the same 
texts, to the same degree of accuracy, under the same strict laws which govern such 
actions. lt may take many years to write just one complete Torah. As the sofaer Eric Ray 
points out, these laws of writing culminate in the writing of the Tetragrammaton, the most 
holy name of God. 
Writing God's name is the most important part of writing a Torah. When 
a sof[a]er writes God's name there are lots of special preparations. On a 
day when I am going to write God's name I go to the mikveh298 • ( ••• ] 
· To write God's name I use a special quill that has never been used 
to write any other words. I mark my Ha-Shem299 quills by leaving part of 
the feathers on one side. I remove all the feathers from my regular quills. 
To write God's name I use a special bottle of ink, which is used only to 
write God's name. No pens except my Ha-Shem quills have ever 
touched it. 
Every day I say a brakhah300 before I start writing the Torah. When 
I write God's name I must say another brakhah.301 
294 A note on the spelling of 'sofaer'. The process of writing Hebrew words in the Roman alphabet 
is one of transliteration and opinions vary widely as to the correct way to transliterate different 
words. Although a direct transliteration of the Hebrew 1!:110 meaning scribe, would be sofaer, 
sofair or sophair (each of which has a legitimate phonetic and orthographic basis) the spelling 
'sofer' has come into common usage in the West as the word for scribe. This is predominantly due 
to German and Yiddish pronunciation of the word, which with a Germanic accent would take the 
stress from the 'ae'- sofaer- and put it on the 'o'- sofer. All of these different spellings occur as 
surnames (though none with any frequency). The spelling 'sofaer' points, with almost entire 
certainty, to a single family that originated in Baghdad. In the following text I choose to use my 
family spelling, which is phonetically accurate. 1t is, after all, my text. 
295 The single most holy object in Judaism, written unde~ strict laws, on animal parchment using 
~ecific writing implements. 
Two leather boxes containing passages from the Torah which are used when praying. 
297 Written prayers attached to the doorposts of Jewish homes. 
296 Sacred purifying pool. 
299 Literally 'the name'- a metonym for God's name (see above). 
300 Prayer 
301 Eric Ray, Sofer: The Story of a Torah Scroll (Los Angeles: Torah Aura Productions, 1999) p.28 
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For the sofaer, writing the name of God orders life in extremis. lt is the act of writing which 
dictates diu mal existence. The sofaer marks the absolute intersection of life and writing. 
Inspired, living and writing by and for God. Writing begets writing. 
The sofaer prefigures other scribes, scriveners and copyists who subsequently become a 
constellation of literary figures which include: Melville's Bartleby, Gogol's Akakii 
Akakievich, Dostoevsky's Prince Myshkin and Flaubert's Bouvard and Pecuchef02. Each 
of these characters is caught by the act of writing. For Giorgio Agamben they embody 
pure potentiality . 
. . . just as the layer of sensitive wax is suddenly grazed by the scribe's 
stylus, so the potentiality of thought, which in itself is nothing, allows for 
the act of intelligence to take place.303 
The writer (sofaer) begets the writer (scrivener) begets the writer (Melville, Gogol, 
Dostoevsky, Flaubert) begets the writer (Bartleby, Akakievich, Myshikin, Bouvard and 
Pecuchet). The sofaer is the first writer, the writer of the law, the writer of The Name. 
For my part, this writing (this very writing- this performance) of my name, in service to the 
name (the name of the father, my father) enacts an embodiment of my name (my 
autobiography) that of a script which I perform (which I nevertheless choose to perform) a 
performance which might well cause my sofaer ancestors (and God?) to shudder. 
302 From the respective short stories and novels Bartleby, The Overcoat, The Idiot, and Bouvard 
and Pecuchet 
303 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(California: Stanford University Press, 1999) p.245 
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Chapter 3: The Crystal Ball 
Fig. 48: The Crystal Ball 
The Crystal Ball: Introduction 
My horoscope, cast by a neighborhood 
astrologer when I was a week-old-infant, 
predicted that I would be a writer, that I would 
win some prizes, that I would cross "the black 
waters" of oceans and make my home 
among aliens. Brought up in a culture that 
places its faith in horoscopes, it never 
occurred to me to doubt it. 
Bharati Mukherjee304 
We are obsessed with the future. We are almost as obsessed with the future as we are 
with the past. While the therapy driven culture of the West maintains its grip on the past in 
its dependency on psychoanalysis, origins, and roots, our entire life, from potty training to 
politics, is geared towards that which is to come. Science identifies the future as the very 
reason for life (the urge towards procreation, the survival of the fittest), Art offers the future 
as its prize (the audience, the legacy), and Religion holds up the future as a stick to whip 
us with (eternal blessedness or eternal damnation). Whether or not we believe the future 
to be predetermined by a higher order, or negotiated by free will and chance encounter, 
the 'problem' of the future is that while it is very easy to predict, it is difficult to rely on. 
What might an autobiography of the future be? 
According to Philippe Lejeune an autobiography must be a 'retrospective' narrative, 
'produced by a real person concerning his own existence'305. But if an autobiography is to 
be 'retrospectively oriented' the totality of a life will never be written. 
What is the future of the life that is writing? 
304 Bharati Mukherjee, 'A Four-Hundred-Year-Old-Woman' in Critical Fictions: The Politics of 
Imaginative Writing Dia Center for the Arts, Discussions in Contemporary Culture Number 7 ed. by 
Philomena Mariani (Seattle: Bay Press, 1991) p.24 
305 Philippe Lejeune, 'The Autobiographical Contract' in French Literary Theory Today ed. by 
Tzvetan Todorov (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982) p.193 
175 
If the 'bio' - the life - of autobiography is to be taken seriously, then recognition must be 
made of the life that continues beyond the writing. Perhaps this makes all autobiography 
impossible, or at least always partial: an autobiography up until the writing of the 
autobiography. 
But how do we write our own future? 
In an attempt to try and answer this question, or at least to raise it, in June 2002, and with 
the support of a 'Nightbird' commission from Duckie via Arts Council England, I produced 
The Crystal Ball at the ICA in London306. 
The Crystal Ball was an experimental theatre piece in which members of the audience 
had their futures predicted by a panel of experts. Those who foretold the future were: Rod 
Dale, an optometrist; Maura Bright, a face reader; Alan Dickinson-Quelch, a financial 
advisor; Tom Hoyes, an expert on ageing; Julia Laverne a psychic life scientist; Julie 
Unite, a career psychologist; and Robin Whitmore, an illustrator. 
Greeted by a hostess who accompanied them on their journey between each of the 
booths in which the experts were housed, audience members spent twelve minutes in one 
to one conversation with each of the experts in turn. At the end of each individual session, 
the expert gave the hostess a piece of paper outlining their guest's prediction, which the 
hostess kept safe until the end of the performance, handing over the assembled collection 
in a cardboard wallet, with the valediction: "This is your future, I hope you enjoy it!" 307 
306 
'Nightbird' is the title given to theatre company Duckie's biannual series of 'experimental' and 
'risk taking' audience interactive events. 
307 The Crystal Ball ran for two days with four performances each day and a total of seven people 
per show as 'full' audience members (many more came to watch, find out what was happening, 
and to see the hostesses perform their dance routine at the change over from one prediction to the 
next). A total of fifty-six people had their futures presented to them. 
The reactions were varied. Everyone that I spoke to found the experiences affecting in 
some sense or another. Some found a strong need to talk about their experience in detail - others 
felt very private about it. 
While the numbers were limited, The Crystal Ball sold out completely two weeks in 
advance and there was clearly something in the idea which had an appeal: seven predictions in an 
hour and a half for £10. 
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This elaborate theatrical construction allowed (or perhaps was simply an excuse for) my 
own future to be written; it gave me seven predictions with which to work. Each of these 
seven predictions has conceived a proposition or an area of discussion, configured below 
as a 'note' following a description of each expert's task and the prediction they made. 
Arising from Rod Dale's prediction of the deterioration of my sight, 'Note 1' tracks the 
relationship between the archetype of the blind seer or prophet who sees the future, and 
the person whose future is blind. The latter case focuses on the last diaries of the artist 
and filmmaker Derek Jarman, who writes blind about losing his sight. 'Note 2' follows on 
from the prediction by Maura Bright, who is a Face Reader; it considers the photographic 
portrait as the locus for identifying the future of the sitter, from physiognomic 
understandings of the human face which abounded at the origins of photography, to 
' contemporary arts practices which use photographic portraits to create futures for their 
sitters. Alan Dickinson Quelch's prediction that my chance of a stable financial future lies 
in property, provokes a discussion in 'Note 3' on the understanding that contemporary 
performance fails to enter into the commodified world of the art market and then considers 
ways in which performance has attempted to contradict this understanding; it considers 
the possibility that performance practice might engender property as a stable financial 
future by looking at the performance space Home, which is based inside a family house. 
Tom Hoyes is Vice President of Age Concern and his prediction about my capacity to 
cope with the effects of ageing leads to 'Note 4' in which the common resistance to aging 
is explored by examining Michael Jackson's preoccupation with J. M. Barrie's character 
Peter Pan. 'Note 5' picks up on Julia Laverne's prediction about life beyond death and 
considers the way in which selected contemporary performance practitioners have chosen 
to stage death. Julie Unite is a Career Psychologist and her prediction about my capacity 
to actualise career goals leads to 'Note 6', an analysis of way in which the narrator of A la 
lt became clear in discussion afterwards that many people who booked tickets did so 
despite never having considered or consented to having their 'fortune' told outside the context of 
an artwork -on the pier or in horoscopes for example- and that it had been quite shocking to 
them to be confronted with a future that they had neither considered nor anticipated discovering. 
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recherche du temps perdu writes towards the moment of writing, that is towards his 
vocation; a parallel analysis considers the mythology surrounding the writing practice of 
the author Marcel Proust. The final note, 'Note 7' follows on from the prediction made by 
Illustrator, Robin Whitmore. Here the onus on what the future should be is directed back to 
me with the questions: 'Where would you like to be in ten years time? What would you like 
to be doing?' and are then actualised in a visual representation. This final prediction 
forces consideration of how we motivate ourselves towards our future with reference to 
Herman Melville's Bartleby. 
In all of these 'notes' the focus is on exploring the relationship between autobiographical 
drives or narratives and the way in which they are performed in and/or for the future. 
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1. Optometrist: Rod Dale 
Fig. 49: Rod Dale 
Rod Dale is an optometrist who predicted the future of my vision. He shone a light into my 
eyes, looked at the optical nerve and tested my near and distance vision using lenses of 
varying strengths. 
Prediction 1 
Your left eye is slightly oval, it is not completely spherical. This is an imperfection but is 
nevertheless normal. You have a sixty percent chance or requiring reading spectacles 
from the age of forty. Given the longevity of your family it is likely that you will live over 
eighty-five and there is a seventy-one percent chance that you will contract a visually 
impairing cataract. Most cataracts are treatable. If, as is likely, you go on to live over 
ninety, the chances of age related macular degeneration, or AMD, the outcome of which is 
debilitating loss of vital central or detailed vision, resulting in eventual blindness, is about 
one in eight. 
Note 1 
Blindness and the future are linked in two separate but complementary sets of 
circumstance: 
(i) the archetype or trope of the blind seer or prophet who sees the future, and 
(ii) the person whose future is blind, both 'unseen' (that is withheld and unknown) 
and 'unseeing' (that is without the capacity to see). 
Both of these figures - sets of circumstance - inter-relations - are manifest by, and 
contingent on, performance, writing and documentation. 
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(i) Blindness has long been associated with an understanding of a sight beyond the 
ocular, found in the archetype of the blind seer or prophet. The 'father' of this literary 
historical tradition is Tiresias, whose ability to see into the future was given to him as a 
kind of recompense for the removal of his sighfOS. 
Since antiquity, 'not seeing' is directly linked to the capacity for precognition and 
prophesy. Ruth Padel writes: 
Darkness is where we are most likely to encounter gods. And where we 
meet their prophets. Caves are associated with prophecy in the Greek 
world, as elsewhere. Zeus's prophetic oracle was associated with the 
darkness of shadowy trees. The Greek seer is characteristically 'dark'. 
The name of the Iliad's Greek seer, Calchas, means 'Dark.' Seers often 
work from a muchos, 'recess,' or are blind. Blindness is linked to 
prophecy in the myth of Teiresias, the Theban seer, and many others. 
Fundamental to Greek ideas of prophecy, and of the mind, is the 
idea that knowledge can be found in, and from, darkness. In tragedy, 
and the myths it explores, alternative ways of seeing may be (but need 
not be) 'truer' than normal vision. 309 
This classical tradition was later picked up by Christianity where Jesus of Nazareth 
restores sight to the blind at the moment of their comprehension of the 'truth' of God, that 
is, they see with greater vision than sight can provide and are therefore provided with 
sight. 
I make no attempt to offer an analysis of the drives, the psychic motivations, that underpin 
the trope of this reciprocity- the gift of prophesy for the taking of sight- I hope merely to 
acknowledge its prevalence. 
308 The two main versions of how Tiresias lost his sight can be summarised as follows: (a) He saw 
Athena bathing; since his mother was her friend, she did not cause his death, but blinded him and 
gave him the power of prophesy by way of compensation. (b) He one day saw snakes coupling and 
struck them with his stick, whereat he became a woman; later the same thing happened again and 
he turned into a man. Being asked by Zeus and Hera to settle a dispute as to which sex had more 
pleasure of love, he decided for the female; Hera was angry and blinded him, but Zeus 
recompensed him by giving him long life and the power of prophesy. [See The Oxford Classical 
Dictionary] Tiresias goes on to prophesy the future and his prophesies often rotate around acts of 
seeing; for instance, that Narcissus will live as long as he does not see himself. [See Jacques 
Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self Portrait and Other Ruins trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault 
and Michael Naas (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) p.17] 
309 Ruth Padel, In and Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992) p.72/3 
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Homer, a storyteller of Tiresias, is himself pictured as blind. This is the way that western 
culture has chosen to depict and understand the author of the texts fundamental to its 
canon: the Iliad and the Odyssey. 
In his study of the classical epic tradition Robert Lamberton puts forward the case that 
Homer himself would have been understood in the classical world as a kind of prophet, 
that' ... Homer was a divine sage with revealed knowledge of the fate of souls and the 
structure of reality, and that the Iliad and Odyssey are mystical allegories yielding 
information of this sort if properly read.'310 
Part of the evidence that Lamberton draws on, toward this conclusion, are the accepted 
autobiographical references within the two epic poems. These intertextual self-portraits 
have been noted in commentaries for centuries. They include characterisations in the form 
of Phemius and the blind Demodocus, who are both depicted as bards. There are also 
stylistic devices which contribute to Lamberton's thesis. The bards within the narrative 
world are accorded the epithet 'divine'; they, like the voice of the narrator, frequently call 
upon supernatural aid to transmit the relevant information, in exact parallel to the way in 
which the seers call upon supernatural aid to transmit their prophesies. The authorial 
voice also predicts what will happen ahead of the description of the events themselves, as 
if to emphasize the vast knowledge of the past, present and future which the narrator 
possesses in comparison with the characters of the narrative. 
The extent to which Homer is seen as a prophet himself is exemplified in the renaissance 
conflation of Homer with Tiresias. As Lamberton is at lengths to point out, the much 
reprinted title page of Chapman's Odyssey [see illustration] depicts the figure of Homer in 
the storyline of Tiresias. The author becomes his character. Lamberton further examines 
the antecedents for this renaissance hybrid with references ranging from Plato to Dante. 
310 Robert Lamberton, Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the 
Growth of the Epic Tradition (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989) p.2 
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What remains is an image in which Homer is surrounded by a legion of poets paying him 
homage, while simultaneously depicting Tiresias surrounded by the ghosts of the 
underworld where he remains in possession of all knowledge: past, present and future. To 
quote Lamberton: 'The head, with blind eyes turned to heaven, illustrates a tradition ... 
Homer's blindness (is] a metaphor for transcendent vision.'311 
Fig. 50: The Title Page of Chapman's 
Odyssey (c.1614) 
Recent incarnations of blind seers include the Irish medium Sharon Neill, whose 'show'312 
is touring the UK at the time of writing. Neill claims to have the ability to communicate with 
those people who have 'passed over', that is, from the living to the dead. 
The trope of the blind seer who sees more than the seeing, is so culturally engrained, that 
it has its own vocabulary, a fact which is evidenced by the title of Sharon Neill's show: 
'Second Sight'. 
There is a sense in which Neill 's ability to see beyond sight is set up by the lineage she 
follows - a kind of predetermined performance script- in which blindness is intrinsic to the 
possibility of a sight beyond sight. lt is no surprise that the flyer and poster campaign for 
Sharon Neill's show is significantly similar to the image of Homer as Tiresias [see 
311 Ibid. p.8 
312 Her term, not mine. 
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illustration]: her blind eyes turned to heaven as a metaphor for transcendent vision. Homer 
performs Tiresias; Neill performs Homer performing Tiresias. 
There is something in this image - particularly it being a posed photograph - of the blind 
medium advertising her 'show', that triggers a complex set of responses. Our moment of 
privilege over her is to see the image of her as she herself can not. What is the 
consequence of this one-sided sight, this gaze on the self-portrait of the blind seer? 
In his homage to Milton's Paradise Lost, the poet Andrew Marvel! compares Milton with 
Tiresias: 
Whence couldst thou words of such a compass find? 
Whence furnish such a vast expanse of mind? 
Just heaven thee, like Tiresias, to requite, 
Rewards with prophecy the loss of sight.313 
As Derrida comments: 
Marvel! compared his friend Milton to Tiresias. The poet of Samson 
Agonistes would have received blindness as a blessing, a prize, a 
reward, a divine 'requital,' the gift of poetic and political clairvoyance, the 
chance for prophecy. There is nothing marvellous or astonishing in this: 
Marvel! believed he knew that in losing his sight man does not lose his 
eyes. On the contrary. Only then does man begin to think the eyes. 314 
lt is, perhaps, our desire to understand natural order in terms of 'requital', of checks and 
balances, that encourages us to {always already?) accept the blind as possessing a 
special gift. Derrida reads Marvell's understanding of Milton's blindness as that which 
forces consideration of the visual. Language which becomes visual; words of 
extraordinary compass. As Derrida remarks elsewhere, the blind woman or man is an 
'archivist of visibility', for they attest to the power and potential of sight315. 
313 Andrew Marvell, 'On Mr. Milton's "Paradise Lost"' in The Complete Poems (London: Penguin, 
1986) p.192 
314 Jacques Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self Portrait and Other Ruins trans. by Pascale-
Anne Brault and Michael Naas (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) p.128 
315 Ibid. p.20 
183 
During the course of her show Neill often refers to matter in visual detail, passing 
messages from the dead which include colours and patterns normally reserved for 
comprehension by the sighted eye. Neill is delivering these messages, not creating them 
(or so we are asked to believe) and those which contain visual information, not only that 
the messenger could not possibly have seen but also could not ever have the possibility of 
seeing, contribute to the performance of their authenticity316• 
Neill makes her blindness visual; she sees through it. We are left to ponder: maybe Neill 
can see the image of the advertisement for her own 'show', and our seeming privilege and 
encouraged voyeurism is, perhaps, a bit short-sighted. 
And the future? Sharon Neill does not really claim to see into the future, although often 
her 'communications' offer advice and knowledge for the future. Rather she deals with the 
other present, the spiritual present of the other world. Her Second Sight is not to foretell, 
in any other way than to claim that that future, after death, is a present reality. She 
describes herself as the "channel" and the "switchboard" for that reality, rather than as a 
prophet. What she hopes to bring is reassurance that 'passing over' is not an ending and 
that mortars are watched by their beloved dead. This is the collective future of the spirit 
world, a generic prophesy. 
So while the visual imagery advertising Neill's show calls upon our collective cultural 
history dating back to the antiquity of Tiresias, her abilities have their antecedents in a 
different context. 
The practices of contacting the dead, of seeing into 'other' worlds, of reading the future, 
have separate (and connected) histories world-wide, but the coupling 'Second Sight' 
316 I do not use the word 'performance' here to indicate that the messages are not authentic 
(though personally I happen to believe they are not) but rather in consideration of the way in which 
'authenticity' is itself manifest. 
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comes from the Gaelic term 'an-da-sheal/adh' which implies 'the two sights': the first being 
vision of the sensual world, the second of the spiritual317. 
In his 1951 study Second Sight: Its History and Origin, Lewis Spence convincingly argues 
that Second Sight 'had its beginnings in the Highlands of Scotland in a primitive 
priesthood associated with ancestral worship, and originated in a very definite intention to 
maintain a close association with the dead and distinguished guardians of the tribe.'318 
Through a remarkable number of case studies, Spence explores the relationship between 
Celtic folklore and instances of Second Sight not only in Scotland but also in Ireland, 
Wales and the Isle of Man. 
This Celtic history, which sets the precedent for the Irish medium Sharon Neill, attracted 
national interest in the UK from the Seventeenth Century on and gathered pace with the 
emergence of the popular press, a spate of pseudo-sciences and an interest in the occult. 
Samuel Johnson, who toured the Western Islands of Scotland in 1773 partly in order to 
find out if he could attest to the accuracy of the folklore, comes back convinced and 
publishes. (Interestingly enough, his travelling companion James Boswell forms a different 
opinion.) 
This 'Second Sight' became corrupted into a magic show with the same name as early as 
1784 when the Italian conjurer Pinetti performed an elaborate guessing game as part of 
his show at the Haymarket Theatre in London. Fifty or so years later 'Second Sight' was 
the title of the sell out tour of the performer Robert Houdin and his later imitator Robert 
Helier. They took the folklore and made it a performance reality. In his expose of 1880 
Second Sight Explained, Washington Bishop describes and uncovers the workings of this 
magic act. 
317 See Lewis Spence, Second Sight: Its History and Origin (London: Rider & Co., 1951) p.15 and 
W. H. W. Sabine, Second Sight in Daily Life (New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1949) p.203 
318 Spence p.xi 
185 
He explains that in 'Second Sight' there are two performers. One who roams the 
audience, picking out or highlighting something or rather for general attention which they 
must then 'psychically' convey and another, the unseeing clairvoyant partner on stage, 
who must speak back to the audience what has been selected. (The performer in the 
audience happens upon a lady's broach, asks their assistant what they hold in their hand 
and the clairvoyant describes it.) Bishop outlines in exorbitant detail the series of word 
associations and sound suggestions through which the performers communicate. 
lt is interesting to note the way in which Bishop describes the clairvoyant: 
The Clairvoyant is usually a young lady, interesting in manner and 
dejected in appearance, as if distressed by some constant strain upon 
the nervous system. The Clairvoyant also presents an appearance of 
passive submission, as if in fear of some powerful controlling influence 
and, even when possessed of robust vigour, she assumes a general air 
of having no will of her own, and, of exceeding timidity. The Clairvoyant 
is blindfolded completely.319 
lt would seem then, that Sharon Ne ill also has a lineage in Nineteenth Century theatrical 
spectacle. 
From Tiresias at the shores of memory, to Sharon Neill at the Felixtowe Spa Pavilion 
(where she is showing next week) the figure of the blind seer or prophet connects a 
'performance present' with a future life. 
In all of the instances mentioned here, writing, like the future itself, is somehow deferred. 
Homer does not write, he works with an oral tradition; it is for posterity to write him. Milton 
writes his major works through an amanuensis; he speaks before his words are written. 
Robert Houdin's undocumented performance code is left to be deciphered by a proto-
journalistic expose. Sharon Neill's prediction-come-communications are passed on 
319 Washington lrving Bishop, Second Sight Explained: A complete exposition of clairvoyance or 
second sight, as exhibited by the late Robert Houdin and Robert Helier, showing how they 
supposed the phenomena may be produced (Edinburgh: John Menzies, 1880) p.8 
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without the need for any mark on paper at all and are left to be written down by their 
recipient, at whim, some time in the future. 
Of course the blind and the blindfolded do write; do physically put pen to paper. 
(ii) The person whose future is blind -the going blind that Rod Dale has predicted 
(the possibility of)- also has its !ropes and archetypes. The 'notion' of the onset of 
blindness with old age is a lived reality that we meet, if not personally, then through our 
friends, family and associates. This future of encroaching blindness puts into play a 
number of scripts of its own: the manual which instructs you on the pragmatics of 
blindness, the prescription that orders you a palliative, the case notes which discuss your 
ability to cope. These scripts come into use with necessary regularity. 
The inevitable possibility of eventual blindness is played out in allegory from Oedipus on. 
As Freud remarks in his study of 'the uncanny' (das unheimliche, literally the 'unhomely'): 
We know from psycho-analytic experience that the fear of damaging or 
losing one's eyes is a terrible one in children. Many adults retain their 
apprehensiveness in this respect, and no physical injury is so much 
dreaded by them as an injury to the eye.( ... ] A study of dreams, 
phantasies and myths has taught us that anxiety about one's eyes, the 
fear of gain~ blind, is often enough a substitute for the dread of being 
castrated. 32 
While even Freud admits to the possibility that the anxiety of going blind would in itself 
produce fear, he insists that the anticipation of violence against the eye is not just that of a 
horror of losing sight but is also metonymic of a fear of an attack on sexual capacity321 • 
For the last year and a half of his life, the artist, filmmaker and writer Derek Jarman was 
blind. His body was wracked due to AIDS and one of the many infections that had to be 
320 Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny' in An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works Standard Edition Vol. 
17 (London: Vantage, 2001) p.231 
321 Freud's subject here is implicitly gendered. The concept that the fear of blindness is a metonym 
for the fear of castration refers specifically to the male body and consequently patriarchal power. 
While this gendered subject is concerned therefore with a male case study, at the expense of the 
female body, this exclusivity problemalises the theory itself. 
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fought was CMV or Cytomegalovirus. About fifty percent of the general population and 
ninety percent of people with HIV carry CMV322. If healthy, the immune system can keep 
this virus in check, if weak, it will start to attack the body. The most common illness 
caused by CMV is retinitis, the death of cells in the retinas, which quickly causes 
blindness unless treated. 
- ... ---
Fig. 52: Oerek Jarman: Diary Entry 12 May 1991 
In the last diaries there is an understandable preoccupation with the onset of blindness 
and also, interestingly in relation to Freud's bringing together the fear of blindness and 
castration, Jarman records the falling off of his sexual capacity. This is an autobiography 
of the dying. The artist made blind; the sexual made impotent. Jarman had known the 
prognosis. 
Ah well, it's two years since the foundations tremored. Evil eyes. I can't 
imagine going blind . Maybe that was the terrible premonition read in my 
hand all those years ago by Umberto Tirelli in Rome.323 
322 See Anonymous, 'Cytomegalovirus (CMV)' AIDS.ORG <http://www.aids.org/factSheets/504-
C~omegalovirus-CMV.html> [accessed 12 September 2003] 
32 Derek Jarman, Smiling in Slow Motion (London: Vintage, 2000) Monday 10 August 1992 
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This "ah well" of resignation is typical of his seeming acceptance of blindness. Blindness 
has been "on the cards"324, and Jarman professes, "I resign myself to my fate, even blind 
fate"325• This pun on his 'blind fate' (fate that unseeing, marked him to be blinded) is 
consistent with a number of word plays in the diaries where the inter-relation between arts 
practice, life and writing, is understood through a blindness that is at times metaphorical, 
at times literal, and occasionally both. 
While" ... the pen splutters"326 before there is any problem in seeing, the way the pen does 
splutter for the sighted who can not see clearly to find the right words, he later" ... run[s] 
out of words as the line blurs on the page."327 This is a transferred epithet, where the 
blurring of his vision is enunciated by the appearance of the blurring of the mark on the 
paper. 
Jarman's blindness becomes his pathway to death- to a blind forever- as his "diary ... ", 
his life, " ... slips into the dark."328 Blindness becomes the metaphor for approaching death . 
. . . the CMV blots out even more of the weak winter day, so I am living in 
a twilight, perhaps I should say my twilight.329 
The closing of his vision, the closing of his life. This relationship between his health and 
his writing is not just descriptive or literary, it is also very pragmatic. There are stretches of 
time with no entries, followed by an explanation of a period of illness (or medication) that 
was particularly strenuous. 
"I've noticed," he writes, "that the length of my diary entries reflects the state of my 
health."330 
324 Ibid. Tuesday 11 August1992 
325 Ibid. Wednesday 12 August1992 
326 Ibid. Thursday 6 February 1992 
327 Ibid. Thursday 24 September 1992 
328 1bid. Thursday 29 October 1992 
329 Ibid. Wednesday 3 February 1993 
330 Ibid. Friday 22 May 1992 
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But blindness does not stop him writing. He likes to write in the dark. "I can write quite 
legibly in the dark,"331 he writes. And he does; he writes in the dark. "Writing blind now,''332 
he writes. And he does; he writes blind. 
The 'now' of this "writing blind now" is key. Much of Jarman's diary writing is not reflective 
or ponderous but describes what is happening at the moment he puts pen to paper. 
Jarman records the absolute present of the moment of writing. ("My stinging eyedrops are 
in and the ward is turning to a blur."333) In doing so, does Jarman record his experiences 
unadulterated or transform them through a mediation? ("The little black floaters swirl 
around and make me dizzy."334) Maybe it is more helpful to think of Jarman performing his 
experiences, for himself, to his diary. Performance, as has often been noted, exists only in 
the moment of its enactment. In writing in the moment of the moment, Jarman's words 
become performative: they are actions which perform him. 
f 
T 
Fig. 53: Derek Jarman: Diary Entry 2 December 1993 
Writing blind, about the onset of blindness at the moment of writing, reveals that the 
performance is, for Jarman, what it is about. lt is the experience of writing itself, of putting 
pen to paper, which becomes the purpose to write. He can not, after all, see to read what 
331 Ibid. Monday 24 August 1992 
332 Ibid. Tuesday 22 September 1992 
333 Ibid. Thursday 10 September 1992 
334 Ibid. 
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he has written. This is not diary writing as record. Although clearly he writes for publication 
and several volumes of his diaries had already been published before these last were 
written, if he had wished solely, or even predominantly, to record his life for posterity, he 
could have chosen other, more practical methods of recording such as sound recording. 
Indeed Jarman does spend a considerable amount of time in his last years giving 
interviews about his life to journalists and academics and also to his biographer. His 
writing is not about a self-reflexive process, it is not writing about writing, it is rather, 
writing as a state of being: a performative state; documentation as performance. This is 
the artist writing. 
The publication of the diary, which is after all what enables you and me to read it, is not its 
first outing. Like the performance photograph, the diary is a kind of performance 
documentation; something other than the performance (the life) but reliant on it. lt also 
becomes another performance. Jarman used his last diaries as the script of his last film: 
Blue. 
Blue is a rich multi-layered audio track of music, city, hospital and domestic sounds, and 
text, which follows moments of Jarman's illness and his blindness, set against a single 
cobalt blue projection throughout the seventy-five minute duration; the only variation in 
tone and texture come from the scratches on the film or dust caught in the projector, or 
what we ourselves manage to see there in our own mind's eye. 
Those moments of diary writing, which are of the moment of writing the absolute present, 
are the sections of Blue which work seamlessly in the diegesis, that is, the narrative world 
of the film. In the context of the film, the first person present, is reanimated as speaking: 
the I am in this moment. Diary writing, in this context (of fine art film) moves away from 
personal musings and becomes a narrative world. 
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The single visual blue of the film not only insists that the audience create their own 
Images, it also documents the world of the blind. As Jorge Luis Barges, another writer who 
went blind, recorded: 
People generally imagine the blind as enclosed in a black world. [ ... ] 
One of the colours that the blind - or at least this blind man - do not see 
is black.[ ... ] I, who was accustomed to sleeping in total darkness, was 
bothered for a long time at having to sleep in this world of mist, in the 
greenish or bluish mist, vaguely luminous which is the world of the blind. 
I wanted to lie down in darkness.335 
I read Jarman's last diaries, published posthumously six years after his death and seven 
years after the premier of Blue. I read them initially in order to try and elucidate the film, to 
see if there were any similar passages or writing, to think about the diary as a script. What 
was so striking was that large portions of the film script are lifted, unedited from the 
diaries. 1t was not the diary which became useful to understand the film, but the film which 
elucidated the diary. The seemingly obvious point that the film script of the diary makes 
the private public, makes a performance out of the journal, became problematic. The 
performance that seemed to matter was Jarman's own: that is, himself, produced by the 
writing of his immediate present; the act of writing as a performance, a documentation as 
performance which in turn became a film performance, itself the documentation of a blind 
life towards death. 
335 Jorge Luis Barges, Seven Nights trans. by Eliot Weinberger (London: Faber and Faber, 1984) 
p.107 
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2. Face Reader: Maura Bright 
Maura Bright 
F R 
Fig. 54: Maura Bright 
Maura Bright is a Face Reader who predicted future challenges and opportunities. Using 
the ancient Chinese art of Face Reading she read the overall shape of my face and then 
each of the main features in turn: ears, eyebrows, eyes, nose and mouth. 
Prediction 2 
Everything is on your doorstep. Your most challenging feature is your digestion. Your low 
set ears indicate more will come to you in later life. You are mentally creative and follow 
projects through from start to finish. Your nose indicates that you have a good capacity for 
sense of self in the future. Your mouth indicates you are, and will be, a crisp 
communicator. Your forties will be a very productive decade but do not invest between the 
ages of forty-nine and fifty-one. The balance of your future health lies in your kidneys. 
Note 2 
The precedent for reading someone's future from their face is not as obscure as it may at 
first appear. Language itself defers to the face as the primary locus for the communication 
of signification. Social anthropologists, life coaches, speech writers, behavioural 
psychologists, all give varying figures for the percentage of communication which is non-
verbal, ranging from fifty-five percent to ninety-five percent, but the general point is clear: 
what we say carries less import than how we say it, carries less import than what our body 
(and especially our face) is doing 'as we say it how we say it'. The face is like a book, 
wherein we may read the author's autobiography336• 
336 An average breakdown goes something like this: 55% non-verbal communication, 38% from the 
way the articulation is made (which is in some sense non-verbal) and 9% from the words 
themselves. See Edward J. Barks, 'How Important Are Non Verbal Signals?' Barks 
Communications (2003) <http://www.barkscomm.com/personaltrainer/PT00060.asp> [accessed 10 
March 2004] 
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Reading a signal or a cue from the face is one thing, but reading the future? 
The cultural medium for recording the face is the portrait. The portrait has consistently 
been caught up with the future, as in for instance in the state portrait (which is used to 
secure the future through dynastic marriages and the dissemination of the image of 
authority), in the commemorative portrait (which acknowledges the past and holds it for 
the future), and in portraits which anticipate the future (in which, for example, the depiction 
of children, either literally or symbolically, points to a time ahead). 
Before the invention and use of photography, painted or sculpted portraits were 
considered as 'direct substitutes for their sitters'337. With the invention of photography, 
painted or sculpted portraits become 'art' and photographic representations become 
analogous with the authority accorded to scientific investigation. Even today, despite the 
discourses surrounding new media and digital manipulation, the 'identity photograph' is 
still that which singles out one. human being from another, most commonly sited in the 
passport. Until DNA finger-printing can be harnessed in an easy to use format, 
photography looks likely to remain as the form which holds the authority of the individual 
in law. 
Photography arrived at a cultural moment which was preoccupied with the relationship 
between the 'face' and the 'soul' and was quickly eo-opted in service of this investigation. 
As Joanna Wood all acknowledges in her historiography of the portrait: 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the authority of the depicted likeness 
as a representation of the sitter's identity was often guaranteed by 
recourse to the science of physiognomy. Physiognomic treatises 
provided systems whereby a person's character could be deduced from 
his (and less commonly her) external appearance. Such systems had 
existed since antiquity, but in the late eighteenth century they acquired a 
more empirical basis and renewed popularity.338 
337 Joanna Woodall ed., Portraiture: Facing the Subject (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1997) p.3 
338 Ibid. p.6 
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The application of this newfound science was felt nowhere as strongly as in 
'anthropological' photography where classifications of human types- from 'race' to 'idiocy' 
- became incorporated by the Victorian obsession with collecting and labelling. 
Taking their cue from the eighteenth century work of physiognomists Franz Joseph Gall 
and Johann Caspar Lavater, in which physical characteristics of the face and head were 
interpreted as corresponding to related character traits, photography was used to 
measure physical manifestations of behaviour, especially with regard to criminals. 
The main purpose of this form of classification was to identify recidivists - that is, people 
who were likely to re-offend - in the future. The classification of criminal types was 
employed as a preventative measure: that is, by reading the future propensity for criminal 
action, of a 'criminal' type, in their face. Thus the American doctor Eugene Talbot argued 
that 'criminals form a variety of the human family quite distinct from law-abiding men.'339 
Photography, in its nascent years, was considered a crude form of representation, but an 
accurate one nevertheless. In Nathaniel Hawthome's moral tale of 1851 The House of the 
Seven Gables, one of the central characters is the daguerreotypist Holgrave340 • The novel 
is littered with references to the face, and the relationship between the dissimulating face 
and the underlying character of its owner. 1t is only photography which reveals the true 
nature of the individual in question; in this case it is Judge Pyncheon: 
Now, the remarkable point is, that the original wears, to the world's eye -
and, for aught I know, to his most intimate friends- an exceedingly 
pleasant countenance, indicative of benevolence, openness of heart, 
sunny good humor, and other praiseworthy qualities of that cast. The 
sun, as you see, tells quite another story, and will not be coaxed out of it, 
after half-a-dozen patient attempts on my part. Here we have the man, 
sly, subtle, hard, imperious, and, withal, cold as ice. Look at that eye! 
339 Quoted in Photography: A Cultural History by Mary Warner Marien (London: Laurence King, 
2002) p.227 
340 The daguerreotype was an early photographic process, developed in France in the 1820s by 
Louis Daguerrre (1789-1851) and widely popular in mid-nineteenth century America. 
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Would you like to be at its mercy? At that mouth! Could it ever smile? 
And yet, if you could only see the benign smile of the original.341 
As the narrative hurtles to its conclusion it is the photographic likeness which proves 
accurate. lt was the prediction of the photographic image made through the reading of 
Judge Pyncheon's face which can be seen retrospectively to have announced his future 
crime. 
This physiognomic prediction is not only enabled by photography but reliant on it; the 
photograph of the face reveals what the face alone can not. In Camera Lucida, the 
author's search for the ontology of photography, a search which is preoccupied by finding 
an adequate representation of his dead mother's face, Roland Barthes identifies the way 
in which photography casts the future retroactively. 
Barthes identifies the 'studium' as the content, the subject matter of the photograph, and 
the 'punctum' as the detail which "pricks" -affects- the spectator. But Barthes also 
identifies the photograph's second punctum as Time. 
In 1865, young Lewis Payne tried to assassinate Secretary of State W. 
H. Seward. Alexander Gardener photographed him in his cell, where he 
was waiting to be hanged. The photograph is handsome, as is the boy: 
that is the studium. But the punctum is: he is going to die. I read at the 
same time: This will be and this has been; I observe with horror an 
anterior future of which death is the stake. By giving me the absolute 
past of the pose (aorist), the photograph tells me death in the future. 
What pricks me is the discovery of this equivalence. In front of the 
photograph of my mother as a child, I tell myself: she is going to die: I 
shudder, like Winnicott's psychotic patient, over a catastrophe which has 
already occurred. Whether or not the subject is already dead, every 
photograph is this catastrophe.342 
The this will be and this has been relies on information provided outside the frame of the 
photograph, in this case, that Lewis Payne was hanged the day after the photograph was 
taken. In this way, photographs always present the future to us (as the past). 
341 Nathaniel Hawthorne, The House of the Seven Gables (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
g-92 
2 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida trans. by Richard Howard (London: Vintage, 1993) p.96 
196 
The much discussed photographic self-portraits of Robert Mapplethorpe make this 
anterior future explicie43. The Self-Portrait of 1988 explicitly invites the spectator to 
consider the photographer-subject's death. Mapplethorpe faces the camera, his head 
floating in a black space, clutching a walking-stick, the handle of which is a carved skull. 
The relationship between the human head and the skull is clear: time will transform one to 
the other. In the Self-Portrait of 1978, ten years earlier, Mapplethorpe can be seen in 
leather chaps and waistcoat, bending away from lens, a bullwhip protruding from his anus. 
Mapplethorpe positions himself as the devil, a wry 'two fingers' to his detractors who 
proclaim his future damnation as a result of his present lifestyle. 
Fig. 55: Robert Mapplethorpe Self Portrait 
(1988) 
Fig. 56: Robert Mapplethorpe 
(1978) 
In light of Mapplethorpe's much publicised death from an AIDS related illness in 1989, 
these photographs illustrate the way in which the future unfolds in the photographic self-
portrait. At the time he took the 1988 Self-Portrait Mapplethorpe was anticipating his 
death, which was to come the following year. Looking at this photograph we perceive the 
"that is dead and that is going to die" which Barthes articulates344• But if the 1988 Self-
Portrait portends Mapplethorpe's own mortality, the 1978 Self-Portrait which exposes the 
photographer's desire, foreshadows what was then, the undiscovered link between unsafe 
gay sex and AIDS. Mapplethorpe seems to be saying - / am damned in your eyes but 
damned through choice, the devil's life of sexual pleasure is mine - but Mapplethorpe's 
343 See for instance Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 
1993} and Wendy Steiner, The Scandal of Pleasure: Art in an age of fundamentalism (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1995) 
344 Barthes p.96 
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owning of his 'deviance' in contravention of the mores of the 1970's is devoid of the 
tragedy that we now know. Looking back at this photograph it is not the deviance which 
registers so much as the ignorance. The playful allusion to eternal damnation, the pact 
with the devil, retroactively predicts a future in which the body is subject not to divine 
retribution, but to corporeal decay, a decay which Mapplethorpe now knows in the self-
portrait taken a decade late,-345 . 
The understanding of the future found in the face of the photograph in these terms, is one 
where biographical knowledge intervenes to re-inscribe a prediction onto the photograph; 
that is knowledge of what happened. The photographs of artist Alison Jackson, which 
employ the use of 'lookalikes', operate in the space of what did not happen. The majority 
of these images ask us to imagine well known faces occupied in activities that we would 
normally not see: David Beckham prancing around in a girl's thong, Queen Elizabeth on 
the lavatory, Tony Blair doing the limbo, Mick Jagger doing the ironing. In all these cases 
the meaning of the photograph rests on the spectator's understanding of a double 
referent: that is both the direct referent which is the lookalike, and the indirect (but 
primary) referent which is the celebrity who is looked like. We are asked to imagine that 
what we are looking at could have happened, could be happening, but in the knowledge 
that it did not happen by the primary referent in this instal')ce. Signification is not 
dependent on the authority of the referent but rather on its likeness to the referent. 
Whether or not it really is the Queen who is on the lavatory in the picture is only relevant 
for semiotics; the effect is that we are asked to imagine Her Majesty taking a dump. 
In a few of the photographs this 'what might have been, what might be' is thrown into a 
different perspective by the depiction of a scenario that clearly did not, nor could not have 
happened. In her portraits of both Marilyn Monroe and Diana, Princess of Wales with Dodi 
AI Fayed, Jackson chooses to photograph the celebrity lookalikes with children the 
345 When AIDS was first classified, religious intolerance proclaimed the 'gay disease' was divine 
retribution for the carnal sin of homosexuality. While this argument may still maintain some force in 
some sections of society, mainstream religious institutions have distanced themselves from this 
viewpoint. 
198 
celebrities never had. Marilyn died childless, Diana and Dodi died without a shared child. 
All three died young. By imagining and imaging a future in which Marilyn was a mother 
and Diana and Dedi had a bi-racial baby, Jackson depicts an impossible future, a this was 
not, this could not be. But the impossibility of these images is not to dismiss them purely 
as fiction, rather it highlights what could h~ve been and thus reflects on our collective 
mortality. Ultimately these photographs seem to be about death. 
Fig. 57: Alison Jackson Marilyn (2003) Fig. 58: Alison Jackson Diana & Dodi (2003) 
In all of these examples: the literal reading of the face of the criminal type, the retroactive 
reading of the photographic face through time, and the photographic face of the non-
existent chi ld, the future is configured by the face of the subject, but is also necessarily 
contingent on the photograph itself. The photograph does not simply allow the reading to 
take place without the presence of its subject but more crucially, it is the authority which 
mediates and controls the meaning. lt is only in the photograph that Judge Pyncheon's 
true identity is disclosed; it is only in the photograph that the retroactive production of 
Mapplethorpe's future can be determined; it is only in the photograph that we can witness 
Diana and Dedi's child. In contradistinction, Maura Bright's reading of my future from my 
face is negotiated in my presence and only time will lend it authority. 
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3. Financial Advisor: A/an Dickinson-Que/ch 
Fig. 59: 
A/an Dickinson-Que/ch 
Alan Dickinson-Quelch is a Financial Consultant who predicted my financial future. He 
asked me a series of questions relating to debt, income, assets and savings and based 
his prediction on my answers. 
Prediction 3 
From what you have told me I can not foresee any major problems. The most important 
thing is that you have a good attitude to debt. You are your own man. You don 't have any 
dependents and no one is dependent on you. /t is good you are building up your savings 
in order to buy your rented property from the council. This is a wonderful opportunity and 
you shouldn't let it go. You should take a risk, even if you end up having to se// it. You may 
not have another opportunity to buy property in London. You should be able to get a 
mortgage, and property is your chance of a stable financial future. 
Note 3 
Debt and property, savings and investments; paying it off, reaping the interest: finances 
articulate our future in a more predictable way than many other aspects of our life. To 
paraphrase Derrida, the future is predictable, the unpredictable is the unexpected 
encounter with 'the other'346• There are financial scandals, pensions which collapse, 
investments which fall through as the housing market swells to bursting, but on the whole, 
western capitalism is based on the generation of wealth through a market economy. In 
this market, property has proved itself to be one of the most stable investments - as safe 
as houses. 
346 Derrida. Dir. Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman. Jane Doe Films. 2003 
200 
Intellectual value is not determined by the market in the same way. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the art market, where at one end of the scale you have Van Gogh's 
portrait of Doctor Gachet being sold in under three minutes for $82.5 million to the 
Japanese paper tycoon Ryoei Salto and on the other a contemporary performance 
artwork which makes negative equity and can only exist with support of the state. The 
problem here is not that paintings can reach such astronomical sums (although this may 
in itself be shocking) but that the variability of financial value may be perceived as being in 
direct relation to intellectual value. This issue became a matter of national discussion in 
the UK in January of 2004 in regard to the governments proposals for top-up fees in the 
university sector. The issue for many was not that the fees were going to be introduced 
but that potential variability in fees would create a false hierarchy of universities as well as 
the subject areas they teach and research. 
Increasingly the mass cultural market seeks the lowest common denominator necessary 
to attract the greatest number of people. This is the way to maximise profits. This need not 
logically lead to poorer quality output (though the proliferation of 'makeover' or 'fly-on-the-
wall' television programmes in the last five years which follow an unadventurous and 
repeated format may evidence that it has). lt remains the case however, that some forms 
of cultural production cannot survive inside the market. Pierre Bourdieu takes a more anti-
capitalist view of the relation between intellectual value and the market: 
To the extent that, grosso modo, the value of works is negatively 
correlated with the size of their market, cultural businesses can only 
exist and subsist thanks to public funds. ( ... ]We cannot leave cultural 
production to the risks of the marketplace or the whims of a wealthy 
patron.347 
For many forms of cultural production it is not so much their lack of popularity (although 
'difficulty' and 'resistance to entertainment' may be fundamental to their conception) but 
their structural resistance to commodification by market forces, that necessitates their 
reliance on subsidy. This subsidy need not only be provided by the state as Bourdieu 
347 Pierre Bourdieu and Hans Haacke, Free Exchange (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) p.69 
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suggests; indeed many artists choose to subsidise their practice through other 
employment. Forms of cultural production which resist commodification by the market 
include site-specific installations which operate as one-off events, and especially 
performance. As Peggy Phelan observes: 
Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive. lt is this 
quality which makes performance the runt of the litter of contemporary 
art. Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive 
representation necessary for the circulation of capital.348 
... and yet there are many examples of performance being eo-opted into the market place. 
(a) Sponsorship 
Sponsorship is the exchange of financial capital for symbolic capital. You give the money 
in order to be reflected by the event. A recent example of this would be the Tate Egg Live 
series of live arts events on the South Bank in London349• As Bourdieu reasons however, 
'censorship is exerted through money' and this is particularly the case where those 
associating themselves with an event are backing it financial!~. 
(b) Ticketing 
Undoubtedly the most common way in which performance enters the market is through 
charging an audience to 'witness'·it. But while it is the case that long-running West End 
theatre will make profit over time, generally speaking contemporary performance work will 
be subsidised well over and above the takings from the box office. 
(c) Performance Skill 
Performance sells its skills to those who want to buy. Here performance is a tool, a 
transferable skill which has applications in different contexts. The performance maker 
Richard Layzell worked for several years with the computer software company AIT. He 
made interventions within the company headquarters and ran workshops with staff. He 
348 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 1993) p.148 
349 See <http://www.tateandegglive.com> [accessed 5 February 2004) 
350 Bourdieu and Haacke p.70 
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was paid for his services at industry rate. The benefits were felt by both staff and 
managers. The company lost only 12% of staff per annum set against a national average 
of 25% in this high employee turnover secto~51 . 
(d) Stocks & Shares 
Rare, but the model exists. David Bowie floated himself on the stock exchange. 
(e) Documentations & Traces 
For contemporary performance makers frustrated with their inability to sell, an increasingly 
prevalent way of entering the market is to save the performance trace or produce 
documentation resulting from the performance and to sell that. There are many examples 
of this, from Rebecca Horn's body sculptures to Franko B's blood paintings. While these 
objects are not performances in their own right, they rely on the performance in order to 
find their markee52 . This was taken to a secondary level by Hayley Newman in 
'Connotations', a series of performance photographs and accompanying texts which were 
fictions; they document performances which never took place. 
(f) Performance 'For Sale' 
The performance maker La Ribot, sick of the fact that she couldn't sell her work in the 
same way as her visual art peers, devised the notion of the 'Distinguished Proprietor'. You 
can 'buy' her performances which are sold as works of art, each at $1000 or £600. As a 
'Distinguished Proprietor' you will have your name printed whenever the piece's title is 
announced and you can attend any of its expositions world-wide, free of charge. This 
contract is a reworking of old models of patronage but a successful one nevertheless. This 
is however, the exception that proves the rule. Performances are not bought or sold -
certainly not the way you might buy and sell a painting353 . 
351 Anonymous, 'Computer workers reap the benefit' BBC News Online (2000} 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hiluk/743992.stm> [accessed 5 March 2002) 
352 Arguments have been made to the contrary; see for instance Joshua Sofaer 'Conflict of Interest: 
Performance as a Spectator Sport' Performance Research 5.1 (2000}, 120-125 
353 This point on La Ribot is rehearsed by the author in the Introduction to Research in Processed. 
by Manick Govinda and David Hughes (Nottingham: Live Art Magazine I Artsadmin, 2000} 
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In all of these cases the circulation of capital is reliant on the act of performance, but not 
one of them answers Alan Dickinson-Quelch's prediction that the (or rather, my) stable 
financial future is in property. Is there a model by which contemporary performance can 
be seen to engender property as a stable financial future? The answer might lie at Home. 
Launched in December 1998, Home is an 'arts organisation' based inside the family 
house of artist and curator Laura Godfrey lsaacs. There are many curators who use their 
home as a gallel)il54 but few where there is full 'integration of art into all living spaces' so 
that the domestic context remains entirely intacfSS. 
Home states that one of its missions is to regularly stage new live art and performance 
work in London. In fact, Home is the only venue in London that has been consistently 
committed to the presentation of contemporary performance work over the last five 
years356• 
While the domestic context is integral to Home's remit, that context is created through a 
default. Many keen gallerists simply can not afford the overheads of a London space and 
therefore 'fall back' on their domestic environment, and while Home embraces·the site in 
which it finds itself, Godfrey-lsaacs is in the process of setting up a venue outside of her 
living space to avoid the understandable conflicts that arise from permitting and charging 
people to enter her home357 . 
354 For instance, just down the road from Home, is Danielle Arnaud at 123 Kennington Road 
355 Laura Godfrey lsaacs, 'The Organisation' Home (1998) <http:ffwww.lgihome.co.uk> (accessed 5 
~ril 2002). This website has an archive of past exhibitions and performances. 
lt is a poor reflection of London's commitment to performance work, especially since the 
departure of Lois Keidan and Catherine Ugwu from the ICA, that the only space to be regularly 
showing contemporary performance is founded on the commitment of one individual to open up 
their private home. In many respects contemporary performance as embodied by the umbrella term 
'live art' has not been stronger than at present, especially since the formulation of the Live Art 
Development Agency in January 1999, but the work often has to negotiate venues with other 
~enda. 
Home's second space is due to open in Rishangles, Suffolk in spring 2005. Information about 
Home's remit and intentions is based on conversations with Laura Godfrey-lsaacs. 
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The historical model of the home as space for performance and discussion is the 'salon', 
which is also the title of the holding form for Home's regular performance events. But 
whereas the historical model was of patronage (by the rich of the poor) Home attracts 
public subsidy, commercial sponsorship and box-office takings. In this model the personal 
investment in one's home is reaped as fine art capital, and fine art capital- as embodied 
by contemporary performance - brings money into the home. Performance invests in 
property358 . This is the theatre of market forces. 
358 There are other performance makers whose work leads directly to the enhancement of their 
property. Erns! Fischer is a London based performance maker whose 'Living Room Theatre' has 
defaulted in providing structural and decorative improvements to his home beyond the moment of 
performance. "I always try to get something from a performance," Fischer remarked to me in 
conversation, "last time it was a coffee:table". 
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4. Vice President of Age Concern: Tom Hoyes 
Fig. 60: Tom Hoyes 
Tom Hoyes is the Vice President of Age Concern England and an expert on sex for the 
over seventies, who forecast my life in old age. He posed a series of provocative 
questions which encouraged a discussion about the effects of aging. 
Prediction 4 
I 'm seventy-three and I'm going to live to one hundred; you're twenty-nine and going to 
live to two hundred. Now there are all sorts of problems that this creates: financially, 
sexually, and for your long term health. You have to be aware that changes are going to 
impose themselves on you. You seem to be aware of the future, but have not formulated 
any plan. The time you spend with your ninety-year-old grandmother should give you 
some indication of what is in store for you and should make you feel reasonably confident 
about what is to come. 
Note4 
Today, Friday January 16, 2004 Michael Jackson is arraigned to answer an indictment: 
seven charges of child abuse - "lewd act upon a child" - and two of giving alcohol to a 
minor- "administering an intoxicating agent''359. This is not the first time that Jackson has 
faced such charges, nor that the media circus surrounds these allegations. Whatever the 
outcome of the case, which may not reach trial for over a year, if indeed it ever does reach 
trial, we will perhaps never really know the veracity of the allegations, or what actually 
took place between Jackson and his complainant, John Doe. Without wanting to detract 
from these very real and serious charges, it is not the aim of this section of writing to 
determine what case there is to be answered, but rather to try and understand something 
of Michael Jackson's relation with childhood and children, and his stated (and embodied) 
359 Thomas W. Sneddon, 'Felony Complaint' County of Santa Barbara District Attorney (2003) 
<http://www.countyofsb.org/da/press.asp> [accessed 1 December 2003] 
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resistance to getting older. This is not about trying to uncover the psychological 
motivations for his behaviour (behaviour which is difficult to determine as it is mediated so 
heavily by the media) nor, to reiterate, to prove the allegations of child molestation as true 
or false. Rather, it focuses on how Jackson's self-selected public image, tracks an 
'association' with the character Peter Pan created by J. M. Barrie. The relationship 
between Jackson, Peter Pan and J. M. Barrie is both proclaimed by Jackson himself and 
manifest by his body and his surroundings. This relationship is both structural (they mirror 
each other) and performative (Jackson performs, and is performed by, Barrie and Peter 
Pan). 
The main source that I will draw upon as evidence for Jackson's preoccupation with Peter 
Pan is his interview with Martin Bashir which was broadcast in February 2003. In this 
interview Jackson corroborates many of the widely publicised biographical anecdotes of 
his life: that he spends his enormous wealth with the ease and taste of a child, that he is 
sexually na"ive, that he was abused by his father, that he missed out on any substantial 
normal childhood experiences. For example: 
Jackson: I remember precisely going to Motown Studios to record, and right across 
the street from the studio was a park and I could hear the roar of, you 
know, the lower league team, and they were playing soccer and football 
and volleyball and they were playing baseball. And I remember a lot of the 
time looking back and really hiding my face and crying. I wanted to play 
sometimes and I couldn't because I had to go to the studio.360 
This quote, is itself, from the mouth of Peter Pan, for "oh! how he longed to play as other 
children play .... "361 
Michael Jackson has been performing since he was five years old. He recorded his first 
single at the age of eight. When he was a child his performance maturity gave rise to the 
remark that he was 'ten going on forty-two', today, at forty-five, surrounded by children 
and childhood toys, the inverse is more frequently applied. 
360 Living with Michael Jackson Interview by Martin Bashir. ITV. 3 February 2003 
361 J. M. Barrie 'The Little White Bird' in Farewell Miss Julie Logan: A JM Ba"ie Omnibus 
(Edinburgh: Cannongate Press, 2000) p.106 
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In the ITV interview, Bashir questions Jackson on his interest in Peter Pan and the fact 
that he has named his home, a three-thousand acre ranch north of Los Angeles, complete 
with full-scale fair-ground, after the island where Peter Pan lives, 'Neverland': 
Bashir: 
Jackson: 
Bashir: 
Jackson: 
Bashir: 
Jackson: 
The inspiration for Neverland - Peter Pan - why is Peter Pan a figure of 
such interest and inspiration to you? 
Because Peter Pan, to me, represents something that's very special in my 
heart. You know, it represents youth, childhood, never growing up, magic, 
flying, everything I think that children and wonderment and magic - what 
it's all about - and to me I just have never ever grown out of loving that or 
thinking that its very special. 
Do you identify with him? 
Totally. 
You don't want to grow up? 
No. I am Peter Pan. 
What does it mean for Michael Jackson to say he is Peter Pan? 
There is no single text called Peter Pan, nor for that matter a text which is the 'original' or 
'authoritative' version. The character was a creation by J. M. Barrie in his 'playtime' with 
the boys of the Llewelyn Davies family whom he met in Kensington Gardens and who 
years later, on the death of their parents, he was ultimately to adopf62. At first the 
character of Peter was based on the newest arrival to the Llewelyn Davies family - Peter 
- but soon the character outgrew his namesake and this original context. 
In 1902, Barrie published The Little White Bird, a novel for adults about the narrator's 
story-telling relationship with a boy, David. This novel contained a few chapters about 
Peter Pan, the boy who never grew up. These were extracted and later formed the 
children's stories Peter Pan in Kensington Gardens and Peter and Wendy. On a parallel, 
362 For biographical detail on J. M. Barrie and his relationship with the Llewelyn Davies family see 
Andrew Birkin, JM Barrie and the Lost Boys (London: Yale University Press, 2003) and Andrew 
Birkin, 'The Llewelyn Davies Family' J. M. Barrie (2003) <http://www.jmbarrie.co.uk/dfjndex.html> 
[accessed 5 January 2004] 
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yet separate, writing tack, Barrie wrote the play-text, which was first produced in 1904 but 
was revised continually and only finally published in 1928. Subsequently both the play-text 
and the story have been adapted and re-adapted by authors all over the world and the 
most popular stage version of recent years is itself an adaptation by John Caird and 
Trevor Nunn, which acknowledges in the introduction that it has "included a lot of new 
material" based on the Barrie archive and that this has resulted in "significant 
alterations"363• The character Peter Pan is not entirely consistent, starting off as a baby 
and ending up as a pre-adolescent boy, his adventures, as his person, shift and develop 
with time. Peter Pan is a concept, rather than a single character of a novel or a play. 
In The Little White Bird, the narrative follows two parallel strands. The first is the narrator's 
creative act - the telling of the story, the writing of the book - which is enunciated from the 
beginning in the telling of the whole story to the boy David, and ends with the delivery of 
the book itself. The second is the mother's creative act - the making of children - which 
begins with the David's birth story and ends with her delivery of a second child. 
In all these aspects the relationship between the narrator, the child and the child's parents 
is seen as one of conflict and symbiosis. Conflict because the narrator wants full 
'possession' of the child, as surrogate father against the birth-parents; symbiosis because 
the narrator has no subject or creative partner without the child or his parents. In The Little 
White Bird the narrator describes the symbiosis thus: 
I ought to mention here that the following is our way with a story: First I 
tell it to him, and then he tells it to me, the understanding being that it is 
quite a different story; and then I retell it with his additions, and so we go 
on until no one could say whether it is more his story or mine.364 
Such was Barrie's relationship with the Llewelyn Davies family. The characters and 
adventures which Barrie creates are developed with the Llewelyn Davies children, not 
363 J. M. Barrie, Peter Pan or The Boy Who Would Not Grow Up ed. by John Caird and Trevor 
Nunn (London: Methuen, 1997) p.viii 
364 J. M. Barrie 'The Little White Bird' in Farewell Miss Julie Logan: A JM Barrie Omnibus 
(Edinburgh: Cannongate Press, 2000) p.100 
209 
just for them because they are present but literally with their input. Here not only do the 
characters, events, and narratives stem from an autobiographic imperative but even the 
development of their creation is incorporated by the creation itself. 
Jackson too, proclaims that his inspiration comes from children: 
Jackson: I think what they get from me, I get from them. I've said it many times: my 
greatest inspiration comes from kids. Every song I write, every dance I do, 
the poetry I write, it is all inspired from that level of innocence, that 
consciousness of purity and children have that. I see God in the face of 
children, and urn, man, I just love being around that all the time. 
The autobiographical nature of The Little White Bird has been widely noted, 'so much so 
that [Barrie's] work has often been seen as little more than a revelation of his complicated 
personality'365; the narrative events mirror those in Barrie's relationship with the Llewelyn 
Davies family but also, as his biographer Andrew Birkin convincingly argues, the character 
of Peter Pan is, or becomes, a reflection of Barrie's fears and desires of childhood. 
Barrie's elder brother David died aged 13. This left his mother distraught and Barrie with 
feelings of low self-esteem, adult responsibility and the sense that he could not fill the 
position of his mother's favourite. This rupture in his early childhood left Barrie with both a 
lifelong sense of the loss of childhood but also an exacerbated taste for childhood. As 
Barrie records in the biography of his mother Margaret Ogilvy: 
The horror of my boyhood was that I knew a time would come when I 
also must give up the games, and how it was to be done I saw not (this 
agony still returns to me in dreams, when I catch myself playing marbles, 
and look on with cold displeasure); I felt that I must continue playing in 
secret.366 
Sociologically, 'growing up', especially from boy to man, is a big deal. The transition is 
traumatic. As Germaine Greer points out in her study The Boy: 
365 Andrew Nash in his introduction to Farewell Miss Ju/ie Logan: A JM Barrie Omnibus (Edinburgh: 
Cannongate Press, 2000) p.vii/viii 
366 Quoted in Andrew Birkin, J. M. Barrie and the Lost Boys (London: Yale University Press, 2003) 
p.7 
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The rites of passage from boyhood to manhood may be as simple and 
as painless as shaving the boy's head, dressing him in a saffron robe 
and sending him to live as a monk for a year, as is done in some 
Buddhist societies. Other cultures require a series of painful and 
dangerous rituals that enact the destruction of the boy before he can be 
reborn as a man.367 
The infliction of pain on adolescent men may seem extreme, but the coming of age, even 
in the 'liberal' west, involves the assumption of responsibilities, social and political. 
As long as the boy is a boy, behaviours that would dishonour the head 
of a family are acceptable and even becoming.368 
Once the transition has been made it is no longer acceptable for the man to act like a boy. 
But Peter Pan (and Barrie, and Jackson) does not want to grow up: 
'I just want always to be a boy and to have fun.'369 
He ran away from home in fear of manhood and rejects any chance of 'normal' 
socialisation when the opportunity arises to be adopted by Mr and Mrs Darling: 
'Would you send me to school?' he inquired craftily. 
'Yes.' 
'And then to an office?' 
'I suppose so.' 
'Soon I should be a man?' 
'Very soon.' 
'I don't want to go to school and learn solemn things,' he told her 
passionately. 'I don't want to be a man. 0 Wendy's mother, if I was to 
wake up and feel there was a beard!'370 
367 Greer continues: 'The Barabeg of East Africa inflict a series of deep cuts across the boy's 
forehead that lay bare the bone. The Native American Luisefios of southern California stake the 
initiate out on an anthill. The Poro of Sierra Leone first circumcise the boy, then push him face 
down on the ground and cut deep gashes in his back with a razor; these are said to be the marks 
made by the fangs of the Poro spirit who eats up the boy so that the man may live. At puberty the 
Masai boy is circumcised; for eight to twelve months thereafter he must wear white face paint and 
dress in black. He is then ready to become a moran and join his age-set living in the bush, raiding 
settlements for cattle to build up their herds. Before he can be accepted as a man, the moran must 
kill a lion single-handed. As a moran he is encouraged to bedizen himself with beads and other 
ornaments; he may wear his hair long and elaborately braided or modelled into fantastic shapes 
with red ochre.' Germain Greer, The Boy (London: Thames & Hudson, 2001) p.13/14 
368 Ibid. p.29 
369 J. M. Barrie, Peter Pan or The Boy Who Would Not Grow Up ed. by John Caird and Trevor 
Nunn (London: Methuen, 1997) p.1 04 
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This desire for boyhood is common enough in adult men. In the 1980's, psychologist Dan 
Kiley produced a guide to what he termed 'The Peter Pan Syndrome'. 
The book is styled as a self-help manual for "victims" and their "wives" to deal with the key 
manifestations of the illness: irresponsibility, anxiety, loneliness, sex role conflict, 
narcissism, chauvinism, social impotence and despondency. The book opens with the 
chapter 'Do You Know This Man-Child?' and moves on to 'The Adult PPS Victim: A Test' 
which offers the reader a scoring system to determine if they have the illness or not. 
The book is heterosexist and aimed at a very particular kind of man, which may account 
for its demise after an initial burst of popularity. lt does, however, figure Peter Pan's antics 
as something to be cautious and worried about, rather than harmless fun to be rejoiced in, 
which is the commonly held 'panto' assumption. Peter Pan's desire for eternal youth and 
the rejection of adult responsibilities is identified here as a social pathology. 
Peter Pan, the boy who refuses to grow up is both Barrie's brother David who could not 
grow up because he died in childhood and Barrie's own longing for a second childhood -
his refusal of the normal requirements of adult life. Peter Pan is also the child that Barrie 
never had. In one of the most revealing statements about his creation, in the programme 
for the Paris production of 1908, Barrie wrote: 
Of Peter himself you must make what you will. Perhaps he was a little 
boy who died young, and this is how the author conceived his 
subsequent adventures. Perhaps he was a boy who was never born at 
all- a boy whom some people longed for, but who never came.371 
Peter Pan is also not quite boy. Across Barrie's accounts of the Pan adventures, it is 
written that before all boys and girls become boys and girls, they start out as birds. Peter 
370 J. M. Barrie, Peter Pan in Kensington Gardens & Peter and Wendy (Oxford: Oxford World's 
Classics, 1999) p.217 
371 Quoted in J. M. Barrie, Peter Pan or The Boy Who Would Not Grow Up ed. by John Caird and 
Trevor Nunn (London: Methuen, 1997) p.xi 
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is not exactly a bird, nor quite human; he is "Betwixt-and-between"372. This is a device 
which enables both Barrie and the narrator to maintain creative control over the birth of 
children within the narrative (that is his artistic control) but it also strips human conception 
of its necessarily sexualised premise. (Michael Jackson relates the desexualised 
conception of his own child through artificial insemination during the Bashir interview.) 
The relationship between reality and fantasy lies at the heart of The Little White Bird and 
the other Pan adventures. This relationship works on the level of the authorial narrative, 
which is to say the way in which the narrator slips in and out of fantasies, setting up 
illusions only to destroy them, involving himself in a narrative fiction only to pull himself 
back to reality; but is also embodied by Peter Pan himself: 
The difference between him and the other boys at such a time was that 
they knew it was make-believe, while to him make-believe and true were 
exactly the same thing.373 
... and again ... 
Make-believe was so real to him that during a meal of it you could see 
him getting rounder. 374 
The collapsing together of fantasy and reality and the inability to recognise the difference 
between them, is manifest in Jackson's responses to questions posed by Martin Bashir. 
Not only does he laugh as Bashir questions him about death -"I would like to live 
forever,"- he also categorically refuses to admit to having any plastic surgery except 
"two" operations on his nose, despite the fact that his face has radically altered shape as 
well as colour over the last twenty years: 
Jackson: Come on. None of it's true. None of it's true. it's BS. They made it up. They 
lie. They don't want to give me credit for anything.375 
372 J. M. Barrie 'The Little White Bird' in Farewell Miss Julie Logan: A JM Barrie Omnibus 
~Edinburgh: Cannongate Press, 2000) p.1 04 
73 J. M. Barrie, Peter Pan in Kensington Gardens & Peter and Wendy (Oxford: Oxford World's 
Classics, 1999) p.128 
374 Ibid. p.135 
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The implication of this overt denial - that his physical body is worth credit - demonstrates 
Jackson's belief that his body manifests some kind of intrinsic value, and I would argue 
that this is in direct relationship to the image of Peter Pan. Jackson rewrites his body as a 
kind of Disney-fied Peter Pan, the white pixie boy who never grows up; he redraws 
himself, literally repaints himself, as Peter Pan. 
When Michael Jackson says: 'I am Peter Pan' he stakes his belief that he embodies 
Barrie's fictional character. This embodiment is physical and conceptual. Jackson not only 
carves out his body to become Peter Pan but he lives in 'Neverland' surrounded by full-
scale reproductions of the characters from the Disney film. Jackson lives in a giant stage-
set, purposefully blurring the boundaries between the adult world of responsibility and the 
fantasy world of childhood. Jackson, like Peter, refuses the responsibilities of adulthood, 
craves the company of children and proclaims his intention for never-ending fun. 
But as Peter Pan is a manifestation of Barrie's fears, desires and personal histories, so 
too Jackson takes on Barrie when he takes on Peter Pan. Nowhere does this mirroring 
appear more stark than in Jackson's welcoming of children into his bed. The scandal 
which ensued after the Martin Bashir interview, revolved, in the main, around Jackson's 
admission that he shared his bed (or at least his bedroom) with children376• The media 
outcry, which included calls for Jackson's own children to be taken into care, resulted from 
a general incomprehension that such activities could be innocent and that they therefore 
were harmful to the children involved. Again, it is not my intention to comment on the 
rights or wrongs of this behaviour, not least because the precise nature of what happened 
375 There has been much documentation and speculation on Jackson's facial reconstruction. See 
for instance: Rahni, 'A Photographic History of Michael Jackson's Face' Anomalies Unlimited 
i2001) <http://www.anomalies-unlimited.com/Jackson.html> [accessed 19 January 2004] 
76 A decade before the Bashir interview, when facing allegations of child molestation in 1993, 
Jackson had admitted to letting children sleep with him in his bed. This statement is qualified in the 
Bashir interview, with Michael saying that he sleeps on the floor when children take his bed. What 
Jackson intimates is that when he has 'kids' over to stay, it is similar to the kinds of sleepover that 
he didn't have when he was a child. These 'innocent' sleepovers are contrasted with Jackson 
recalling that when he was a child singer on tour, he was put in the same room as his brother, and 
that his brother would be engaging in casual sex with a groupie, while Michael was supposed to be 
asleep. 
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is so unclear. However, it is surely no coincidence that the key scene in the narrative of 
The Little White Bird turns on exactly the same action. The chapter opens: 
David and I had a tremendous adventure. lt was this - he passed the 
night with me. m 
... and reaches its culmination thus: 
'What can it be, David?' 
'I don't take up very much room,' the far-away voice said. 
'Why, David,' said I, sitting up, 'do you want to come into my bed?' 
'Mother said I wasn't to want it unless you wanted it first,' he squeaked. 
'lt is what I have been wanting all the time,' said I, and then without more 
ado the little white figure rose and flung itself at me. For the rest of the 
night he lay on me and across me, and sometimes his feet were at the 
bottom of the bed and sometimes on the pillow, but he always retained 
possession of my finger, and occasionally he woke me to say that he 
was sleeping with me. me 
Although latterly Barrie's reputation has been entangled with allegations of paedophilia, 
allegations categorically denied by the Llewelyn Davies boys, at the time this was written 
the adult-child sleepover was accepted as an act of innocent platonic parental love. Even 
in this context however, purity is at the limit of acceptability. 
lt is difficult not to see Jackson's fixation with Peter Pan and Barrie's oeuvres caught up 
with this. Jackson manifests Barrie's desire. Barrie's text is Jackson's script. lt is well 
publicised that Jackson has read 'everything that J. M. Barrie ever wrote'. lt is as if 
Jackson finds his license in the world of fiction. 
The irony of Jackson's stated embodiment of this fictional character, is that Peter Pan's 
eternal youth and his inability to grow up, derive from his premature death. Peter Pan is a 
living death, and the way to get to Neverland is to die. In the late 19th and early 20th 
Centuries, where child mortality was such that twenty-five percent of children did not 
survive beyond five years, an epoch where Barrie's own brother was locked in the 
377 J. M. Barrie 'The Little White Bird' in Farewell Miss Julie Logan: A JM Barrie Omnibus 
~Edinburgh: Cannongate Press, 2000) p.154 
78 Ibid. p.157 
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memories of the family as a thirteen year old boy because of his premature death, Peter 
Pan is a representation of the sinister and the tragic, rather than the youthful or the 
immortal. Peter Pan is not about a child's desire to stay young, but the adult's desire for 
the child; the vicarious understanding of the world through the eyes of the child, the 
mourning at the loss of childhood. As Jacqueline Rose summarises in her study of Peter 
Pan: 
Childhood persists - this is the opposite, note, from the reductive idea of a 
regression to childhood most often associated with Freud. lt persists as 
something which we endlessly rework in an attempt to build an image of our 
own history. When we think about childhood, it is above all our investment 
in doing so which counts.379 
That investment may be different from person to person but it is an investment which 
plays centre-stage for Michael Jackson. Employing a fiction as the motivational force for 
the future of his life-performance, Jackson has internalised J. M. Barrie's creation to the 
degree that he can state: 'I am Peter Pan'. 
379 Jacqueline Rose, The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children's Fiction (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993) p.12 
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5. Psychic Life Scientist: Julia Laverne 
Fig. 61: Julia Laverne 
Julia Laverne is a Psychic Life Scientist who predicted aspects of my future life (and 
beyond life). Using palm-reading and tarot, she answered specific questions and gave 
general advice about my future. 
Prediction 5 
You are a deep thinking individual with writing abilities and would be fabulous in show 
business. You have psychic ability and are good at delegation but you lack confidence. 
You have poor circulation. Your club thumbs mean that you are blunt and offend people 
unwittingly. Your double girdle of Venus shows that you are emotionally fickle. You are 
protective in love. Your life path is about being a pioneer, forging new territory and making 
something out of it. An early family rift still affects you and you constantly feel you need to 
please your mother. You should try to escape this. You hope for "nothingness" after death 
and you get your desire. 
Note 5 
Of all the seven predictions made to me in The Crystal Ball, that of Julia Laverne was the 
only one which dealt with a future beyond life itself. Death is always already the future. 
The unwritten end of every autobiography is death; the once in a lifetime event that the 
autobiographer can never write, for even an account of dying that looks towards death, is 
not an account of death itself. 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud proposes the notion of the death instinct (or 
death drive) which supersedes the pleasure principle as the primary purpose of life. 
Quoting Schopenhauer, Freud comes to the conclusion that 'death is the "true result and 
to that extent the purpose of life", while the sexual instinct is the embodiment of the will to 
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live.'380 Paralleling the biological model of corporeal decay, Freud understands that 'the 
aim of all life is death' and thus arises 'the paradoxical situation that the living organism 
struggles most energetically against events (dangers, in fact) which might help it to attain 
its life's aim rapidly - by a kind of short-circuit.'381 
This short-circuit is, of course, manifest by those who choose to engineer death by their 
own hand, but it is also flirted with and provoked by arts practices which stage death. 
Performance is always about death. The life of performance is the life of performance; it 
exists only in the moment of its enactment. As Peggy Phelan has observed, performance 
becomes itself through disappearance: 
The enactment of invocation and disappearance undertaken by 
performance and theatre is precisely the drama of corporeality itself.382 
The aim of all life is death; the aim of all performance is disappearance. 
Live performance is also always about failure; the possibility that something could go 
wrong at any moment. Our collective need to witness something happening in space and 
time is our need to face the risk of failure; this is what Ad am Phillips calls "spectacle as 
vicarious risk"383. The ultimate risk is death; the ultimate failure of the living body (and also 
its ultimate aim) is death. 
Just as performance needs an audience to achieve meaning, so too, as Phelan points out, 
does death. 
380 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle Standard Edition Vo1.18 (London: Vintage, 
2001) p.SO 
381 Ibid. p.38/39 
382 Peggy Phelan, Mourning Sex: Performing Public Memories (London: Routledge, 1997) p.4 
383 Adam Phillips, Houdini's Box: On the Arts of Escape (London: Faber and Faber, 2002) p.45 
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Death is an act that can only achieve meaning in and through the 
observation of the other, the spectator-witness.384 
Disappearance, failure, witness: the constituents of performance mark it for death. 
Perhaps more than any other 'subject', death - or 'mortality' - has preoccupied arts 
practices from Ancient Greek tragedy to the present day. Death is the 'single most reified 
once in a lifetime experience', the leveler of the playing field, the ultimate assurance385• 
For the magician and the illusionist the performance is about cheating death. 
'The easiest way to attract a crowd', Houdini wrote, 'is to let it be known 
that at a given time and a given place someone is going to attempt 
something that in the event of failure will mean sudden death. '386 
Harry Houdini sets up scenarios in which death is courted, even provoked. David Blaine 
buries himself alive, freezes himself, starves himself- acts which have killed people, 
things we do to corpses387 . Derren Brown plays Russian Roolette live on Channel4 
television, a loaded gun at his temple and pulls the trigger88. They all cheat death. 
'Magician' and 'Illusionist' are misnomers for the perpetrators of these stunts. Or are they? 
Do these men cheat death or cheat us? This question is perhaps the one intended to 
remain unanswered. 
But whereas the magician and the illusionist leave their self-inflicted trial untouched and 
unharmed, the live artist uses (and abuses) their body to the degree that the trace of the 
performance remains a scar. Derren Brown pulls the trigger and cheats death, but Chris 
384 Peggy Phelan 'Andy Warhol: Performances of Death in America' in Performing the Body: 
Performing the Text ed. by Amelia Jones and Andrew Stephenson eds (London: Routledge, 1999), 
223-236 (p.229) 
385 Peggy Phelan, 'Performance and Death: Ronald Reagan' Cultural Values Vol. 3 No.1 (1998), 
100-122 (p.107) 
386 Quoted in Adam Phillips, Houdini's Box: On the Arts of Escape (London: Faber and Faber, 
2002) p.16 
387 See David Blaine, Mysterious Stranger (London: Channel 4 Books, 2003) 
388 Russian Roulette Derren Browne. Channel 4 Television. 9 October 2003 
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Burden is shot. In 1971 Burden asks his friend to shoot him at the F Space in Santa Ana, 
California. The bullet 'blew away a large piece of flesh' in Burden's arm389• He is shot and 
survives. 
In Rhythm 0, performed in Naples in 1974, Marina Abramovic laid out objects on a table in 
the gallery, including a pen, scissors, chains, an axe, and a loaded pistol. The rules of the 
piece stipulated that there were seventy-two objects on a table that any member of the 
audience could use on Abramovic as they wanted, for a period of six hours. Her clothes 
are removed, her hair is cut, her skin is slashed, and a fight breaks out among gallery 
goers when one member of the public wants to shoot her--390. She sits impassive. She 
exposes her body to the aggression and desire of the other and survives. 
Franko B cuts into his body, allowing the inside out. In I Miss You! performed at Tate 
Modern in London in 2003, Franko B parades along a canvas catwalk. His painted white 
body is bleeding, leaving bloodstained footprints behind as traces. He bleeds and 
survives. 
These bodies are resurrected; they meet death for their audience and come back to life. 
While generous of body, such performances in which the artist chooses to suffer for us, 
also suggest the messianic; they imbue the suffering body with a redemptive possibility 
not open to many who face such trials outside the context of art practice. 
Art practices maintain a degree of control over death within the safe boundaries of 'genre' 
that is otherwise impossible. Nowhere is this more redolent than in fiction. The authors of 
novels, plays, television and film dramas, all choose when to kill off their characters. 
Examples are legion, a fact which Tim Etchells exploits in his performance text Taxonomy: 
Death Stories, which is simply a list of different kinds of stories about death: 
389 RoseLee Goldberg, Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present (London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1988) p.159 
390 See Marina Abramovic, Marina Abramovic (Milano: Edizioni Charta, 2002) p.30 
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... stories of perfect death 
stories of absurd death 
suicide stories 
stories of faked death 
stories of corpses which must be hidden 
stories which focus on the materiality of corpses 
stories of last words, wishes, writings 
stories of mass death 
stories of horrible deaths 
murder stories 
foretelling, premonitions or foreknowledge of death 
stories in which the dead show signs of life 
stories about the discovery of corpses 
stories of communicating with the dead 
and of communications from the dead 
stories in which the living are taken to the borders of death 
stories about controlling death 
stories involving what people see, experience or do when temporarily 
'dead'391 (etc. etc.) 
In all of these stories to which Etchells alludes, the writer controls death by making it 
happen. The writer performs death by scripting it. 
The dead themselves perform. In our mediatised world of rewind and fast-forward we see 
the dead perform again and again. The television journalist is the Dr Frankenstein of our 
age. Played out before us are the victims of murderers, muggers, rapists; of fires and 
floods; of the battlefield and of terrorism. 
We have entered an epoch where the staging of an individual death has dramatic 
reverberations for world relations. In the form of the suicide bomber, the spectacular 
staging of death manifests a knowledge of mediatised culture and an anticipation of how 
that death will be played and replayed on televisions around the world. Typically the 
performer in this spectacle of terror looks forward to a death in which the glory of that 
staging earns immortal bliss. 
This televisual replaying always keeps us a step removed from the action, but our 
collective desire to meet face to face with the bodies of the dead, in the otherwise 
391 These are a selection of subheadings which are then elaborated at some length. See 
Taxonomy: Death Stories by Tim Etchells. Artist's Collection. 2002 
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sanitized and mediated West, is evidenced by the 13.5 million people who have so far 
queued up to see Gunther von Hagen's Body Worlds: The Anatomical Exhibition of Real 
Human Bodies, which is the most successful touring exhibition ever392• The most popular 
gallery show in the world is not of Impressionist paintings but of cadavers. 
Von Hagen has invented a technique which he calls 'plastination' which enables him to 
preserve dissected corpses in intricate anatomical detail. These he displays as both 
medical specimens (diseased organs, developmental growths, the workings of capillaries 
etc.) and 'artistic' display (an anatomical separation of a man riding an anatomical 
separation of a horse, a muscles-only basketball player, a flayed man who carries his own 
skin etc.). 
These anatomical models are created in Dalian, China in what Von Hagen has termed 
'Piastination City'. He claims that China offers him the work force and the resources he 
needs to build up his collection, but this geographic location has also led to accusations of 
illegal trading in human remains. Such accusations mean that Von Hagen is at lengths to 
appear 'above board' in his recruitment of cadavers and there are international 
recruitment days for interested donors. 
Life, or rather death, is cheap in China. Even conservative readings of population trends 
indicate that by 2020 China will have many millions of bachelors - some figures as high 
as forty-million- as parents abort girl foetuses, maltreat, or murder their girl children393. 
The one child only policy, recently relaxed in rural areas, has lead to a son/daughter 
hierarchy. The preference for the boy-child has lead to a massive increase in prostitution 
and a general complacency in understanding human life as disposable. 
392 See <http://www.bodyworlds.com> [accessed 6 April 2004] 
393 These figures were given by Li Weixiong of China's national advisory population committee and 
reported by Justin McCurry and Rebecca Alison '40 million bachelors and no women ... the birth of 
a new problem for China' The Guardian 9 March 2004 p.14 
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lt is no surprise then, that much of the work of contemporary Chinese artists should not 
only focus on 'mortality' but should directly employ human remains as the medium of the 
work. This is the materializing of death. 
Artist Sun Vuan created an installation of a giant Doric column; peering at the gallery label 
it becomes clear that the pillar is made of human fat. The reverberations of this 
materialization - the body as architecture - are perhaps lost in an ethical aporia: whose 
bodies are these? Where did they come from? 
Even more extreme in his use of the human body is Zhu Vu, in a series of works from 
2000-2003394. In Pocket Theology an amputated human arm dangles from the ceiling of 
the gallery space clutching a rope; in Brains Manufacture Vu minces up human brain in a 
morgue, bottles it, and places it on the shelf of a supermarket; in Eat Man he can be seen 
having a dinner of stir fried vegetables and dead human baby. Regardless of the quality of 
the work (work which is made possible in a country where you can buy the dead for a few 
Vuan) this use of the material of the corpse, stages death as material culture. The future 
elides the past, death elides life, through a radical process of recontextualisation. 
More troubling still is Zhu Vu's work Sacrifice, ·in which the artist documents his financial 
negotiation with a prostitute to carry his child, which is aborted at four or five months and 
which he then feeds to his dog. The artwork, which exists as a DVD documentation, 
opens in an enclosed space in which there is a table; on the table is a dog; next to the dog 
is a white plate on which can clearly be seen a well developed human foetus. Vu presents 
the plate to his dog; the dog refuses (dogs don't eat human) and Vu then paints his 
aborted child with honey in order to try and make it more palatable, chopping it up in 
smaller pieces until the dog will eat it. The controlled violence of this imagery is without 
redemption. The documentation then retrospectively presents hidden camera shots in 
which Vu can be seen negotiating with a series of prostitutes as he explains his intentions. 
394 See Sacrifice. Zhu Yu. Artist's DVD. The Live Art Development Agency Archive 2002 and 
Collected Images. Zhu Yu. Artist's DVD. The Live Art Development Agency Archive 2002. 
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The bottom line is financial rather than ethical; so many months will cost so much money. 
lt is difficult to know how to approach such work, to find a locus of meaning for such a 
performance in which death is manifest so starkly. In this act of controlled paternal 
infanticide, Yu perpetrates death as performance. This is post-human performance. 
To return to Beyond. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud alludes to the preoccupation 
of arts practices with death: 
... the artistic play and artistic imitation carried out by adults, which ... are 
aimed at an audience, do not spare the spectators (for instance, in 
tragedy) the most painful experiences and can yet be felt by them as 
highly enjoyable. [ ... ] The consideration of these cases and situations, 
which have a yield of pleasure as their final outcome ... are of no use for 
our purposes, since they presuppose the existence and dominance of 
the pleasure principle; they give no evidence of the operation of 
tendencies beyond the pleasure principle, that is, of tendencies more 
primitive than it and independent of it.395 
Perhaps this refusal to use 'the staging of death' as evidence of the operation of the death 
instinct, can be understood to recuperate 'the staging of death' as life affirming. The 
staging of death affirms life precisely because it is not death. Maybe this is what is so 
difficult to reconcile in Zhu Yu's Sacrifice: the child does not overcome; it really is dead. 
cheating death 
surviving death 
controlling death 
materializing death 
perpetrating death 
Performance and death are intertwined: death is the future of performance; performance 
is the future of death. How might such examples contribute to our understanding of an 
autobiography of the future? Can we even understand these performances as 
autobiographical? 
In discussing the work of the artist, Marina Abramovic has written: 
395 Freud p.17 
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The more problematic your childhood is, the better artist you get. I don't 
know if it's true for some artists, but for me it was very true. I had a really 
difficult childhood and I think that artists always get the most inspiration 
and their own material from their own history, from the kind of situations 
they really live in. 396 
This is a problematic generalisation, which conforms to the trope of the angst ridden 
'artistic temperament'; artists must be allowed to make art for many different reasons, at 
the same time as acknowledging that all cultural production is in some sense 
autobiographical, even if only as a result of what is edited in and out. Whatever their 
motivation, and whether or not Abramovic is right that "most inspiration" is 
autobiographical, the work produced becomes the life. 1t is difficult to imagine an 
autobiography that would not include being shot or engineering the abortion of one's own 
child, when these things happened. 
As Phelan proposes, ' ... it may well be that theatre and performance respond to a psychic 
need to rehearse for loss, and especially for death.'397 The performances which stage 
death not only prepare us for the death of another - a ritualized preparatory mourning -
they also teach us how to die. 
396 Marina Abramovic, Marina Abramovic (Milano: Edizioni Charta, 2002) p.27 
397 Peggy Phelan, Mourning Sex: Petiorming Public Memories (London: Routledge, 1997) p.3 
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6. Career Psychologist: Julie Unite 
Fig. 62: Julie Unite 
Julie Unite is a Career Psychologist who highlighted pitfalls and possibilities that I will face 
on my future career path and offered me advice on how to tackle them. She predicted my 
psychological capacity to actualise career goals. 
Prediction 6 
You are spoilt because the work that you do is fulfilling and you enjoy doing it. You say 
you want to move out of the artworld and into the mainstream, if so, you need to start 
learning how to talk the businessman's language. If you want to be called on by the 
mainstream you will have to make a name for yourself The artworld is safe for you 
because you know it. If you want to move on from it then you have to break the barriers 
that you have put up and take a risk into the unknown. You've got to think outside your 
box and look at your end goal. Only then will you realise your aims. 
Note 6 
To paraphrase Alexander Garcia Duttmann: the problem for writers who read Proust is the 
temptation to try and write like Proust; what a writer should get from Proust, is simply the 
need to write.398 
As mentioned before, the relationship between Proust and the narrator of his Search is 
one of complementarity and difference399• The difficulty arises with the (in)appropriateness 
of asking to what extent the work is autobiographical. For both Proust and his narrator 
however there is at least one identical: writing per se, is what is urgent. 
398 International Roundtable: New Perspectives on Proust- lnstitut Fran9ais, London, 28th 
February 2003 
399 See Chapter 2: Namesake - Section 6 'Not in My Name: Author 
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Like the writer Marcel Proust, the narrator of A la recherche du temps perdu is engaged in 
the act of writing. The dynamic of this writing in time, oscillates between the present 
moment of writing, the memory of a past, the memory of a past memory (also involuntary 
memory), and the memory of a past which looks to the future moment of writing. 
In this way the narrator is writing about a past but nevertheless always writing towards the 
future; the future which is the present moment of writing. The past only exists in service to 
the future. As Gilles Deleuze writes: 
[H]owever important its role, memory intervenes only as the means of an 
apprenticeship that transcends recollection both by its goals and by its 
principles. The Search is oriented to the future, not to the past.400 
As Deleuze configures it, the Search describes an apprenticeship: 
Proust's work is not oriented to the past and the discoveries of memory, 
but to the future and the progress of an apprenticeship. What is 
important is that the hero does not know certain things at the start, 
gradually learns them, and finally receives an ultimate revelation. 401 
This apprenticeship (an apprenticeship being initiatory training in preparation for a future 
career) is that of the writer; not the learning to write, but the having something to say. 
A la recherche du temps perdu traces the writer-narrator's movement towards writing. 
This movement is configured as a narrative journey towards the commencement of 
writing. His longing to be a writer; his lack of qualification and self doubt in his writing 
ability; a doubt in literature itself and its transforrnative potential; delay and deferral from 
writing; the feeling that time is wasted and time is running out to do the work that has to be 
done. To give some idea of the stature of this movement over the course of the Search, it 
is necessary to quote at some length: 
400 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs (London: The Athlone Press, 2000) p.4 
401 Ibid. p.26 
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The narrator is longing 'someday to become a writer'402, for a 'literary career'403 , in the 
hope of becoming a 'famous author'404. This ambition is obstructed from the start by his 
father 'refusing even to dignify it with the title career'405. The narrator is wracked by doubt, 
thinking that he has a 'lack of qualification'406, that he would 'never have any talent'407, that 
his 'imagination and sensibility had weakened'408, that he had a 'lack of talent for 
literature'409, that he 'had no gift for literature'410• He says, 'If ever I thought of myself as a 
poet, I know now that I am not one,'411 and even more dramatically, 'I possessed the proof 
that I was useless'412• Paradoxically, such enunciations of self-doubt increase towards the 
end of the multi-volume work; the narrator articulates his uselessness as a writer .only two-
hundred-and-fifty pages before the end of a three-thousand page work of writing! 
Coupled with this self-doubt, is a doubt of literature: 'Until now, I had concluded only that I 
had no gift for writing; now M. de Norpois took away from me even the desire to write.'413 
This is a world in which 'literature [ ... ] had no very profound truths to reveal'414 and in 
which the narrator not only chastises himself but also raises 'objections against 
literature'415 itself. He remarks on 'the vanity, the falsehood of literature'416 , and convinces 
himself 'that literature could no longer give [him] any joy whatever'417• 
This doubt in his own ability and doubt in the power of literature, manifests itself in a delay 
in the process or act of writing. The narrator records that 'scarcely had I sat down at my 
402 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time Vols 1-6 trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 1996) Vol.1 p.207 
403 Ibid. p.213 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid. Vol.2 p.11 
406 Ibid. Vol.1 p.213 
407 Ibid. p.12 
408 Ibid. Vol.6 p.2 
409 Ibid. p.22 
410 Ibid. p.39 
411 Ibid. p.202 
412 Ibid. p.216 
413 Ibid. Vol.2 p.26 
414 Ibid. Vol.6 p.22 
415 Ibid. p.33 
416 Ibid. p.202 
417 Ibid. p.216 
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desk than I would get up'418; he records his intention 'to enjoy working, as soon as I was 
well'419 , declaring his frustration, after one-thousand-three-hundred pages of the work: 'If 
only I had been able to start writlng!'420• This deferral is a consistent theme of the Search: 
'I promised Albertine that, if I did not go out with her, I would settle down to work. 
But.. .'421 • The 'but' says it all. 
The narrator's memory of the frustration at his incapability to start writing is matched by 
his memory of the 'wasted years'422 through which he is yet to pass in the course of his 
narrative. He is pressed by the urgency that time is running out: 
When I reflected that [the] trees- pear-trees, apple-trees, tamarisks-
would outlive me, I seemeq to be receiving from them a silent counsel to 
set myself to work at last, before the hour of eternal rest had yet 
struck.423 
lt is only two-thousand-seven-hundred-and-fifty pages into A la recherche du temps 
perdu, as the work builds towards its climactic end (and thus the commencement of 
writing) that the narrator can finally disregard these concerns. Tripping up on a paving-
stone on the way to dine with the Duchesse de Guermantes, he finally gets a grip of what 
his intellectual subject is: 
Just as at the moment when I tasted the Madeleine, all anxiety about the 
future, all intellectual doubts had disappeared, so now those that a few 
seconds ago had assailed me on the subject of the reality of my literary 
gifts, the reality even of literature, were removed as if by magic.424 
The discovery which makes 'death a matter of indifference'425 to the narrator is that of 
involuntary memory, the essential past as captured in the present moment. 
418 Ibid. Vol.2 p.178 
419 Ibid. p.449 
420 Ibid. Vol.3 p.166 
421 Ibid. Vol.4 p.85 
422 Ibid. Vol.3 p.459 
423 Ibid. Vol.4 p.476 
424 Ibid. Vol.6 p.217 
425 Ibid. 
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And I understood that all these materials for a work of literature were 
simply my past life. [ ... )And thus my whole life up to the present day 
might and vet might not have been summed up under the title: A 
Vocation.426 
The 'and yet might not have been' which sits almost in parenthesis here, shows the 
fragility of the discovery he has made. The possibility of becoming a writer of doing the job 
of finding a vocation is presented as a precarious future to which the road is tortuous. And 
yet the beauty of the Search is that already at the beginning, when the narrator is an 
adolescent within the context of the narrative, he has shown through the writing how he 
will become a writer, in the future. He writes not only of the struggle to write but makes it 
his truth. 
Like his narrator, Proust works towards the moment of writing. In the 1908 'carnets', 
Proust's surviving notebooks, which have been published in facsimile, a· scribble reads: 
Peut'litre dois-je benir 1 ma mauvaise sante, qui m' 1 a appris, par le lest 
de la 1 fatigue, l'immobilite, le 1 silence, la possibilite de 1 travailler. Les 
avertisse I ments de mort. Bientot tu 11 ne pourras plus dire tout cela. 1 La 
paresse ou le doute ou Jl'impuissance se refugiant 1 dans !'incertitude 
sur la forme 1 d'art. Faut-il en faire 1 un roman, une etude philosophi 1 
que, suis-je romancier? 
Perhaps I should bless my ill health, which has given me, through the 
weight of tiredness, immobility, silence, the possibility of working. The 
warning signs of death. Soon you won't be able to say all this. Laziness 
or doubt or helplessness hide the uncertainty of the form the artwork will 
take. Should one make of it a novel, a philosophical essay, am I a 
novelist?427 
lt is clear then that in 1908, before Proust embarked upon the writing of his major work, 
that while he had his vocation (that of writing) and his subject (the materials of his past 
life), he did not yet know what form the work would take. 'Am I a novelist?' begs the 
question of what form (of writing) Proust should employ. Roland Barthes carefully 
proposes the "moment decisif' in October 1909, which is to say that before Proust 
426 Ibid. p.258 
427 Marcel Proust, Le carnet de 1908 etablie et presente par Phifip Kolb (Paris: Gallimard, 
1976) 10 V0 /11 p.60-61. I am grateful to Caroline Bergvall for pointing out this note to me and also 
for her translation of the French. 
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embarked upon his work he had planned the entire structure428• This is backed up by 
Proust's use of both sequential and prospective notebooks to draft his narrative. As the 
major biographer of Proust, Jean-Yves Tadie remarks: 
[W]hile Proust was writing these sequential notebooks, his ideas were 
being developed in other notebooks that consisted of fragments to be 
used in the later parts of the narrative: while it is true that some 
notebooks containing sketches and others containing the fair copy were 
written simultaneously, they did not, of course, deal with the same parts 
of the novel, because the approach was always prospective and looking 
to the future. 429 
Proust's performance of writing, his diurnal (or as it happens, nocturnal) behaviour, have 
become as much part of his mythology as the work itself; perhaps in the context of a 
popular discourse which hasn't read A la recherche du temps perdu, even more so. 
The narrator ends his novel at the moment when he begins to write it. If we wish to know 
how it was written we must turn to the author. One of the most compelling accounts of the 
writing of A la recherche du temps perdu is that of Proust's maid and confidante Celeste 
AI baret, who after half a century of silence following her 'master's' death, recorded a long 
series of taped interviews which were transcribed and edited by Georges Belmont and 
published under the title Monsieur Proust in 1973. In reading Albaret's account of the eight 
years she spent in the service of 'M. Proust' we read the account of a dedicated and 
deeply respectful intimate who had unique access to his writing process. As Andre 
Aciman writes in the Forward to the 2003 reprint: 
In the end, she gave to his readers a Proust whom Proust had labored a 
lifetime to create, to perfect, to invent.430 
But to ask if Albaret's account is 'factually accurate' or not, is to miss the point. 1t may be 
possible, as in a court of law, to corroborate or disprove certain parts of what she calls her 
428 Roland Barthes, La Preparation Du Roman I et If: Notes de cours et seminaires au College de 
France (Paris: Seuil/lmec, 2003) p.154 
429 Jean-Yves Tadie, Marcel Proust: A Life trans. by Euan Cameron (London: Viking, 2000) p.534 
430 Celeste Albaret, Monsieur Proust (New York: New York Review of Books, 2003) 
p.xii 
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"testament'"'31 but for the most part, as Tadie attests, she is the only source we have 
'alone before history, just as she was alone before Proust'432, certainly for the most 
reclusive final years of his life. Her account becomes Proust, regardless of its factual 
accuracy. 
Monsieur Proust traces the writer-master's movement towards the completion of writing. 
This movement is configured as a harrowing journey towards death. The recurrent themes 
are the sacrifice of all other activity to the order of writing; the duty to the task of writing; 
obsession with the task, fear and panic at the possibility of leaving it incomplete; writing as 
the reason for living, literally the raison d'etre. To quote again in some detail: 
As articulated by Albaret, 'M. Proust' sacrificed everything to his artistic goal. He 'shut 
himself up for the sake of his work'433 , his 'great sacrifice for his work'434 was his life itself, 
'his devotion to the work to which he'd completely sacrificed his health'435• Proust is 
presented as a stoic: 
What loneliness! And what strength of mind to have chosen it, and, 
having chosen it, to have endured it!436 
Writing appears in this context as a duty. 'To finish his book- that is all that mattered 
now'437• Albaret paraphrases Proust as saying: 'I am married to my work. All that matters 
is my writing,'438 and this marriage is not one of pleasure but rather of endurance. Albaret 
makes a point of saying that Proust never wrote 'for the mere pleasure of writing or 
expressing an emotion'439. 
431 Ibid. p.344 
432 Tadie p.776 
433 Albaret p.44 
434 Ibid. p.50 
435 Ibid. p.BO 
436 Ibid. p.172 
437 Ibid. p.45 
438 Ibid. p.173 
439 Ibid. p.200 
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The fear of falling short of this duty is expressed in terms of an obsession to complete and 
a panic at the prospect of failure. Albaret identifies the writing as an 'obsession'440 that 
'was like a fever in him'441 . Writing here is pathologised as an illness . 
. . . during all those years, there couldn't have been one day when at 
some moment or other there wasn't some sign of his fear that he might 
not be able to finish what he had started.442 
And if he did fail to finish what he had started there was the understanding that he would 
have 'sacrificed everything, for nothing'443. 'The only thing he feared was dying before he 
had finished his work.'444 
Paradoxically, given that so many people have chosen to see Proust's obsession with 
writing his Search as the thing which killed him, including Albaret (and according to her, 
Proust's brother Robert445 ), writing is nevertheless identified as the thing which gave 
Proust a reason to live, literally which kept him alive. 
lt is the writing that 'kept him going'446 , because 'he lived only for his work'447 and he 
keeps the flame of his life 'alight only for his work'448 • In the end 'he gave his life for it'449 • 
According to Albaret. when Proust wrote 'Fin' at the end of his manuscript he summoned 
her to his room: 
He laughed like a boy who has played a trick on someone. 
"Well, my dear Celeste, I shall tell you. lt is great news. Last night I 
wrote 'The End'.'' 
440 Ibid. p.45 
441 Ibid. p.334 
442 Ibid. p.333 
443 Ibid. p.334 
444 Ibid. p.67 
445 AI baret paraphrases Professor Robert Proust thus: 'My brother could have lived longer if he'd 
been willing to live the same way as everyone else. But he chose what he did, and he chose it for 
the sake of his work. All we can do is bow our heads.' AI baret p.50 
446 Albaret p.66 
447 Ibid. p.267 
448 Ibid. p.332 
449 Ibid. p.331 
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And then he added smiling, and with that light in his eyes: "Now I can 
die". [ ... ] "Now my work can be published. I shan't have given my life in 
vain."450 
The end of the writing, the end of the book, the end of the life. A vocation which leads 
towards death. The moment of completion of the writing is the moment of mortal death, 
death which gives way to posthumous fame and the future life of the creation: A la 
recherche du temps perdu. 
450 Ibid. p.337 
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7. Artist and Illustrator: Robin Whitmore 
Fig. 63: Robin Whitmore 
Robin Whitmore is an Artist and Illustrator who drew my future. He asked me to describe a 
place or activity that I would ideally (though not completely unrealistically) like to inhabit in 
ten years time. He drew as I described my vision and an illustration emerged. 
Prediction 7 
lt is a purpose built house, on the river in East London. The house was built by my lover. lt 
is very large, equivalent to two large town houses. lt is four stories, rectangular, wider than 
it is tall. lt is a plain, modernist design and has a roof garden. lt is all glass, so you can see 
inside when the lights are on and the blinds are up. There is a large 'ball room ' on the 
ground floor. /live there with my lover and my lover's sister who is also the mother of my 
children. We have a boy and a girl; they are twins. We have lots of parties and events 
there. There is a big garden running down to the river. I sleep right at the top. There is a 
spiral staircase. 
Note 7 
The final prediction in The Crystal Ball is different from those which it follows. The first six 
'experts' apply a skill, method or science to read the body or the mind of the client and 
provide an interpretive schema. The seventh 'expert' also applies a skill - illustration - but 
the onus of the prediction is left with the client themselves. 
Where would you like to be in ten years time? What would you like to be doing? lt is as 
simple as that. You say what you want and Robin Whitmore draws your future and you 
can see it there in front of you. This is a model for a self-defined future made pictorial 
reality; the transformation of words into image and from image to the future. 
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Fig. 64: Robin Whitmore Where would you like to be in ten years time? (2002) 
The transition which Robin Whitmore enacts, from words to pictures, is necessarily reliant 
on the future proposed by its subject, in my case this quasi-modernist embankment house 
built by 'my builder-boyfriend'. Reading back my stated desire for the future I am turned-
off by the banality of my choice. lt crosses my mind to change the prediction, to try and 
recoup the future. This is, after all, the final section of the final section of this document. 
Surely it is better to end with something that is more conducive to academic interrogation. 
The future I offered in the past is one that this present future rejects as crass, as an 
embarrassment. 
My bad impression of the future I once described, is reminiscent of the spoiling Roland 
Barthes observes on rereading his diary, which he notes in his essay 'Deliberation'. This is 
the text which 'doesn't hold up', which becomes 'unappetizing from one day to the next'451 . 
The diary records the past for the future, and while Barthes may be disgusted at his own 
artifice of sincerity, artistic mediocrity, the 'pose' of the journal situation, Robin Whitmore 
asks something else; not to record the present, but the future. 
451 Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language trans. by Richard Howard (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1989) p.359. Previously discussed in Chapter 2: Namesake, Section 6. Not In My 
Name: Author 
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The diary entry which does deal with the future is the appointment diary; what Tony 
Godfrey rather dismisslvely calls 'mere sub-headings for the future'452. But these sub-
headings do more than merely allocate time, they often ask us to visualise the 'dates' 
ahead as we work towards them. 
The artist Jonathan Monk has created a series of text works which simply give a place, 
date and time. Meeting #13 reads: 
A la Tour Eiffel, le 13 Octobre 2008 a midi453 
The text, which is provided in an envelope (ready to send) serves as invitation to an 
appointment, in the future. We are left to imagine- to visualise- what might happen at 
the Eiffel Tower at midday on 13th October 2008 and who might be there. Monk cleverly 
asks us to visualise the future without fixing what that future is. 
Maybe what really turns me off from the future described to Robin Whitmore is that it gives 
too much (of myself) away. This is what Paul Alien calls 'the artless confessional mode', a 
mode in which the personal is left untransformed454 • There are many examples of people 
apologizing for the inclusion of the autobiographical. For instance in Memoirs of the Blind, 
Jacques Derrida writes: ' ... you will excuse me for beginning so very close to myself as if 
the autobiographical could somehow rob him of critical acumen; or at the least he 
acknowledges that he is aware of the possibility of such an accusation being made455 . 
In opposition to the premise of this study and the stated intention in its opening remarks, I 
also find myself, in these final passages, having to apologise for the autobiographical. lt 
seems then, at the end, that I am hoisted by my own petard, by the methodology I have 
452 Tony Godfrey, 'Diaries, or why I can't write them' in Diary ed. by Margot Helier (Manchester: 
Cornerhouse, 2000) 125-135 (p.125) 
453 Meeting #13 was eo-published by Book Works, London and Yvon Lambert, Paris in 2000 and is 
printed offset in an edition of 10,000. lt has no cover and a concertina format 8pp., folded to 10mm. 
ll54 Paul Alien ed., Art, Not Chance: Nine Artist's Diaries (London: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 
2001) p.8 
455 Jacques Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self Portrait and Other Ruins trans. by Pascale-
Anne Brault and Michael Naas (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) p.3 
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engaged. Put simply: I would prefer not to associate myself with the future that I once 
chose. 
'I would prefer not to' is the repeated answer of Bartleby, Herman Melville's character from 
the short-story of the same name. Like me, Bartleby is a scrivener- a sofaer- a writer, a 
copyist, a scribe456. Unlike me, his logic of preference, a negativism without outright 
refusal, leads to a complete withdrawal of the (auto)biographical reference457. Bartleby's 
preference is to withhold biographical information: 
'Will you tell me, Bartleby, where were you born?' 
'I would prefer not to.' 
'Will you tell me anything about yourself?' 
'I would prefer not to.'458 
This preference which, as has been pointed out by readers before, is not an overt refusal, 
places Bartleby outside social convention and expectation. lt is this which passively 
empowers Bartleby in opposition to the will of his employer. By way of default, it also 
highlights the way in which the (auto)biographical reference is at the heart of social 
convention and expectation. Anything beyond a fleeting social engagement is 
accompanied by some kind of personal history. 
In his essay 'Bartleby; or, The Formula', Gilles Deleuze argues that while Bartleby's 
phrase 'I would prefer not to' is grammatically and syntactically correct, it has the affect of 
being agrammatica/, that 'it has an anomalous ring to it'459• Linguistically its affect is 
neither constative nor performative; it neither describes something nor performs an action. 
A word always presupposes other words that can replace it, complete it, or 
form alternatives with it: it is on this condition that language is distributed in 
such a way as to designate things, states of things and actions, according 
456 See Chapter 2: Namesake, section 7, Ineffable Name: God for a detailed discussion of the 
sofaer as scribe and scrivener. 
457 The phrase 'logic of preference' is used by Gilles Deleuze in 'Bartleby; or, The Formula', in 
Essays Critical and Clinical by Gilles Deleuze trans. by Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco 
u-aondon: Verso, 1998). 
Herman Melville, Bartleby (London: Penguin, 1995) p.24 
459 Deleuze p.69 
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to a set of objective, explicit conventions. But perhaps there are also other 
implicit and subjective conventions, other types of reference or 
presupposition. In speaking, I do not simply indicate things and actions: I 
also commit acts that assure a relation with the interlocutor, in keeping with 
our respective situations: I command, I interrogate, I promise, I ask, I emit 
"speech acts." Speech acts are self-referential (I command by saying "I 
order you ... "), while constative propositions refer to other things and other 
words. lt is this double system of references that Bartleby ravages.460 
Bartleby's logic of preference places his speech not only at the limit of social convention 
but also at the limit of understanding. 
'I would prefer not to.' 
'You will not?' 
'I prefer not.'461 
While Bartleby's negative preference is manifest in the response to his employer's 
commands to run errands, ~o reveal biographical information, to quit the premises, and to 
eat, the core of his negative preference is his preference not to write. 
'Why, how now? what next?' exclaimed I, 'do no more writing?' 
'No more.' 
'And what is the reason?' 
'Do you not see the reason yourself?' he indifferently replied.462 
The reason - that he would prefer not to - while comic, oster;Jsibly robs Bartleby of his 
vocation and thus his identity; he is after all, a scribe who has stopped writing. But as 
Giorgio Agamben argues, it is paradoxically the arresting of his vocation which offers its 
potential and identifies its power. 
As a scribe who has stopped writing, Bartleby is the extreme figure of 
the Nothing from which all creation derives: and at the same time, he 
constitutes the most implacable vindication of this Nothing as pure, 
absolute potentiality. The scrivener has become the writing tablet: he is 
now nothing other than his white sheet.463 
460 Ibid. p.73 
461 Melville p.17 
462 Ibid. p.27 
463 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(California: Stanford University Press, 1999) p.254 
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Writing, like creation itself, issues from nothing. Bartleby's immobility, his silence, his 
putting down of the pen, performs him. An autobiography is made up as much from its 
empty pages as from its printed words. 
In the factual-fiction Bartleby & Go. by Enrique Vila-Matas, the narrator of the story, a 
Barcelona office clerk named Marcelo, has been unable to write; 'I became a Bartleby' he 
records464• In an attempt to regain his writing ability he sets out to search through literature 
for other possible Bartlebys who have refused writing. Marcelo forms an inventory of (both 
real and invented) writers who have met this negative impulse. lt is through writing the 
account of this No that Marcelo's future as a writer is restored but also that writing itself 
has a future. 
Only from the negative impulse, from the labyrinth of the No, can the 
writing of the future appear.465 
The prediction I gave to Robin which he then actualised is a raw and exposing 
autobiographical future which I would prefer not to have given. Writing could give me back 
the future; all I need to do is to alter the words, to rewrite the autobiography, to turn back 
time and rewrite the future of the text. I prefer not to. 
464 Enrique Vila-Matas, Bartleby & Co. trans. by Jonathan Dunne (London: The Harvill Press, 2004) 
p.3 
465 Ibid. 
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Afterworrds 
What comes after the future? 
What comes after autobiography? 
What happens when you stop performing? 
What happens when you stop writing? 
Autobiography is both impossible and all-encompassing. Impossible because the life can 
not be written in its entirety, all-encompassing because it includes everything, even 
beyond the moment of writing itself. 
The future which is offered by Bartleby's preference not to write may be recuperated by 
Giorgio Agamben as the moment of pure potentiality, but within the narrative world of the 
short-story Bartleby, it leads only to the scrivener's death466 . 11 is in death that self is 
revealed to the world; that the self which refused autobiographical reference in life is 
determined. The cessation of writing heralds death, which paradoxically offers up an 
autobiography. Bartleby's autobiography is his silence, his negative preference. lt is left to 
the lawyer-narrator, so shaken by his employee's death, to act as the amanuensis. 
Two other Nineteenth Century protagonists reveal their autobiography at the point of 
death, literally in that moment. Dorian Gray and Dr Jekyll whose lives are spent in the 
refusal of autobiographical reference, in order to dissemble who or what they are, find 
their lives explicated (in Gray's case by accident and in Jekyll's through intention) as they 
themselves bring their life to an end. 
Dorian stabs the monstrous painting which has carried the representational weight of his 
sinful life. In doing so he not only kills himself, he also breaks the spell which has given 
him eternal youth and transmogrifies the image of sin which the painting has kept secret, 
onto his body. 
466 This is a direct continuation from the line of thought explored in Chapter 3: The Crystal Ball, 
Section 7: Robin Whitmore: Illustrator. 
242 
When they entered they found, hanging upon the wall, a splendid portrait 
of their master as they had seen him, in all the wonder of his exquisite 
youth and beauty. Lying on the floor was a dead man, in evening dress, 
with a knife in his heart. He was withered, wrinkled, and loathsome of 
visage. lt was not till they had examined the rings that they recognized 
who it was.467 
In his attempt to kill his conscience Dorian Gray betrays his secret life. Gray's cadaver is 
his autobiography. The picture which held his life and told his story is now written on his 
body. 
Dr Jekyll refuses to acknowledge the beast within ('He, I say- I can not say, 1'468). In his 
embodiment as Hyde the world can 'read Satan's signature' on his face469• Jekyll dies 
twice, once as himself and again as Hyde. 
Will Hyde die upon the scaffold? or will he find the courage to release 
himself at the last moment? God knows; I am careless; this is my true 
hour of death, and what is to follow concerns another than myself. Here 
then, as I lay down my pen and proceed to seal up mrc confession, I 
bring the life of that unhappy Henry Jekyll to an end.4 0 
Having written his confession and laid down his pen Jekyll is taken over by Hyde forever. 
Jekyll's written statement and Hyde's corpse collectively reveal a life kept secret. As 
Dorian's corpse reveals his life, so too Hyde's corpse reveals Jekyll's. In death, Hyde is 
Jekyll's autobiography. As Philippe Lejeune suggests, autobiography is not a 'guessing . 
game'471 • 1t may however require detective work. 
But these fictional characters who leave their autobiography behind on their death are 
reliant on their fiction and their author for both their life and their death. Death is not the 
panacea of autobiography; death may arrest the writing subject but it does not complete 
an autobiography. 
467 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray {London: Penguin, 1949 repr. 1985) p.264. Closing 
words. 
468 Robert Louis Stevenson, Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987 repr. 
1991) p.73 
469 1bid. p.19 
470 Ibid. p.76. Closing words. 
471 See the opening remarks of this study in the Introduction. 
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Above all else, this study testifies to the performance of the autobiographical trace left by 
the author once they have put down their pen. As the protagonist of Bartleby & Go. 
records: 
... every writer must be forgotten almost as soon as they have stopped 
writing, because the page has been lost, has literally flown away, has 
entered a context of different situations and sentiments, answers 
questions put by other men, which its author could not even have 
imagined.472 
But the writer is only forgotten to the degree of their intentionality. After the performance, 
after autobiography, it performs you. The text performs the author. There is no smooth 
consistency in this operation, no assurance of intention. The text is left to be interpreted 
by the other. This is the autobiographical performance. 
As he refutes the autobiographical content of his writing, Hanif Kureshi implicitly offers a 
value judgement on the genre: that it is a 'reduced' form of literature. His annoyance 
stems from his inability to control the reception of his writing once he has published. 
lt annoys me to have my own work reduced to autobiography - often, 
writing isn't a reflection of experience so much as a substitute for il.473 
The writer who denies the autobiographical referent may do so not just simply because 
they are worried that the autobiographical label robs their craft of its skill (wary of the 
accusation that they merely record their experiences rather than creating new ones) but 
also because they do not wish to expose themselves to a 'truth reference'. Kureshi does 
not wish to be judged as a man but as a writer. But his argument is self-defeating. If 
writing becomes life, then that writing is necessarily autobiographical. This study has 
explored that necessity in the guise of the autobiographical performance. 
472 Enrique Vila-Matas, Bartleby & Co. trans. by Jonathan Dun ne (London: The Harvill Press, 
2004) p.19 
473 Hanif Kureshi, 'Fast & Loose' Time Out 25 August-1 September 2004 p.7 
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In Chapter 1: Disinter/est: Digging Up Our Childhood, a joint research project between 
a sister and a brother, an archaeologist and an artist, gave way to a performance and 
installation which in turn demanded a series of propositions about how we access our 
infant life. The process of this research, working with the eo-subject of study and utilising 
their particular area of expertise - archaeology- was methodologically highly productive. 
This cross-disciplinary approach which worked in and between two areas of professional 
practice, came together in a collective concern about infant experience but also a shared 
personal history. A degree of happenstance enabled the specifics, not least that sister and 
brother had different skill sets and knowledge bases to bring to shared concerns. There 
was a symbiosis in this method which went beyond the confines or relevance of this study 
and has potential for application in the future. Of particular importance here were the 
developments made in the documentation of a process, the incorporation of the personal 
and pictorial archive and the determination of a strategy to disseminate findings. The 
'research tools' which were invented for this purpose acted as a bridge between the 
processes of collaborative research, performance practice and the academic and 
conceptual writings of this study. Disinter/est: Digging Up Our Childhood hopes to offer 
not only some insights into the possibility of an autobiography of infancy but also a 
methodological approach to epistemology. 
In Chapter 2: Namesake, the encounter with an identical other, someone who shared 
exactly the same name but led a very different kind of life, produced both a performance 
and an academic investigation which grew together and drew on each other. Here too, the 
role played happenstance - that the other Joshua Sofaer was who he was and was willing 
to co-operate in the project - allowed the methodology to develop. Within this area of 
investigation, which found its outcomes separately in performance practice and academic 
writing, there is a continual balance that needs to be struck between the case study of the 
author's name and the wider conceptual propositions made. There is here an implicit 
acknowledgement of the role of the author, in discussion of the autobiographical subject. 
Namesake hopes to offer not only some insights into the range of references, activations 
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and meanings of the personal proper name but also a model for the development of 
performance research and the possibilities for multiple outputs from a single research 
strand. Namesake therefore hopes to respond to some of the concerns of the academy 
about the interrelation of theory and practice by embodying serious academic 
investigation alongside performance practice474. 
In Chapter 3: The Crystal Ball, an experimental theatre piece in which members of the 
audience had their futures predicted by a panel of experts, offered seven predictions 
which acted as pathways towards the configuration of a possible autobiography of the 
future. While the performance here was completely separate from the text which it later 
conceived, performance acted as a catalyst to writing. Not writing about performance but 
writing from performance. Here the performance event was both an endpoint in itself and 
the research core of the writing. More than the previous two chapters in which the 
performance was made with the writing in mind, or simultaneously to it, the writing of the 
third chapter in particular offers a model for writing, in which performance is an endpoint of 
only one particular research outcome. As the academy continues to develop its 
relationship with professional arts practice it is hoped that this model will have further 
application. The event which was The Crystal Ball brought together seven different 
experts and their correspondent disciplines which performance practice filtered and the 
writing of the third chapter of this study exploited. Such cross-fertilisation of discipline 
would have been impossible in the writing if it had not been established by the 
performance. 
The use of performance as the way into each of the chapters of this study has provided a 
framework which reflects its concerns. lt has also taught me that performance is not only a 
form of knowledge in and of itself but also acts as a precursor to other kinds of knowledge. 
474 CD documentation of the performance Namesake: The Story of a Name can be found in 
Appendix 4. 
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What this methodology allows (or perhaps forces) is for a range and diversity of primary 
sources which otherwise would not have been engaged by the study. This approach has 
been pursued at the expense of any in-depth investigation into a single work, artist, author 
or archive but provides a potential framework for the autobiographical performance. 
Perhaps after all the predominant concern of this study is its investigations into the 
methodological possibilities of performance practice, and secondarily its testing of the 
boundaries of autobiography. The terms in which the autobiographical performance were 
first determined in this study- as the performance of the autobiographical act - need now 
to be rethought as including the autobiographical imperative of performance. This leads to 
a new area of investigation which lies ahead of this study, the motivational force of 
creativity, and the question: why do artists create? 
The range of autobiographical practices explored in this study leave the genre of 
autobiography displaced. Lejeune's definition (as with all definitions) has been relatively 
easy to deconstruct. But the efficacy of Lejeune's proposition of the autobiographical 
contract lies not only in its usefulness as a method for classification of texts themselves 
and our understanding of them, but rather precisely as a provocation to both the writer 
and the reader to determine texts which sit uncomfortably, or even outside, its boundaries. 
Labels and definitions offer both stability and a point of reaction. 
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Appendix 1 
Associated Research Outcomes 
Disinter/est: Digging Up Our Childhood 
Performance: Mill Lane Lecture Rooms, Cambridge University, 24 March 2001 
Installation: Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, Downing Street, 
Cambridge, 17 March - 5 May 2001 
Conference Paper: Texts of Testimony: Autobiography, Life-Story Narratives and the 
Public Sphere, Centre for Literature and Cultural History, Liverpool 
John Moores University, 23- 25 August 2001 
Conference Paper: Biographies and Space: Placing the Subject in Art and Architecture, 
Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art, London, 28 March 
2003 
Public Lecture: 
Refereed Article: 
Namesake 
Turku Academy, Turku, Finland, 17 December 2001 
'Disinter/est: Digging Up Our Childhood' Performance Research 7.1 
'On Editing' (2002) 45-56 
Performance: The Jewish Museum, London, 13 May 2004 
Performance: Home, London, 14 May 2004. 
Performance: The Swiss Church, London, 15 May 2004 
Conference Paper: Writing in the Context of Fine Art, Tate Britain, 15 November 2003 
The Crystal Ball 
Performance: The ICA (Institute of Contemporary Arts) London 29- 30 June 2002 
Conference Paper: Caught in the Act: Performance Art and Representation, Tate 
Liverpool, 29 November 2003 
Seminar Paper: 
Refereed Article: 
Partly Writing 3: Expanded Literacies and Writing Arts, Centre for 
Cultural Poetics, University of Southampton, 28 - 29 February 2004 
'The Crystal Ball' Performance Research 9.2 'On the Page' (2004) 
118-131 
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The Crystal Ball is an event that forecasts the lives of the audience that 
attend. Presented as a sequence of one-to-one interactions, participants will 
have their destiny revealed through professional consu~ations. 
Experts set up stall to predict the Mure YOU in a series of snapshots compiled 
on site and presented to each participant before they leave as This Is Your Ufe 
To Come. A troupe of sequinned ballroom dancers greet each guest and shadow 
their journey from one prediction booth to the next Working as a spectacle 
for onlookers and a fortune telling for participants, The Crystal Ball puts your ~ 
Mure in the picture. All consu~ations will be given in strict confidence. ~ 
it's Robert Wilson meets Mystic Meg. ~·s Pina Bausch at a Spiritualist Meeting. ~ 
it's Miss High Leg Kick and Nostradamus at a Careers Fair . . . lt's The Future. o. 
Starring: Psychic Ufe Scientist Julia Laveme, Optometrist Rod Oale, Career 
Psychologist Julie Unite, Face Readers Maura Bright and Teresa Oane, 
Independent Financial Advisor Alan OickinsorHJuelch, Illustrator Robin Whitmore, 
with Dancers Miss High Leg Kick, Abigail Oavies, Pot~ Wi~ire, Keiko Akamatsu, 
Helen Plewis, Vahirie Renay, Sheila Ghelani, Choreographed by Maxine Ooyle. 
Saturday 29 & Sunday 30 June · I CA · The Mall · London SWI 
ConsultatiOns are pnced at £10/£9 /£8 each and last 90 mms. 
Bookings taken for sess10ns at 2pm, 4pm, 6pm and Bpm 
lii Advance reservations: ICA box office on 020 7930 3647. 
Non participatory v1ewmg FREE w1th ICA day membership. 
~:-­
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Disinterest 
Digging Up Our Childhood 
ArtiSt Joshua Sofaer 
Archaeologist Joanna Sofaer Derevenski 
On the I st August 1972 Joshua Sofa er was born in Mill Road Maternity 
Hospital in Cambridge. His elder sister Joanna was about to have her second 
birthday. By September 1973 the family had left for Edinburgh. 
In this research project Disinter/est, brother and sister met in Cambridge to 
explore the city, the places of their childhood, the places they were before 
they can remember. and have used the practices of archaeology to see if it is 
possible to understand the forgotten past. 
"Those years of my earliest childhood are no longer a part of myself: they are 
external to me; I can learn nothing of them save - as we learn things that 
happened before we were born - from the accounts given me by other peo ple." 
Marcel Prous~ In Search of Lost Time, Volume 3 
Autobiography necessitates an experiential narrative, one that is predicated 
on introspection. The prevalence of psychoanalytic models for the 
understanding of infancy have resulted in a generic conception of the 
'autobiography' of early childhood in terms of psychoanalytic tropes. As 
infancy precedes established long term memory, we can not access our own 
history with the same kinds of hindsight formulation that we would our later 
childhood, adolescence or young adult life. This mysterious era that is both 
of ourselves and of other lends itself to a rethinking of the relationship 
between self and autobiography. In tracing the 'auto ' of infancy we necessarily 
have to negotiate an understanding that runs counter to traditions. 
Archaeologists are interested in investigating the material world and using it 
to explore the past. This project challenges us to consider how different 
people view the objects that surround them in different ways, both at a 
single point in time and as changing individuals over time, in a setting that is 
on one hand familiar, yet on the other, incredibly distant. From an 
archaeological perspective, the infant child (ourselves) that we have been 
using as the subject of our case study belongs to a period of life analogous 
to prehistory. lt is a time about which we remember nothing. lt is an 
investigation of the self as other - a metaphor for archaeology as a whole. 
During the research, the boundaries of archaeological method were 
inevitably challenged, or at least had to confront and engage with the 
d isciplines of social anthropology. oral history and psychology. There was also 
a necessary negotiation of the pleasures and problems of working with 
family as both eo-researcher and research subject. The process has been 
incredibly provocative, not only pushing the traditional boundaries of subject 
specialisms, but bringing together a sister and a brother in a social and 
working relationship they would otherwise never have encountered. 
For more mformat1on please concact: 10shua.sofaer@gmx.net 020 7820 9147 
Performative Lecture 
discussing the outcomes of our research 
Saturday 24th March 200 I, 7.00 p.m. 
Mill Lane Lecture Theatre I, 
Mill Lane, Cambridge. 
Entrance is FREE 
Display of 'Seven Research Tools' 
Saturday 17th March to Saturday 5th May 200 
Museum of Archaeology & Anthropology 
Downing Street, Cambridge. 
Tuesday - Saturday 2.00 - 4.30 p.m. 
Entrance is FREE 
east g a arts 
Image on obverse: Research Tool 2 - 'Aerial Evidence' 
Cambndge University Collection of Air Photographs: Copyright Reserv< 



Appendix 3 
Appendix 4 
CD Documentation 
lihe following enclosure is an audio CD·documentation ofthe performance 
Namesake: The Story ofa Name 
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